EU Sanctions Policy and the Protection of Due Process Rights: Judicial Lawmaking by the Court of Justice of the EU

Author(s):  
Monika Heupel
Global Jurist ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Riccardi

Abstract This article revisits the response of the European Union (EU) to the challenges posed by anti-terrorist smart sanctions regimes to fundamental rights, vis-à-vis recent legal developments. Following the Kadi saga, many authors defined the EU judicature as the bastion of the rule of law against executive powers. From the perspective of the Council of the EU, instead, Kadi caused a tremor. The EU courts did not only declare that anti-terrorist sanctions could be reviewed: they also affirmed that such review is in principle full, thus extended to all information substantiating sanctions, irrespective of whether covered by secrecy. In this respect, the European Court of Justice established that it is a task of the judiciary to accommodate security considerations militating against the disclosure of intelligence in court and the right to a fair trial. However, through legal instruments adopted in late 2016, the EU seems to be backing off from these settled principles. To test such assumption, the article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it outlines the contours of the UN Security Council anti-terrorist sanctions regime, pinpointing the characteristics that make such regime problematic with respect to fair trial rights. Secondly, it surveys the development of EU courts’ case-law on secret evidence. Thirdly, it investigates whether the new legal instruments adopted by EU institutions adhere to the principles enshrined in said EU courts’ decisions, or rather represent a departure from consolidated due process rights.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 399-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Komarek

AbstractWhy is it so difficult to qualify the Court of Justice’s decisions as ‘sources of law?’ Does the Court of Justice only ‘interpret’ law, or does it ‘make’ it? To what extent should its pronouncements be taken into account by others? This chapter shows how a particular theoretical approach to precedent and judicial lawmaking shapes the answers to the queries mentioned above. It examines a set of interrelated questions concerning precedent and judicial lawmaking by the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation and then applies these findings to the Court of Justice. The questions are: first, in what sense is it said that these courts make law; secondly, who is bound by their pronouncements; and, thirdly, how does this binding force actually work? It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found ways in which to reconcile judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems, especially by allowing other actors to respond to judicial lawmaking (in the particular sense of the word ‘lawmaking’ used in these two systems), the EU system is still waiting for a satisfactory answer.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 399-433
Author(s):  
Jan Komarek

AbstractWhy is it so difficult to qualify the Court of Justice’s decisions as ‘sources of law?’ Does the Court of Justice only ‘interpret’ law, or does it ‘make’ it? To what extent should its pronouncements be taken into account by others? This chapter shows how a particular theoretical approach to precedent and judicial lawmaking shapes the answers to the queries mentioned above. It examines a set of interrelated questions concerning precedent and judicial lawmaking by the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation and then applies these findings to the Court of Justice. The questions are: first, in what sense is it said that these courts make law; secondly, who is bound by their pronouncements; and, thirdly, how does this binding force actually work? It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found ways in which to reconcile judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems, especially by allowing other actors to respond to judicial lawmaking (in the particular sense of the word ‘lawmaking’ used in these two systems), the EU system is still waiting for a satisfactory answer.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


Author(s):  
Elena Sorokina

The preliminary ruling procedure is an essential feature of the EU legal system, which is a unique cooperation tool as part of the dialogue between the Court of Justice of the EU and national courts of the Member States. Its main purpose is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of EU law with all Member States and to preserve the uniformity of the European legal system. The continuous use by national courts of the Member States of the mechanism of preliminary ruling and constructive inter-judicial cooperation, the Court of Justice has developed an extremely extensive case law on the prohibition of discrimination and with the result to introduce substantial changes in European anti-discrimination law.The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice have shown its inclination to expand notions of what constitutes discrimination and in most cases the Court prompt by the desire to interpret the provisions of European law so as to ensure the full effectiveness of the law, as well as a willingness to promote and strengthen protection against discrimination in Europe. While the protection against discrimination on some grounds is stronger than others, however, the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice are important contribution to the transformation of anti-discrimination law, promote change in the national legislation of the Member States and provide the more effective protection of human rights in general.


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