The Development of the United Nations Law Concerning Peace-Keeping Operations

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-281
Author(s):  
Robert Siekmann

Especially as a consequence of the termination of the Cold War, the détente in the relations between East en West (Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy matters) and, finally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the number of UN peace-keeping operations substantially increased in recent years. One could even speak of a ‘proliferation’. Until 1988 the number of operations was twelve (seven peace-keeping forces: UNEF ‘I’ and ‘II’, ONUC, UNHCYP, UNSF (West New Guinea), UNDOF AND UNIFIL; and five military observer missions: UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM and UNIPOM). Now, three forces and seven observer missions can be added. The forces are MINURSO (West Sahara), UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia); the observer groups: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan), UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’ (Angola), ONUCA (Central America), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) and ONUSAL (El Salvador). UNTAG (Namibia), which was established in 1978, could not become operational until 1989 as a result of the new political circumstances in the world. So, a total of twenty-three operations have been undertaken, of which almost fifty percent was established in the last five years, whereas the other half was the result of decisions taken by the United Nations in the preceding forty years (UNTSO dates back to 1949). In the meantime, some ‘classic’ operations are being continued (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), whereas some ‘modern’ operations already have been terminated as planned (UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’, and ONUCA). At the moment (July 1992) eleven operations are in action – the greatest number in the UN history ever.

Author(s):  
Michelle Getchell

The United States was heavily involved in creating the United Nations in 1945 and drafting its charter. The United States continued to exert substantial clout in the organization after its founding, though there have been periods during which U.S. officials have met with significant opposition inside the United Nations, in Congress, and in American electoral politics, all of which produced struggles to gain support for America’s international policy goals. U.S. influence in the international organization has thus waxed and waned. The early postwar years witnessed the zenith of American prestige on the global stage. Starting in the mid- to late 1950s, as decolonization and the establishment of newly independent nations quickened, the United States began to lose influence in the United Nations owing to the spreading perception that its alliances with the European colonial powers placed it on the wrong side of history. As U.N. membership skyrocketed, the organization became more responsive to the needs and interests of the decolonizing states. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the American public responded to declining U.S. influence in the United Nations with calls to defund the organization and to pursue a unilateral approach to international challenges. The role of the United States in the United Nations was shaped by the politics of the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. Throughout the nearly five decades of the Cold War, the United Nations served as a forum for the political and ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which frequently inhibited the organization from fulfilling what most considered to be its primary mission: the maintenance of global security and stability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the peaceful end of the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a brief period of unrivaled global hegemony. During this period, U.S. officials pursued a closer relationship with the United Nations and sought to use the organization to build support for its international policy agenda and military interventionism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Judas Everett

The Cold War was a confrontation dominated by dogmatic ideology; the rise of Gorbachev and his attempts to inject new thinking into the Soviet Union were critical in ending that standoff. Generally, Gorbachev was successful in the field of foreign policy and many of his ideas and actions created lasting legacies which have shaped the world today. However, one idea which failed to gain much traction was his proposal regarding a Common European Home. The aim of this paper is to examine how this opportunity was missed or why hasn’t it been taken advantage of, before moving on to analyse whether shared aims, freedoms, values and responsibilities exist between Russia and the EU today. Opinion polling shows that Russian values and opinions are complex, but often similar to other post-communist countries that have successfully become European Union member states. The issue of NATO expansion stands out as more problematic than a lack of shared values between the EU and Russian citizens.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Götz

From the mid-1950s on, the United Nations (UN) provided a forum for Finland to have an international presence despite its status as a neutral country in the Cold War. But until 1955, Finland's bid to join the UN was blocked by the Soviet Union. The inability to gain admission caused some Finns to favor staying outside the UN, a view that gained its widest circulation in the latter half of 1950 after the UN had been invoked to respond to North Korea's attack on South Korea. Nonetheless, although some Finns were concerned that membership in the UN might cause their country to become embroiled in a superpower Cold War conflict against its will, others believed that entry into the UN would confer prestige and legitimacy on Finland and strengthen its position as a sovereign member of the international community. Although Finns realized that the UN would not provide a security guarantee, the organization did help Finland to consolidate its neutral position in the Cold War international system.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Denise Getchell

This article reevaluates the U.S.-backed coup in 1954 that overthrew Guatemala's democratically elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. The coup is generally portrayed as the opening shot of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere and a watershed moment for U.S.–Latin American relations, when the United States supplanted its Good Neighbor Policy with a hardline anti-Communist approach. Despite the extensive literature on the coup, the Soviet Union's perspectives on the matter have received scant discussion. Using Soviet-bloc and United Nations (UN) archival sources, this article shows that Latin American Communists and Soviet sympathizers were hugely influential in shaping Moscow's perceptions of hemispheric relations. Although regional Communists petitioned the Soviet Union to provide support to Árbenz, officials in Moscow were unwilling to prop up what they considered a “bourgeois-democratic” revolution tottering under the weight of U.S. military pressure. Soviet leaders were, however, keen to use their position on the UN Security Council to challenge the authority of the Organization of American States and undermine U.S. conceptions of “hemispheric solidarity.” The coup, moreover, revealed the force of anti-U.S. nationalism in Latin America during a period in which Soviet foreign policy was in flux and the Cold War was becoming globalized.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines how the United States and the Soviet Union sought to win the hearts and minds of people in various parts of the world as empires began to collapse during the period 1953–1963. It begins with a discussion of the end of the French Empire, taking into account the loss of French Indo-China and the start of American involvement in Vietnam, along with the collapse of French rule in Morocco and Tunisia. It then considers the crises in the Congo, Angola, and the Middle East, focusing on the zenith of the Cold War in Black Africa, Britain’s declining power, and the Suez crisis. It concludes by looking at the end of the British Empire in Africa.


Author(s):  
Louis Kriesberg

Conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) is defined by a set of ideas about avoiding, minimizing, and stopping violence that often is mutually destructive. CAR relates to all domains of conflicts, whether within or between families, organizations, communities, or countries. The CAR field emerged between 1946 and 1969, as numerous wars and crises erupted, associated with the Cold War and the national liberation struggles of the decolonization process. Many doctrines, theories, and research appeared to explain and influence those conflicts. New governmental and nongovernmental actions were also undertaken to prevent future wars by building transnational institutions and fostering reconciliation between former enemies. The rapid expansion and institutionalization of CAR began in the early 1970s, when many American pioneers in the field became discouraged by their failure to accomplish more during the 1950s and 1960s. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 profoundly changed the world environment. Several developments contributed to limiting destructive international and domestic conflicts. These include the increasing economic integration of the world and the intensification of global communications; the growing adherence to norms protecting human rights; increasing number of democratic countries; and growing engagement of women in governance. Core CAR concepts include conflict analysis, conflict fluidity and subjectivity, and multiplicity of actors.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-541
Author(s):  
W. Andy Knight

AbstractThe end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for the United Nations to play a greater role in international security than it was allowed to play in the midst of the ideological conflict between the United States and the former Soviet Union. However, the expected "peace dividend" never materialized in the post-Cold War period. Instead, a number of civil conflicts erupted and new threats to security, particularly to human security, emerged. This chapter critically examines the evolution of the UN's role in addressing international security problems since 1945, including global terrorism. It also outlines recent attempts by the world body, through extension of its reach beyond the territorial constraints of sovereignty, to build sustained peace through preventive measures and protect human security globally.


Author(s):  
Gerd Hankel

According to the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, the member states of this organization resolved ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ as well as to act in a way that demonstrates ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’. As demonstrated by the emergence and consolidation of the Cold War, the reality of the situation was very different. The two superpowers (USA and Soviet Union) pursued their own agendas based on their respective power politics. For the most part, the United Nations watched helplessly from the sidelines. The states were meticulous in their efforts to ensure that the United Nations was not allocated any powers that could have led to any appreciable infringement of their sovereignty.


1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dallin

The United Nations has patendy not fulfilled the high hopes which some of its sponsors had for it. A major share of responsibility for this failure has commonly been assigned to the Soviet Union, and not widiout reason. Yet the Soviet view and Soviet conduct have not been products of perversity or malice. They follow logically, first, from the world view held by the communist leadership, which sees the United Nations as another arena in the struggle between the two “world systems” of our age, and, second, from the Soviet experience as a minority power seeking to frustrate the efforts of the hostile majority “in control” of the UN.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert English

This article recounts the origins of Soviet “new thinking” as a case study of how Soviet intellectuals sought to redefine national identity in response to the West. It demonstrates that new thinking was fundamentally normative, not instrumental, insofar as it was developed in a period (1950s–1960s) when “socialism” was thought to be materially outperforming capitalism. It also demonstrates that new thinking decisively affected Soviet policy in the second half of the 1980s. Putting forth a socialization argument to show how newthinking ideas originated in the post-Stalin period within a community of intellectuals, the article charts the growing influence of these intellectuals through the 1970s and 1980s. In the mid-1980s, when Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party and empowered many of the new thinkers as advisers, their liberal, Westernizing ideas played an indispensable role in shaping his reforms. The analysis focuses on mechanisms of identity change at two levels: that of the community of reformist intellectuals, and that of the Soviet Union itself. The analysis challenges realist and rationalist views that new thinking was largely instrumental. Until the Gorbachev era, Soviet reformers advocated new-thinking ideas often at the risk of their personal, professional, and institutional interests.


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