The Supreme Court and New Deal Economics

2022 ◽  
pp. 941-985

Significance The move is the latest in a series of environmental regulation rollbacks by Trump’s administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under its head, Andrew Wheeler. Impacts The Supreme Court could decide to weaken the Chevron doctrine that sees courts defer to agencies over legal ambiguities. The Republicans will try to undermine the Democrats’ Green New Deal proposals as expensive and unworkable. Republicans will likely go into the 2020 elections proposing more modest environmental ideas.


1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The 1936 term of the Supreme Court will probably be rated a notable one. This is due both to the Court's own work, and to certain extraneous occurrences which could hardly fail to have some impact upon it. In any attempt to evaluate the work of this term, one should bear in mind the following facts: First, a month after the Court convened President Roosevelt was reëlected by one of the most impressive popular and electoral majorities in our political history. Second, in February the President submitted to Congress his proposal for the reorganization of the Supreme Court, including the enlargement of its membership by the addition, up to fifteen, of a new justice for every one remaining on the Court beyond the age of seventy. This proposal aroused violent opposition, the debates on it continued for many months, and ultimately the plan was defeated largely through the efforts of the President's own party. The discussions on this proposal were going on during much of the time in which the Court was sitting. Third, in every case in which New Deal laws were attacked, they were held valid. These results were accomplished in many instances by five-to-four margins, and in the Minimum Wage Case by a five-to-four reversal of a previous five-to-three decision.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Dave Bridge

<p>If the Supreme Court rules against the wishes of the majority, how can that majority respond?  I argue that while federal judges will never stand for election, majorities can employ various response mechanisms to counter-majoritarian decisions.  I draw out observable expectations for inter-branch, local, and electoral responses.  I then test these expectations in cases from the “mature” New Deal—communism, school prayer, busing, and abortion—showing the range of effective results achieved by anti-Court majorities.  Given these results, I conclude that there is no “accountability problem”; there is just a narrow definition of accountability.</p>


Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This chapter examines the revival of the presumption of constitutionality and its almost immediate qualification in the form of Footnote Four, which it argues is inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment. The era in which the Supreme Court attempted to scrutinize the necessity and propriety of state and federal restrictions on liberty came to a close as the perceived legitimacy of legislative activism continued to grow. The doctrinal vehicle used by the New Deal Court to overturn the Progressive Era precedents was the adoption of a presumption of constitutionality. The chapter first provides an overview of Footnote Four before discussing the Ninth Amendment, which mandates that unenumerated rights be treated the same as those that are listed. It shows that Footnote Four runs afoul of the text of the Constitution, and more specifically the Ninth Amendment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (01) ◽  
pp. 100-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Bridge ◽  
Curt Nichols

Reexamination and reinterpretation of the “mature” (1955–1984) New Deal era of congressional attacks on the Supreme Court reveals a new hypothesis: that Court‐curbing efforts played a previously unrecognized role in party system development. Court rulings that create inter‐ and intraparty tension provide opportunities for various actors to attack the Court in an effort to solidify their faction's standing within national coalitional politics. Congressional attackers can use Court‐curbing resolutions and amendments in efforts to help them maintain coalitional cohesion, build a new majority, or consolidate previous victories. Thus, we might see legislative‐judicial relations as an unrecognized “site” of political development, where coalitional change is opposed and wrought.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-43
Author(s):  
Dave Bridge

If the Supreme Court rules against the wishes of the majority, how can that majority respond?  I argue that while federal judges will never stand for election, majorities can employ various response mechanisms to counter-majoritarian decisions.  I draw out observable expectations for inter-branch, local, and electoral responses.  I then test these expectations in cases from the “mature” New Deal—communism, school prayer, busing, and abortion—showing the range of effective results achieved by anti-Court majorities.  Given these results, I conclude that there is no “accountability problem”; there is just a narrow definition of accountability.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field

The paragraphs that follow answer the same questions with respect to unconstitutional legislation by Congress that were answered with respect to unconstitutional legislation in the ten states (Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Illinois, Indiana, and New York) included in my study published in 1943 under the title, Unconstitutional Legislation in Ten Selected States. The congressional statutes and the decisions of the Supreme Court analyzed herein are based upon the list found in Professor Charles Grove Haines, The Doctrine of American Judicial Supremacy. The reason why this list was chosen as the basis for analysis was that it covers approximately the same period, namely, from the beginnings to the early thirties, not including the period of the New Deal which formally began in 1933. This does not mean that there is no point in analyzing the later statutes and decisions, but that for purposes of comparison it was thought safer to restrict this analysis to the same general period for both state and national materials. The three cases under No. 1 in the Haines list have been omitted because no decrees based on invalidity followed their decision.


1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-368
Author(s):  
John B. Taylor

American political history is often conceived as a series of stable eras, controlled by dominant party coalitions and demarcated by realigning elections, most often identified as those of 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. Since there is a lag in the corresponding reconstitution of the Supreme Court, it is often deemed a countermajoritarian drag on the workings of electoral democracy. An examination of judicial review in relation to political eras shows that view to be correct only in the New Deal era. Judicial review most commonly occurs within eras rather than across them, with a Court reconstituted by the prevailing coalition negating legislation passed by that coalition. This reality significantly alters the normative question of the Court's role in a democracy, and it raises questions about the concept of stable eras. The current trend of political party dealignment calls into question the continuing validity of the critical-elections approach.


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