Accessing Other Minds: The Role of Temporo-Parietal Junction and its Dysfunction in Autism

NeuroImage ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. S68
Author(s):  
R.K. Kana ◽  
E.R. Blum ◽  
C.C. Klein ◽  
L.G. Klinger ◽  
M.R. Klinger
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds

Einfühlen und Verstehen

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-243
Author(s):  
Verena Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Many

How do we understand other minds? The current debate uses the iridescent term “empathy” to explain our quite different mindreading capacities. Since no alternatives seemed to be available the discussion has been mostly in a deadlock between “simulation theory” and “theory theory”. Only recently the relevance of phenomenological findings on the issue has been brought forward. In this paper Husserl’s two concepts of “Einfühlung”, as developed in the second volume of his Ideas, are set against the background of the latest discussion. Husserl’s explanation of empathy in terms of analogical experience highlights the transcendental role of empathy in the context of constitution. At the same time it may solve some of the many riddles left by the recent debate.

Criteria

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Other Minds ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Language Functions ◽  
Central Notion

The concept of criteria has been interpreted as the central notion in the later Wittgenstein’s account of how language functions, in contrast to the realist semantics of the Tractatus. According to this later account, a concept possesses a sense in so far as there are conditions that constitute non-inductive evidence for its application in a particular case. This condition on a concept’s possessing a sense has been thought to enable Wittgenstein to refute both solipsism and scepticism about other minds. There are powerful objections to this conception of criteria, which have led some philosophers to look for an alternative account of the role of criteria in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

scholarly journals RADICAL ENACTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (141) ◽  
pp. 723-743
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla
Keyword(s):  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Radical Enactivism ◽  
Perceptual Model ◽  
Self Knowledge

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds.

Importance of the “thinking through other minds” process explored through motor correlates of motivated social interactions

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Mouras
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Information Processes

Abstract We wanted to gather recent results supporting the idea of the central role of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational information processing. Here, we want to support the idea that this process is quite arbitrary, early in the temporal chain of processes and not only influence the psychological, but also the motor correlates of socioaffective information processes.

Die ethische Bedeutung des Skeptizismus

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Stricker
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Ethical Dimension ◽  
Stanley Cavell ◽  
Theoretical Relationship ◽  
The World ◽  
Respective Treatment ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

The paper undertakes a comparison of the philosophies of Stanley Cavell and Emmanuel L_vinas, focusing on their interpretation of skepticism and the crucial role of the problem of the other or other minds in the works of both. The comparison proceeds in three major steps: first, differences in their respective interpretations of Descartes’ stance on the problem of other minds are discussed. In the second section, Cavell’s examination of the intelligibility of someone else’s pain and L_vinas’ questioning of the sense of suffering are juxtaposed. Finally, the author analyzes their respective treatment of skepticism. This results in the opening of an ethical dimension which grounds the dominating theoretical relationship towards the world and the other human being in epistemology and ontology. The periodical return and irrefutability of skepticism can thus be regarded not only as evidence of the inevitable limitation of knowledge, but as a consequence of the necessarily social or intersubjective structure of subjectivity itself.

The role of eye-gaze in understanding other minds

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Pellicano ◽  
Gillian Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Eye Gaze ◽  
Other Minds

Thinking through others’ emotions: Incorporating the role of emotional state inference in thinking through other minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Smith ◽  
Richard D. Lane
Keyword(s):  
Emotional State ◽  
Emotional Responses ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Active Inference ◽  
Cultural Cognition ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Sociocultural Practices ◽  
Affective Dynamics ◽  
State Inference

Abstract The active inference framework offers an attractive starting point for understanding cultural cognition. Here, we argue that affective dynamics are essential to include when constructing this type of theory. We highlight ways in which interactions between emotional responses and the perception of those responses, both within and between individuals, can play central roles in both motivating and constraining sociocultural practices.

Making the Best of Austin’s Goldfinch

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Martin Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Attribution ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
External Criterion ◽  
Fundamental Point ◽  
Knowledge Claims

This paper discusses Austin’s goldfinch example from “Other Minds,” which plays a central role in Kaplan’s Austin’s Way with Skepticism. The paper aims to clarify the obscure distinction Austin makes in connection with this example, between cases in which we know and can prove and cases in which we know but can’t prove. By discussing a couple of remarks that Austin makes in passing, a view is extracted from his text that stands in conflict with Kaplan’s reading at a fundamental point. The view proposed emphasizes the role of law-like generics in our practice of knowledge attribution, and brings out the disjunctivist elements in Austin’s conception. It is argued that the response to skepticism that Kaplan ascribes to Austin is not fully satisfactory, since it fails to tell us what makes some challenges to our knowledge claims appropriate and others outrageous. The alternative view proposed in this paper can handle this problem without postulating the sort of general external criterion that Kaplan’s Austin rightly rejects.

Role of dactinomycin in the improved survival of children with Wilms' tumor

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  
Wilms Tumor
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