scholarly journals The welfare cost of vaccine misallocation, delays and nationalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Christian Gollier
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
George S. Ford ◽  
Thomas M. Koutsky ◽  
Lawrence J. Spiwak

1985 ◽  
Vol 93 (5) ◽  
pp. 1025-1034 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edgar K. Browning

1982 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 794-808 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Sonstelie
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Tirole

The paper provides a first analysis of market jump starting and its two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints. The government optimally overpays for the legacy assets and cleans up the market of its weakest assets, through a mixture of buybacks and equity injections, and leaves the firms with the strongest legacy assets to the market. The government reduces adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. The existence of a market imposes no welfare cost. (JEL D82, D83, G01, G31, H81)


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANGELO COSTA GURGEL ◽  
SERGEY PALTSEV ◽  
JOHN REILLY ◽  
GILBERT METCALF

ABSTRACTWe develop a forward-looking version of the recursive dynamic MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, and apply it to examine the economic implications of proposals in the US Congress to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We find that shocks in the consumption path are smoothed out in the forward-looking model and that the lifetime welfare cost of GHG policy is lower than in the recursive model, since the forward-looking model can fully optimize over time. The forward-looking model allows us to explore issues for which it is uniquely well suited, including revenue-recycling and early action crediting. We find capital tax recycling to be more welfare-cost reducing than labor tax recycling because of its long-term effect on economic growth. Also, there are substantial incentives for early action credits; however, when spread over the full horizon of the policy they do not have a substantial effect on lifetime welfare costs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 998-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentino Dardanoni ◽  
Paolo Li Donni

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