Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague—the failure of global climate negotiations

2003 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 182
Energy Policy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (13) ◽  
pp. 1191-1199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urs Steiner Brandt ◽  
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOSEF BHATTI ◽  
KASPER LINDSKOW ◽  
LENE HOLM PEDERSEN

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solveig Aamodt

With the 2015 Paris Agreement, global climate governance increasingly depends on domestic climate policy ambitions, also in large developing countries such as Brazil and India, which are prominent representatives for developing countries in the international climate negotiations. Although the environmental policy literature expects ministries of environment to be important drivers of domestic climate policy, studies find that the climate policy ambitions of the Brazilian and Indian environmental ministries differ considerably. With a long-term analytical approach building on historical institutionalism, this article analyses and compares the climate policy roles of the Brazilian and Indian ministries of environment. The comparative analysis finds that three factors in particular influence the environmental ministries' climate policy ambitions: first, the historical view of environmental policy as a domestic or an international issue; second, the ministry's formal role in international climate negotiations; and third, the subsequent development of institutional climate logics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Federica Genovese

Abstract International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.


2011 ◽  
Vol 189-193 ◽  
pp. 1757-1760
Author(s):  
Chien Hsiung Tsai ◽  
Yao Nan Wang ◽  
Chang Hsien Tai ◽  
Jr Ming Miao ◽  
Jik Chang Leong

This work employs FDS to simulate the heating process of a tunnel-type dryer and visualizes the computational results using Smokeview. The inappropriate design of a tunnel-type dryer in a factory has motivated this work. This poorly designed dryer not only has caused terrible fuel consumption but also produced parts some of which are under- or over-cooked. These are caused by the terribly uneven temperature distribution within the dryer. In order to improve the evenness of temperature distribution, this work simulates and investigates the effects of various ventilation schemes. Based on the results, it is found that the hot air intake vent should be placed at the bottom whereas the cold air outtake vent at the top. The flow rate through the intake vents does not have a very significant effect on the temperature distribution after 40 s.


Subject France's new government. Significance President Francois Hollande has kept Prime Minister Manuel Valls and Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron while letting Green party members back into government. The change appears more a matter of electoral politics than substance: it tries to cement a coalition on the left to help Hollande pass the first round of the 2017 presidential election without altering the government's economic or political orientation. Such a tactical manoeuvre is neither likely to allow France to exit its current predicament nor Hollande to recover from his deep unpopularity. Impacts With this reshuffle, Hollande may have consolidated his majority enough for it to hold until the presidential election of April-May 2017. It will certainly guarantee that he will be the only candidate from the executive -- neither Valls nor Macron will stand against him. By sticking with a 'social-liberal' line, Hollande is fostering alternative candidates, both within and without the Socialist Party. Fabius's departure is likely to muffle even more France's voice on the European and international scene, and in global climate negotiations.


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