Burden-sharing and global climate negotiations: the case of the Kyoto Protocol

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOSEF BHATTI ◽  
KASPER LINDSKOW ◽  
LENE HOLM PEDERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Kyoto Protocol ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Climate Negotiations

scholarly journals The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or High Stakes Experiment?

Climate Law ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meinhard Doelle
Keyword(s):  
Kyoto Protocol ◽  
Paris Agreement ◽  
Climate Regime ◽  
Top Down ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Flexible Approach ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Loss And Damage ◽  
Self Differentiation

This article offers an overview of the two key outcomes of the 2015 Paris climate negotiations, the Paris cop decision, and the Paris Agreement. Collectively, they chart a new course for the un climate regime that started in earnest in Copenhagen in 2009. The Paris Agreement represents a path away from the top-down approach and rigid differentiation among parties reflected in the Kyoto Protocol, toward a bottom-up and flexible approach focused on collective long-term goals and principles. It represents an approach to reaching these long-term goals that is focused on self-differentiation, support, transparency, and review. The article highlights the key elements of the agreement reached in Paris, including its approach to mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, transparency, and compliance.

scholarly journals The risk of carbon leakage in global climate agreements

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Nielsen ◽  
Nicolai Baumert ◽  
Astrid Kander ◽  
Magnus Jiborn ◽  
Viktoras Kulionis
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Kyoto Protocol ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Carbon Leakage ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Climate Action ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Nationally Determined Contributions

Abstract Although climate change and international trade are interdependent, policy-makers often address the two topics separately. This may inhibit progress at the intersection of climate change and trade and could present a serious constraint for global climate action. One key risk is carbon leakage through emission outsourcing, i.e. reductions in emissions in countries with rigorous climate policies being offset by increased emissions in countries with less stringent policies. We first analyze the Paris Agreement’s nationally determined contributions (NDC) and investigate how carbon leakage is addressed. We find that the risk of carbon leakage is insufficiently accounted for in these documents. Then, we apply a novel quantitative approach (Jiborn et al., 2018; Baumert et al., 2019) to analyze trends in carbon outsourcing related to a previous international climate regime—the Kyoto Protocol—in order to assess whether reported emission reductions were offset by carbon outsourcing in the past. Our results for 2000–2014 show a more nuanced picture of carbon leakage during the Kyoto Protocol than previous studies have reported. Carbon outsourcing from developed to developing countries was dominated by the USA outsourcing to China, while the evidence for other developed countries was mixed. Against conventional wisdom, we find that, in general, countries that stayed committed to their Kyoto Protocol emission targets were either only minor carbon outsourcers or actually even insourcers—although the trend was slightly negative—indicating that binding emissions targets do not necessarily lead to carbon outsourcing. We argue that multiple carbon monitoring approaches are needed to reduce the risk of carbon leakage.

Environmental Ministries as Climate Policy Drivers: Comparing Brazil and India

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solveig Aamodt
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Subsequent Development ◽  
Institutional Climate ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Historical View ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

With the 2015 Paris Agreement, global climate governance increasingly depends on domestic climate policy ambitions, also in large developing countries such as Brazil and India, which are prominent representatives for developing countries in the international climate negotiations. Although the environmental policy literature expects ministries of environment to be important drivers of domestic climate policy, studies find that the climate policy ambitions of the Brazilian and Indian environmental ministries differ considerably. With a long-term analytical approach building on historical institutionalism, this article analyses and compares the climate policy roles of the Brazilian and Indian ministries of environment. The comparative analysis finds that three factors in particular influence the environmental ministries' climate policy ambitions: first, the historical view of environmental policy as a domestic or an international issue; second, the ministry's formal role in international climate negotiations; and third, the subsequent development of institutional climate logics.

scholarly journals Market responses to global governance: International climate cooperation and Europe's carbon trading

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Federica Genovese
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Environmental Cooperation ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

Abstract International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.

scholarly journals Overcoming Inaction through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 1079-1100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Wijen ◽  
Shahzad Ansari
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Kyoto Protocol ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Regime Theory ◽  
Institutional Entrepreneurship ◽  
Institutional Entrepreneurs

Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors with divergent interests. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and regime theories to identify drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship and develop an analytical framework. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to illustrate how collective inaction was overcome to realize a global regulatory institution, the Kyoto Protocol.

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