Inhibition of Return (IOR): Is it Consciousness of an Object without Attention or Attention without an Object and Consciousness?

The crux of the dispute on the mutual relations between attention and consciousness, and to which I have referred in this paper, lies in the question of what can be attended in spatial attention that obviously resonates with the phenomenological issue of intentionality (e.g., the noesis-noema structure). The discussion has been initiated by Christopher Mole. He began by calling for a commonsense psychology, according to which one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. In other words, attention is supposed to be a condition which is sufficient but not necessary for consciousness, i.e., consciousness is a necessary concomitant of attention, but attention is not a necessary concomitant of consciousness. Mole seeks to validate his stance with data from psychology labs. His view is, however, partly confronted, for instance, by Robert Kentridge, Lee de-Wit and Charles Heywood, who used their experimental research on a neurological condition called blindsight as evidence of a dissociation between attention and consciousness, i.e., that visual attention is not a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. In this meta-theoretical state of affairs, I would like to focus on the cognitive phenomenon most often referred to as Inhibition of Return (IOR) and suggest that, following its micro dynamics from the perspective of micro-phenomenology, it can be used to actually showcase all of the options on both sides of the argument. One of my leading goals would be also to follow Mole’s attempt to link attention with agency but where we differ is that I wish to heuristically articulate the matter in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of embodied pre-reflective intentionality.

Awareness and Integration: Understanding the Challenges of Inferring Multisensory Integration Outside of Awareness

<p>Multisensory integration describes the cognitive processes by which information from various perceptual domains is combined to create coherent percepts. For consciously aware perception, multisensory integration can be inferred when information in one perceptual domain influences subjective experience in another. Yet the relationship between integration and awareness is not well understood. One current question is whether multisensory integration can occur in the absence of perceptual awareness. Because there is subjective experience for unconscious perception, researchers have had to develop novel tasks to infer integration indirectly. For instance, Palmer and Ramsey (2012) presented auditory recordings of spoken syllables alongside videos of faces speaking either the same or different syllables, while masking the videos to prevent visual awareness. The conjunction of matching voices and faces predicted the location of a subsequent Gabor grating (target) on each trial. Participants indicated the location/orientation of the target more accurately when it appeared in the cued location (80% chance), thus the authors inferred that auditory and visual speech events were integrated in the absence of visual awareness. In this thesis, I investigated whether these findings generalise to the integration of auditory and visual expressions of emotion. In Experiment 1, I presented spatially informative cues in which congruent facial and vocal emotional expressions predicted the target location, with and without visual masking. I found no evidence of spatial cueing in either awareness condition. To investigate the lack of spatial cueing, in Experiment 2, I repeated the task with aware participants only, and had half of those participants explicitly report the emotional prosody. A significant spatial-cueing effect was found only when participants reported emotional prosody, suggesting that audiovisual congruence can cue spatial attention during aware perception. It remains unclear whether audiovisual congruence can cue spatial attention without awareness, and whether such effects genuinely imply multisensory integration.</p>

Awareness and Integration: Understanding the Challenges of Inferring Multisensory Integration Outside of Awareness

<p>Multisensory integration describes the cognitive processes by which information from various perceptual domains is combined to create coherent percepts. For consciously aware perception, multisensory integration can be inferred when information in one perceptual domain influences subjective experience in another. Yet the relationship between integration and awareness is not well understood. One current question is whether multisensory integration can occur in the absence of perceptual awareness. Because there is subjective experience for unconscious perception, researchers have had to develop novel tasks to infer integration indirectly. For instance, Palmer and Ramsey (2012) presented auditory recordings of spoken syllables alongside videos of faces speaking either the same or different syllables, while masking the videos to prevent visual awareness. The conjunction of matching voices and faces predicted the location of a subsequent Gabor grating (target) on each trial. Participants indicated the location/orientation of the target more accurately when it appeared in the cued location (80% chance), thus the authors inferred that auditory and visual speech events were integrated in the absence of visual awareness. In this thesis, I investigated whether these findings generalise to the integration of auditory and visual expressions of emotion. In Experiment 1, I presented spatially informative cues in which congruent facial and vocal emotional expressions predicted the target location, with and without visual masking. I found no evidence of spatial cueing in either awareness condition. To investigate the lack of spatial cueing, in Experiment 2, I repeated the task with aware participants only, and had half of those participants explicitly report the emotional prosody. A significant spatial-cueing effect was found only when participants reported emotional prosody, suggesting that audiovisual congruence can cue spatial attention during aware perception. It remains unclear whether audiovisual congruence can cue spatial attention without awareness, and whether such effects genuinely imply multisensory integration.</p>

Research on Visual Awareness Interface Design Based on Human-Computer Interaction Task

By using the form and specific process of human-computer interaction to comprehensively understand and judge whether users can accurately and quickly recognize products, it has a positive effect on the current visual and perceptual interface design work. On the basis of understanding the achievements of current related scientific research projects, this paper analyzes how to construct and design a new visual and perceptual interface based on human-computer interaction tasks by studying the main factors that affect users’ cognition of visual information interface.

Effects of Moderate-to-Vigorous Acute Exercise on Visual Consciousness

Background the effect of acute exercise on cognition covers almost all stages of information processing, but few studies have focused on visual awareness. Subjective reports on the appearance of faint speed-changes in the perception of stimuli were used as an index for visual consciousness. Visual consciousness was assessed after exercise or rest. Aside from subjective index, objective speed-change discrimination was added as an index for the level of consciousness. Results: the results showed that subjective reports on the appearance of faint speed-changes in the perception of stimuli were affected by acute aerobic exercise. The hit rate for speed-change detection was marginally significantly higher after exercise than sedentary condition. Furthermore, the d’ index was higher after exercise. Analysis of the results obtained for the objective discrimination task showed that discrimination speed was boosted only when subjects were aware of the speed-change. Conclusions: these results suggest that acute exercise enhances visual consciousness.

Involvement of Visual Mismatch Negativity in Access Processing to Visual Awareness

Psychophysiological studies with electroencephalography, focusing on the dynamical aspect of neural correlate of consciousness, reported that visual awareness negativity and P3 enhancement are observed at a latency, 200–300 ms after the visual stimulus onset, when the visual stimulus is consciously perceived. However, access processing to visual awareness (APVA) immediately before conscious perception still remains at the earlier stage of visual sensory processing, though there is little known regarding this subject. The present study hypothesized that visual mismatch negativity (vMMN), which reflects automatic change detection at a latency of 130–250 ms, might be involved in the APVA. In a previous study, vMMN was reported to be evoked by the deviant stimulus that is not consciously perceived in binocular rivalry. To clarify whether the visual change detection affects APVA, we conducted a modified experiment of oddball paradigm on binocular rivalry. The results showed a significant correlation between enhancement of vMMN amplitude and facilitation of perceptual alternation when the unconscious deviant was presented. This implies that vMMN is relevant to the APVA, which is a novel role of vMMN. In early visual processing, the attentional mechanism associated with vMMN is suggested to play an important role in unconscious neural processing at an earlier stage of visual awareness.