scholarly journals The Contractual Principle of Good Faith and the Duty of Honesty in Bhasin v. Hrynew

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon O'Byrne ◽  
Ronnie Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Contracting Out ◽  
Commercial Code ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Common

This article explores the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2014 decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew. This includes an assessment of the new duty of honesty in contractual performance and the newly identified organizing principle of good faith. The authors also discuss contracting out of the duty of honesty — which Bhasin itself raises as a possibility — by assessing both Canadian and American law on point, including the Uniform Commercial Code. The article concludes that Bhasin’s largest and most lasting contribution is likely in how it expressly legitimates and defends the role of good faith in the common law of contract.

scholarly journals The Principle of Good Faith in Contractual Performance: A Scottish-Canadian Comparison

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-331
Author(s):  
Hector MacQueen ◽  
Shannon O'Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common

In 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew formally but cautiously acknowledged good faith as a general organising principle of contractual performance at common law and that the principle largely manifests by way of implied terms and through the new duty of honesty. Rejecting English recalcitrance on the subject, the SCC concluded that recognising a good faith principle makes the common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and just. The article suggests that the limitations placed on the good faith principle by the SCC make its potential adoption in Scotland offer more opportunity than risk, especially in relation to the exercise of contractual discretions and contractual remedies.

MINGLING THE WATERS

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Polden
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Formative Years

Views about the nature and extent of the “fusion” effected by the Judicature Acts frequently focus narrowly on those cases which determined the doctrinal position, with insufficient regard for the accompanying changes to practice, procedure and structures.This article examines the means by which the promoters of the legislation and other interested parties sought to promote or restrain its formidable fusionist potential. It explores the use of cross-jurisdictional appointments to infuse equity into the common law divisions; the successive changes to the membership and working arrangements of the court of appeal; and the short-lived experiment of sending Chancery and appellate judges on circuit. It suggests that a more detailed examination of the effect of these structures and the role of individual judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature in its formative years is needed for a full understanding of the limited fusion that emerged.

Democratic Law and the Erosion of Common Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Seana Valentine Shiffrin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Narrow Focus ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Democratic Character ◽  
The Common ◽  
Customary Practices

This chapter explores the democratic character of the common law by examining the implied contractual duty of good faith and its dismissive treatment by the US Supreme Court in Northwest v. Ginsberg, a 2014 preemption decision. The decision was mistaken because it failed to recognize law’s morally indispensable role of publicly articulating and interpreting our shared moral commitments, treating law instead as a mere means of resolving disputes. The chapter also celebrates the democratic character of common law, which, although articulated by judges, responds to reasons and problems emerging from the citizenry and attends to moral expectations embodied in customary practices. The chapter underscores the importance of common law (and the doctrine of good faith) in publicly articulating reasons and drawing on the underlying values that law serves, democratic functions that are lost when litigation is replaced by private arbitration and overlooked by a narrow focus on elections.

Knowing Habeas Corpus When You See It

2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Enemy Combatant

Viewing habeas corpus through a legal lens frequently misleads. The common law “rule” against controverting the return to writs of habeas corpus was commonly evaded through devices permitting judicial examination of the underlying facts and law. In many cases concluding “writ denied,” the prisoner in fact obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” Failure to understand this explains why the Fourth Circuit performed so badly in rejecting the challenge of Yaser Hamdi to his detention as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court very properly reversed that decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), resulting in the prisoner’s speedy release when the government was confronted with having to actually prove in court the claims it had made on paper.

Remedies for equitable wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
Court Of Chancery

Torts and breach of contract are termed common law wrongs because they were historically developed in the common law courts. Equitable wrongs are civil wrongs that historically were developed in the Court of Chancery. Despite the fusion of the common law courts and the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–1875, much of the substantive law has not been fused. One example is the continued distinction between common law and equitable wrongs. In a rational fused system, nothing should turn on whether a civil wrong is common law or equitable. But that is not the present law.

11. Illegality

2020 ◽  
pp. 405-434
Author(s):  
Jack Beatson ◽  
Andrew Burrows ◽  
John Cartwright
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Restraint Of Trade

This chapter considers what counts as illegality and the effect of illegality on a contract (and consequent restitution). The approach of the Courts to illegality has been transformed for the better, and simplified, by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza in 2016. Illegal conduct, tainting a contract, can vary widely from serious crimes (eg murder) to relatively minor crimes (eg breach of licensing requirements) through to civil wrongs and to conduct that does not comprise a wrong but is contrary to public policy. As regards the effect of illegality, where a statute does not deal with this, the common law approach is now to apply a range of factors. A final section of the chapter examines contracts in restraint of trade.

A Curious Decision by Zambia’s Highest Court: Six Years Imprisonment for Civil Contempt?

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-138
Author(s):  
Christopher Phiri
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Abstract On 23 November 2018, the Supreme Court of Zambia delivered a judgement which suggests that Zambian judges have virtually unbridled power to move on their own motion to punish for contempt of court anyone who criticises their judicial decisions. This article considers that judgement. It argues that whilst justice might well have been done in the case in question, it was certainly not seen to be done. Two main reasons are given for this argument. First, the judges appeared to have acted both as prosecutors and adjudicators in their own cause when it was neither urgent nor imperative to act immediately on their own motion. Second, the classification by the Court of the contempt in question as civil contempt rather than criminal contempt is alien to the common law world. The article culminates in a clarion call for the Zambian legislature to intervene and clarify the law of contempt of court to avert capricious and unbridled invocation of the judicial power to punish for contempt.

Common Law Confrontations

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (03) ◽  
pp. 763-786
Author(s):  
Bernadette Meyler
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
New Jersey ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
Late Eighteenth Century ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Late Eighteenth ◽  
The Common

This symposium essay contends that the image of the common law drawn by the Supreme Court in the Confrontation Clause context is both distorted and incomplete. In particular, the Court and scholars defending originalist positions rely almost entirely on English sources in their reconstruction of the common law basis for the Confrontation Clause, thereby neglecting the diversity of American common laws from the time of the Founding, a diversity that has already been unearthed by a number of legal historians. By drawing on hitherto untapped sources to furnish a bottom-up reconstruction of how testimony was treated in local criminal courts within mid- to late-eighteenth-century New Jersey, this essay demonstrates that, in at least some jurisdictions, the originalist vision of common law did not apply. The common law cannot, therefore, furnish a univocal answer to questions about the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.

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