n-Person cooperative games with transferable utility: the modified Shapley value

1977 ◽  
pp. 212-243
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Transferable Utility

AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 63-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. ALBIZURI ◽  
J. ARIN ◽  
J. RUBIO
Keyword(s):  
Partition Function ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Function Form ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Partition Function Form

Lucas and Trall (1963) defined the games in partition function form as a generalization of the cooperative games with transferable utility. In our work we propose by means of an axiomatic characterization a solution for such games in partition function form. This solution will be a generalization of the Shapley value (1953).

scholarly journals Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas Dietzenbacher ◽  
Peter Sudhölter
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Convex Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Scale Covariance

AbstractThis paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors.

Shapley-Based Analysis of the Leadership Formation in Social Networks

2019 ◽  
pp. 357-390
Author(s):  
Ivan Belik
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Importance Measure ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Leadership Position ◽  
Leadership Formation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
As Graph ◽  
Research Domains

The dynamic nature of networks formation requires the development of multidisciplinary methods for the effective social network analysis. The research presented in this chapter is motivated by the necessity to overcome the limitation of using analytical methods from the originally disconnected research domains. Hence, the authors present an approach based on techniques from different areas, such as graph theory, theory of algorithms, and game theory. Specifically, this chapter is based on the analysis of how an agent can move towards leadership in real-life socioeconomic networks. For the agent's importance measure, the authors employed a Shapley value concept from the area of cooperative games. Shapley value is interpreted as the node centrality that corresponds to the significance of the agent within a socioeconomic network. Employing game theoretic concept, the authors introduced an algorithmic approach that detects the potential connectivity modifications required to increase an agent's leadership position.

scholarly journals A NOTE ON NTU CONVEXITY AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 385-390
Author(s):  
RUUD HENDRICKX
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme ◽  
Monotonic Allocation Scheme ◽  
Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes

For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept, mainly because it implies some very nice and handy properties. One of these is that every extended marginal vector constitutes a population monotonic allocation scheme. In this note, this well-known result is generalised to games with nontransferable utility.

Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions Based on Limit Characteristic Functions

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Cui Liu ◽  
Hongwei Gao ◽  
Ovanes Petrosian ◽  
Juan Xue ◽  
Lei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Irrational Behavior ◽  
The Individual

Abstract Irrational-behavior-proof (IBP) conditions are important aspects to keep stable cooperation in dynamic cooperative games. In this paper, we focus on the establishment of IBP conditions. Firstly, the relations of three kinds of IBP conditions are described. An example is given to show that they may not hold, which could lead to the fail of cooperation. Then, based on a kind of limit characteristic function, all these conditions are proved to be true along the cooperative trajectory in a transformed cooperative game. It is surprising that these facts depend only upon the individual rationalities of players for the Shapley value and the group rationalities of players for the core. Finally, an illustrative example is given.

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