The Cold War in Central America, 1975–1991

Author(s):  
John H. Coatsworth
1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-281
Author(s):  
Robert Siekmann

Especially as a consequence of the termination of the Cold War, the détente in the relations between East en West (Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy matters) and, finally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the number of UN peace-keeping operations substantially increased in recent years. One could even speak of a ‘proliferation’. Until 1988 the number of operations was twelve (seven peace-keeping forces: UNEF ‘I’ and ‘II’, ONUC, UNHCYP, UNSF (West New Guinea), UNDOF AND UNIFIL; and five military observer missions: UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM and UNIPOM). Now, three forces and seven observer missions can be added. The forces are MINURSO (West Sahara), UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia); the observer groups: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan), UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’ (Angola), ONUCA (Central America), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) and ONUSAL (El Salvador). UNTAG (Namibia), which was established in 1978, could not become operational until 1989 as a result of the new political circumstances in the world. So, a total of twenty-three operations have been undertaken, of which almost fifty percent was established in the last five years, whereas the other half was the result of decisions taken by the United Nations in the preceding forty years (UNTSO dates back to 1949). In the meantime, some ‘classic’ operations are being continued (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), whereas some ‘modern’ operations already have been terminated as planned (UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’, and ONUCA). At the moment (July 1992) eleven operations are in action – the greatest number in the UN history ever.


1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert H. Holden

The US.-sponsored programs of military and police collaboration with the Central American governments during the Cold War also contributed to the surveillance capacity of those states during the period when the Central American state formation process was being completed. Guatemala is used as a case study. Washington’s contribution was framed by the conventional discourse of “security against communism” but also by an underlying technocratic ethos in which “modernization” and “security” were higher priorities than democratization.


2021 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-579
Author(s):  
Molly Avery

AbstractThe history of the Cold War in Latin America in the 1970s is commonly split into two episodes: the establishment of anticommunist dictatorships and the ensuing repression across the Southern Cone in the early and middle decade, and the Nicaraguan Revolution and the eruption of violent conflicts across Central America at its close. By exploring the Chilean and Argentine response to the Nicaraguan Revolution, this article brings these two episodes together, demonstrating how they were understood to belong to one and the same ideological conflict. In doing so, it highlights the importance of the revolution in the Chilean and Argentine perception of the Cold War and explores how the Sandinista triumph directly shaped Southern Cone ideas about US power and the communist threat, also prompting reflection on their own ‘models’ for anticommunist governance. Both regimes responded by increasing their support for anticommunist forces in Guatemala and El Salvador, often conducting this aid through a wider transnational and clandestine network. This article contributes to new understandings of the nature of Latin American anticommunism in this period, challenges traditional understandings of external involvement in Central America, and demonstrates the need to understand events in Latin America in this period in their full regional context.


Author(s):  
Joaquín M. Chávez

Global and regional political and cultural trends shaped a set of interrelated and persistent conflicts between authoritarian regimes and democratic and revolutionary forces during the Cold War in Central America. US Cold War anticommunism, in particular, abetted authoritarian governments that sparked major conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The failure of the post-World War II wave of democratization in Central America led to persistent revolutionary and counterrevolutionary politics in the next three decades. Two successive waves of revolution emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The reverberations of the Cuban Revolution and US counterinsurgency mainly shaped the first wave of revolution and counterrevolution in the 1960s. The Cuban Revolution, progressive Catholicism, and the Sandinista Revolution mainly shaped the second wave of revolution and counterrevolution in the 1970s and 1980s. The armed conflict in Guatemala (1960–1996), El Salvador’s Civil War (1980–1992), and the Contra War in Nicaragua (1979–1991) became the last major Cold War conflicts in Latin America. The changing dynamics of the conflicts on the ground and the international consensus in favor of peace negotiations in Central America that emerged at the end of the Cold War enabled the political settlement of the conflicts. The peace processes that put an end to the armed conflicts created fragile democracies in the midst of the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s, which limited the meaning of social citizenship in Central America.


Diálogos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Roberto Moll Neto

Em meio a Guerra Fria, a Revolução Sandinista abalou os interesses dos Estados Unidos na região da América Central e do Caribe. Durante o Governo Reagan, os Estados Unidos intensificaram as ações de intervenção na região a fim de derrubar o Governo Sandinista. Este artigo pretende demonstrar que, mesmo no campo ortodoxo da política estadunidense, o papel dos Estados Unidos em face da revolução na Nicarágua não estava pré definido exclusivamente em uma visão de mundo única e que, portanto, haviam propostas concorrentes, que, inclusive, compreendiam a realidade na região a partir de dinâmicas próprias, e não apenas em função da Guerra Fria. Abstract Other Cold Wars: the clashes between neoliberals and neoconservatives in the face of the Nicaraguan Revolution In the midst of the Cold War, the Sandinista Revolution shook US objectives in the Central America and Caribbean. During the Reagan Administration, the United States stepped up intervention in the region to overthrow the Sandinista Government. This paper intends to demonstrate that even in the orthodox field of American politics, the role of the United States in the face of the revolution in Nicaragua was not exclusively defined in a single perceptions and that therefore there were competing proposals that even understood the reality in the region from its own dynamics, and not only because of the Cold War. Resumen Otras guerras frías: los embates entre neoliberales y neoconservadores estadunidenses ante la Revolución Nicaragüense En medio de la Guerra Fría, la Revolución Sandinista sacudió los intereses de Estados Unidos en la región de América Central y del Caribe. Durante el Gobierno Reagan, Estados Unidos intensificó las acciones de intervención en la región a fin de derrocar al Gobierno Sandinista. Este artículo pretende demostrar que, incluso en el campo ortodoxo de la política estadounidense, el papel de los Estados Unidos frente a la revolución en Nicaragua no estaba pre definido exclusivamente en una visión de mundo única y que, por lo tanto, había propuestas concurrentes, que incluso comprendían la realidad en la región a partir de dinámicas propias, y no sólo en función de la Guerra Fría.


2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 1155-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
VAN GOSSE

On 2–5 June 1984, Ronald Reagan toured Ireland. He was met by widespread protest regarding US policies in Central America, including reproofs from the Irish government, and snubs from the Catholic hierarchy. Yet for Irish diplomats, engaged in a long-term effort to encourage Britain towards a settlement of the civil war in Northern Ireland, the visit was a success. This article argues that these immediate resonances have wider meanings, which complicate our understanding of the Cold War. Both large and small “cold wars” (the US in Central America; the US versus the Soviets; Ireland versus Britain) got mixed up with each other during this visit, contributing to the resolution of all three: the Europeans pushed the US to the negotiating table in Central America; following re-election, Reagan began his rapprochement with Mikhail Gorbachev; in September 1984, the President began nudging his closest ally, Margaret Thatcher, towards a rapprochment with the Irish Republic. The relationship between these overlapping frames underlines the article's claims that “cold wars” are a useful category of international relations, in which small nations can be significant factors. Tensions over Ronald Reagan in Ireland remind us that the global Cold War was always much more complex than superpower rivalries.


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