Language acquisition in the absence of explicit negative evidence: can simple recurrent networks obviate the need for domain-specific learning devices?

Cognition ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary F Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Recurrent Networks ◽  
Negative Evidence ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Simple Recurrent Networks ◽  
Specific Learning

Something old, something new

2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 934-935 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY F. MARCUS
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Negative Evidence ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Domain Specific

MacWhinney's list of proposed mechanisms for language acquisition seems so all-encompassing that it might appear churlish to dwell on a mechanism that's left out, but on his ultimate list of critical mechanisms there is an indeed an important (and intended) omission: innate, linguistically-specialized constraints. Such constraints are indeed mentioned, but if I understand the point of the article correctly, it is to argue that seven cognitive mechanisms, ranging from competition to cue construction, indirect negative evidence and monitoring, collectively obviate the need for any innate machinery that it specialized for language. Why not include room for innate, domain-specific constraints, too?

Language acquisition recapitulates language evolution?

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 532-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teresa Satterfield
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Language Evolution ◽  
General Purpose ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
L1 Acquisition ◽  
Specific Learning

AbstractChristiansen & Chater (C&C) focus solely on general-purpose cognitive processes in their elegant conceptualization of language evolution. However, numerous developmental facts attested in L1 acquisition confound C&C's subsequent claim that the logical problem of language acquisition now plausibly recapitulates that of language evolution. I argue that language acquisition should be viewed instead as a multi-layered construction involving the interplay of general and domain-specific learning mechanisms.

Learning Nonregular Languages: A Comparison of Simple Recurrent Networks and LSTM

2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (9) ◽  
pp. 2039-2041 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Schmidhuber ◽  
F. Gers ◽  
D. Eck
Keyword(s):  
Recent Article ◽  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Recurrent Networks ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Simple Recurrent Networks ◽  
Long Short Term Memory ◽  
Context Free

In response to Rodriguez's recent article (2001), we compare the performance of simple recurrent nets and long short-term memory recurrent nets on context-free and context-sensitive languages.

Universals, innateness and explanation in second language acquisition

2004 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 682-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Eckman
Keyword(s):  
Second Language ◽  
Second Language Acquisition ◽  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Universal Grammar ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Language Typology ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Typological Approach

This paper considers the question of explanation in second language acquisition within the context of two approaches to universals, Universal Grammar and language typology. After briefly discussing the logic of explaining facts by including them under general laws (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948), the paper makes a case for the typological approach to explanation being the more fruitful, in that it allows more readily for the possibility of ‘explanatory ascent’, the ability to propose more general, higher order explanations by having lower-level generalizations follow from more general principles. The UG approach, on the other hand is less capable of such explanatory ascent because of the postulation that the innate, domain-specific principles of UG are not reducible in any interesting way to higher order principles of cognition (Chomsky 1982).

Changing minds about climate change: a pervasive role for domain-general metacognition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manos Tsakiris ◽  
Neza Vehar ◽  
Stephen M Fleming ◽  
Sophie De Beukelaer ◽  
Max Rollwage
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Science ◽  
Social Effects ◽  
Negative Evidence ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
The Face ◽  
Metacognitive Abilities ◽  
Insight Into

Updating one’s beliefs about the causes and effects of climate change is crucial for altering attitudes and behaviours. Importantly, metacognitive abilities - insight into the (in)correctness of one’s beliefs- play a key role in the formation of polarized beliefs. We investigated the role of domain-general and domain-specific metacognition in updating prior beliefs about climate change across the spectrum of climate change scepticism. We also considered the role of how climate science is communicated in the form of textual or visuo-textual presentations. We show that climate change scepticism is associated with differences in domain-general as well as domain-specific metacognitive abilities. Moreover, domain-general metacognitive sensitivity influenced belief updating in an asymmetric way : lower domain-general metacognition decreased the updating of prior beliefs, especially in the face of negative evidence. Our findings highlight the role of metacognitive failures in revising erroneous beliefs about climate change and point to their adverse social effects.

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