Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

1. Union Institutions

2020 ◽  
pp. 9-36
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Democratic Institution ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the four major European Union institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Court. The provisions dealing with the EU institutions are split between the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Directly elected by the European citizens, the Parliament constitutes not only the most democratic institution; it is also the most supranational institution of the EU. Ultimately, each of the EU institutions is characterized by its distinct composition and its decision-making mode. Importantly, the EU is not based on a strict separation of functions between its institutions but follows a ‘checks and balances’ version of the separation-of-powers principle. This means that various EU institutions share in the exercise of various governmental functions.

6. The European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
European Community ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Eu

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.

6. The European Union

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
European Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Eu

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

scholarly journals The political system of the European Union and the politological and political determinants of the activity of the EU Council and the European Council

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-42
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Czachór
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political System ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
European Council ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Political Determinants ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

If the relationship between the EU Council and the European Council in the context of the horizontal division of power is based on a system of checks and balances, the emphasis must be on balance rather than on the separation of authorities/entities exercising power. For this reason, the powers and authority of the states and of the European Union are to some extent mixed up in this relational formula, and they overlap. At the same time, each entity has decision-making powers creating a mechanism of political influence. The powers of the EU Council and the European Council are separated in terms of institutions (structures and personnel) but not of functions, because their powers are interrelated. The competition for power here results in its being shared, which is based on the ‘joint exercising’ of power and thus the joint performance of certain systemic functions, tasks and roles. The powers of one authority should not be performed directly or completely by any of the remaining authorities, and none of the authorities should gain a definite advantage over the others. This should be the message for both the presidency of the EU Council and for the President of the European Council.

2. Institutions of the Union: composition and powers

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
European Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the institutions within the European Union (EU), their powers and the relationship between the institutions. The main EU institutions are the European Parliament, the Council, the European Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. The chapter explains that these institutions are given different powers, and that they are required to work together in order to provide the checks and balances within the Union legal order, or the so-called institutional balance.

Struktura organizacyjna instytucji unijnych – analiza efektywności w dobie kryzysu

2015 ◽  
pp. 90-116
Author(s):  
Jolanta Szymańska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Modes Of Operation ◽  
Internal Structures ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
Treaty Implementation ◽  
Difficult Situations ◽  
The Eu

The economic crisis showed the weaknesses of the institutional system of the European Union, raising questions about its shape. The article aims to determine whether internal structures of the EU institutions and their modes of operation are chances or barriers for effective treaty implementation and the ability of institutions to face unexpected, difficult situations. The article focuses both on the formal structure of the institutions and their human resources. The article aims to conclude if the crisis may give impetus to a significant improvement in the EU institutional system.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Ballmann ◽  
David Epstein ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Considerable Controversy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Eu

Although relatively unknown outside of Europe, comitology committees are an object of considerable controversy in the European Union (EU). Controversy stems from their pivotal role in overseeing policy implementation authority delegated from the Council of Ministers (Council) to the European Commission (Commission). In this article, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the influence of these, committees on policy outcomes. Our analysis provides three important insights. First, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, comitology committees move outcomes toward the Commission's preferred policies rather than the Council's. Second, we demonstrate that the possibility of a Council veto may also move outcomes away from Council members' policy preferences and toward the Commission's. Third, the 1999 changes to the comitology procedures, designed to enhance the Commission's autonomy in policymaking, may have had the exact opposite effect. Paradoxically, we conclude that comitology serves to enhance the Commission's role in policy implementation and thereby strengthens the separation of powers within the EU.

scholarly journals Has the Action for Failure to Act in the European Union Lost its Purpose?

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Scientific Literature ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Legislation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Remedy ◽  
The Eu

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.

scholarly journals The European Union and WTO law: a nexus of reactive, coactive, and proactive approaches

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIS ANTONIADIS
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Comprehensive View ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Community Legal Order ◽  
The Eu

Ranging from the denial of direct effect to WTO law by the Court of Justice to a WTO-friendly legislative culture currently booming in the EU's political institutions, different approaches towards WTO law have been adopted within the EU. This article classifies the different approaches into reactive, coactive, and proactive by drawing on their common characteristics. The principal aim is to explore the considerations shaping the development of the different approaches and to argue that these stem from the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature. In doing so, this article purports to provide a comprehensive view of the application of WTO law within the Community legal order.

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