The “Responsibility to Prevent”: An International Crimes Approach to the Prevention of Mass Atrocities

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Reike

On September 9, 2013, diplomats and civil society activists gathered in a ballroom in New York to welcome Jennifer Welsh as the UN Secretary-General's new Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). In her first public appearance in that role, Special Adviser Welsh explained that one of her top priorities would be “to take prevention seriously and to make it meaningful in practice.” “In the context of RtoP,” Welsh added during the discussion, “we are talking about crimes, and crimes have implications in terms of how we deal with them. You'll hear me say that a lot.” Welsh's approach of treating RtoP as a principle that is primarily concerned with prevention and is firmly linked to international crimes neatly captures the evolution of RtoP since its formal acceptance by states at the 2005 UN World Summit. Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the World Summit's Outcome Document not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of RtoP but also restricted the scope of RtoP to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The crime and prevention–focused version of RtoP has subsequently been defended and promoted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and by UN member states. This article seeks to systematically explore some of the implications of linking RtoP to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of RtoP, the so-called responsibility to prevent. What, then, are the consequences of approaching the responsibility to prevent as the prevention of international crimes?In order to systematically examine this question, this article turns to literature from criminology. While the criminological perspective has so far been neglected in debates on RtoP, the prominent criminologists John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond argue vehemently that “criminology is crucially positioned to contribute understanding and direction to what the United Nations has mandated as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ groups that are threatened with mass atrocities.” For the purpose of this article, the label “criminology” comprises domestic criminology, supranational criminology, and international criminal law. While insights from supranational criminology and international criminal law are directly applicable to international crimes, translating knowledge generated in relation to crimes at the domestic level to atrocity crimes at the international level is, of course, not without challenges. Reasoning by analogy is an important method in this regard, though given the anarchical nature of international society some analogies will inevitably be imperfect. The benefits of such an approach, if carefully employed, however, outweigh the risks.

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 788-821
Author(s):  
Talita de Souza Dias

The principle of fair labelling has informed the creation of international crimes and other concepts of international criminal law since the modern inception of this discipline. In particular, it was the symbolic and condemnatory import of international labels such as genocide and crimes against humanity that partly motivated their introduction as offences separate from domestic ordinary crimes. Paradoxically, fair labelling has received marginal attention in legal scholarship and practice. Moreover, frequent instances of relabelling known as ‘recharacterisation of crimes’ may not be entirely consistent with that principle, inviting further analysis thereof. In this context, the purpose of this article is to provide a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of the principle of fair labelling in international criminal law, particularly in light of the phenomenon of recharacterisation of crimes. Its central claim is that fair labelling is as a fair trial right which precludes recourse to recharacterisation in certain circumstances.


Postgenocide ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 112-134
Author(s):  
Jobair Alam

This chapter considers the worst contemporary state-led prosecution of a minority group, which amounts to genocide, namely the Rohingya. It examines the atrocity crimes committed against them under international criminal law (ICL) and the application of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) thereupon. It suggests that such atrocities are constitutive of violations of jus cogens which warrants obligatio erga omnes. Accordingly, the perpetrators can be brought to justice under inter/national and universal jurisdictions, which, nonetheless, has not yet occurred. Given the failure of ICL mechanisms, the normative foundations of the R2P can provide valuable tools for intercepting mass atrocity crimes. The Rohingya—who face direct and structural violence at the hands of the Myanmar state—need protection from these crimes. The chapter explains how insular national politics can undo the gains made by the international community in upholding the distinctiveness of humanitarian claims through the application of the R2P.


Author(s):  
Schwöbel-Patel Christine

The ‘core’ crimes set out in the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute - the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression - are overwhelmingly assumed to be the most important international crimes. In this chapter, I unsettle the assumption of their inherent importance by revealing and problematising the civilizational, political-economic, and aesthetical biases behind designating these crimes as ‘core’. This is done by shedding light on discontinuities in the history of the core crimes, and unsettling the progress narrative ‘from Nuremberg to Rome’. More specifically, crimes associated with drug control are placed in conversation with the accepted history of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exemplify a systematic editing of the dominant narrative of international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Melanie O’Brien

China was active in the drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but has not become a state party, and the Chinese relationship with international criminal law is not strong. Given this, an examination of China’s own abilities and actions with regard to accountability for international crimes is warranted. China does not have any legislation proscribing violations of international humanitarian law, or war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. This article will examine some of the options under current Chinese Criminal Law of 1997 that could be used to prosecute international crimes in lieu of express provisions. The second part of the article undertakes an international criminal law and human rights analysis of the Gang of Four trial, as the only trial of leaders linked to the mass crimes of the Cultural Revolution and thus the only real example of an attempt at accountability for mass crimes in modern China. These two parts of the article combine together to provide an analysis of China’s ability to enact and attempts at accountability for international crimes committed in China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-311
Author(s):  
Eki Yemisi Omorogbe

Abstract This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-176
Author(s):  
Kirsten J. Fisher

AbstractDue to the distinct nature of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity originating out of and contributing to the pervasive collective character of mass atrocity, the appropriate mens rea for individual commission of these crimes is difficult to pin down. The mens rea for these international crimes has been deliberated, disputed and inconsistently applied, leaving what it means for individuals to intend to commit crimes of mass atrocity mired in confusion. This paper explores the meaning of intentional commission of collective crime, and demonstrates that from both philosophical and legal perspectives, acting intentionally in the context of mass atrocity can be interpreted in different ways, resulting in a condition of international criminal law which is at risk of unpredictability and expressive uncertainty. The paper endorses purpose-based, rather than knowledge-based, intent as the appropriate standard in the context of international crimes by arguing that mere knowledge of outcomes is insufficient.


Author(s):  
Robert Cryer

This chapter examines the material and mental aspects of four offences that are directly criminalized by international law: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. The discussions also cover some of the general principles of liability and defences that are of particular relevance to international crimes. Firstly, joint criminal enterprise, co-perpetration, command responsibility, and the defence of obedience to superior orders are considered. The chapter then looks at international and national prosecution of international crimes, including the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. As prosecution is not the only, or predominant, response to international crimes, the chapter concludes with a discussion of alternatives and complements to prosecution, such as amnesties, and truth and reconciliation commissions.


Author(s):  
Robert Cryer

This chapter first discusses the overlaps between human rights and international criminal law, focusing on four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. It then considers prosecutions and non-prosecutorial options, concluding with an analysis of the pros and cons of using international criminal law to protect human rights.


Author(s):  
Lawrence Douglas

By the terms of the ‘sentimental story of the state’ fashioned by thinkers such as Hobbes, the state represented the greatest bulwark against the disordering effects of violence, and obedience to the law represented the supreme virtue of the pacified citizenry. Nazi Germany fundamentally upset the sentimental story; in the parlance of Karl Jaspers, Nazi Germany was a Verbrecherstaat, a criminal state. The Nuremberg trial treated aggression as the paradigmatic crime of the criminal state; subsequent developments in international criminal law view acts of atrocity—crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes—as the paradigmatic state crimes. In this chapter, it is argued that this shift—from treating aggression to treating acts of atrocity as the paradigmatic state-sponsored crimes—has unsettled basic legal categories, such as the criminal/enemy dyad and the distinction between policing and war-making. The unsettling of these categories leaves, the chapter argues, international criminal law in a vexed state.


Author(s):  
Ruben Reike

This chapter examines how the agenda of prevention of armed conflict relates to the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P). While R2P was originally assumed to be fully compatible with the goals and principles of traditional conflict prevention, subsequent research has disentangled the relationship between R2P and conflict prevention, arguing that conflict prevention is a necessary but not a sufficient component of atrocity prevention, and that atrocity prevention needs to include a strategy for deterring potential perpetrators. Recent scholarship has started to examine the implications of marrying R2P to international criminal law categories. What follows from R2P’s move to crimes is an individualization of the principle, as well as a shift towards partiality, intrusion, and coercion. This means that where a threat of atrocity crimes occurs in the context of armed conflict, it cannot simply be assumed that R2P and conflict prevention are pulling in the same direction.


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