Visual Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 225-243
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 2-2 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Salomon ◽  
M. Lim ◽  
B. Herbelin ◽  
G. Hesselmann ◽  
O. Blanke

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Binn Zhang ◽  
Xiaoxu Meng ◽  
Yanglan Yu ◽  
Yaogang Han ◽  
Ying LIU

Abstract Background the effect of acute exercise on cognition covers almost all stages of information processing, but few studies have focused on visual awareness. Subjective reports on the appearance of faint speed-changes in the perception of stimuli were used as an index for visual consciousness. Visual consciousness was assessed after exercise or rest. Aside from subjective index, objective speed-change discrimination was added as an index for the level of consciousness. Results: the results showed that subjective reports on the appearance of faint speed-changes in the perception of stimuli were affected by acute aerobic exercise. The hit rate for speed-change detection was marginally significantly higher after exercise than sedentary condition. Furthermore, the d’ index was higher after exercise. Analysis of the results obtained for the objective discrimination task showed that discrimination speed was boosted only when subjects were aware of the speed-change. Conclusions: these results suggest that acute exercise enhances visual consciousness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor A. F. Lamme

Significant progress has been made in the study of consciousness. Promising theories have been developed and a wealth of experimental data has been generated, both guiding us towards a better understanding of this complex phenomenon. However, new challenges have surfaced. Is visual consciousness about the seeing or the knowing that you see? Controversy about whether the conscious experience is better explained by theories that focus on phenomenal (P-consciousness) or cognitive aspects (A-consciousness) remains, and the debate seems to reach a stalemate. Can we ever resolve this? A further challenge is that many theories of consciousness seem to endorse high degrees of panpsychism—the notion that all beings or even lifeless objects have conscious experience. Should we accept this, or does it imply that these theories require further ingredients that would put a lower bound on beings or devices that have conscious experience? If so, what could these ‘missing ingredients’ be? These challenges are discussed, and potential solutions are offered. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.


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