IS FOUNDATIONAL A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION INDISPENSABLE?

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-331
Author(s):  
Ted Poston
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Coherence Theory ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Indispensability Arguments ◽  
Traditional Account

AbstractLaurence BonJour's (1985) coherence theory of empirical knowledge relies heavily on a traditional foundationalist theory of a priori knowledge. He argues that a foundationalist, rationalist theory of a priori justification is indispensable for a coherence theory. BonJour (1998) continues this theme, arguing that a traditional account of a priori justification is indispensable for the justification of putative a priori truths, the justification of any non-observational belief and the justification of reasoning itself. While BonJour's indispensability arguments have received some critical discussion (Gendler 2001; Harman 2001; Beebe 2008), no one has investigated the indispensability arguments from a coherentist perspective. This perspective offers a fruitful take on BonJour's arguments, because he does not appreciate the depth of the coherentist alternative to the traditional empiricist-rationalist debate. This is surprising on account of BonJour's previous defense of coherentism. Two significant conclusions emerge: first, BonJour's indispensability arguments beg central questions about an explanationist form of coherentism; second, BonJour's original defense of coherentism took on board certain assumptions that inevitably led to the demise of his form of coherentism. The positive conclusion of this article is that explanatory coherentism is more coherent than BonJour's indispensability arguments assume, and more coherent than BonJour's earlier coherentist epistemology.

scholarly journals Induction and Epistemological Naturalism

Philosophies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Lars-Göran Johansson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Implicit Definitions ◽  
Epistemological Naturalism

Epistemological naturalists reject the demand for a priori justification of empirical knowledge; no such thing is possible. Observation reports, being the foundation of empirical knowledge, are neither justified by other sentences, nor certain; but they may be agreed upon as starting points for inductive reasoning and they function as implicit definitions of predicates used. Making inductive generalisations from observations is a basic habit among humans. We do that without justification, but we have strong intuitions that some inductive generalisations will fail, while for some other we have better hopes. Why? This is the induction problem according to Goodman. He suggested that some predicates are projectible when becoming entrenched in language. This is a step forward, but not entirely correct. Inductions result in universally generalised conditionals and these contain two predicates, one in the antecedent, one in the consequent. Counterexamples to preliminary inductive generalisations can be dismissed by refining the criteria of application for these predicates. This process can be repeated until the criteria for application of the predicate in the antecedent includes the criteria for the predicate in the consequent, in which case no further counterexample is possible. If that is the case we have arrived at a law. Such laws are implicit definitions of theoretical predicates. An accidental generalisation has not this feature, its predicates are unrelated. Laws are said to be necessary, which may be interpreted as ‘“Laws” are necessarily true’. ‘Necessarily true’ is thus a semantic predicate, not a modal operator. In addition, laws, being definitions, are necessarily true in the sense of being necessary assumptions for further use of the predicates implicitly defined by such laws. Induction, when used in science, is thus our way of inventing useful scientific predicates; it is a heuristic, not an inference principle.

THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION

Ratio ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Horvath
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Modal Argument

Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Multiple Domains ◽  
The Way

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori Once Again1

2020 ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Learning Mathematics ◽  
The Way

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s Chapter 15 and amplifies the arguments of the author’s Chapter 14. In particular, it illustrates the loss of underived dispositions with an example from learning mathematics, when the novice gradually ceases to be tempted by a certain kind of mistake. It is also explains why the argument of Chapter 14 does not assume that introspection and postulation are mutually incompatible; rather, it notes the author’s inability to introspect the non-doxastic intellectual seemings Boghossian postulates and suggests that it is not idiosyncratic. Finally, a challenge is raised for Boghossian’s view of a priori justification as coherence with intellectual seemings. What prevents bigoted beliefs being justified a priori in the way he describes by the bigoted intellectual seemings of a consistent Nazi, for example? If nothing does, what prevents the Nazi’s so-justified beliefs as to what one ought to do from justifying the corresponding actions?

Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1

2020 ◽  
pp. 214-226
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Mental States ◽  
A Priori Justification

This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.

A posteriori

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul K. Moser
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Common ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Common Understanding ◽  
Priori Knowledge

A prominent term in theory of knowledge since the seventeenth century, ‘a posteriori’ signifies a kind of knowledge or justification that depends on evidence, or warrant, from sensory experience. A posteriori truth is truth that cannot be known or justified independently of evidence from sensory experience, and a posteriori concepts are concepts that cannot be understood independently of reference to sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge contrasts with a priori knowledge, knowledge that does not require evidence from sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge is empirical, experience-based knowledge, whereas a priori knowledge is non-empirical knowledge. Standard examples of a posteriori truths are the truths of ordinary perceptual experience and the natural sciences; standard examples of a priori truths are the truths of logic and mathematics. The common understanding of the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge as the distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge comes from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787).

THE NO FREE LUNCH THEOREM: BAD NEWS FOR (WHITE'S ACCOUNT OF) THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Gerhard Schurz
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Prediction Methods ◽  
Free Lunch ◽  
Event Sequences ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
No Free Lunch Theorem ◽  
Uniform Probability Distribution ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
No Free Lunch

AbstractWhite (2015) proposes an a priori justification of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justification of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justification externalism and (ii) optimality justifications.

Induction Justified (But Just Barely)

Philosophy ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 58 (226) ◽  
pp. 481-488
Author(s):  
Ralph W. Clark
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Empirical World ◽  
Future Events

Hume's sceptical arguments regarding induction have not yet been successfully answered. However, I shall not in this paper discuss the important attempts to answer Hume since that would be too lengthy a task. On the supposition that Hume's sceptical arguments have not been met, the empirical world is a place where, as the popular metaphor goes, all the glue has been removed. For the Humean sceptic, the only empirical knowledge that we can have is given to us in immediate perception. We have no reason to believe that the patterns of future events will in any way resemble patterns of events in the present or past. We have no reason to believe even that present events not observed resemble present events that are observed, or that knowledge of past and present can be any guide in making new discoveries about what took place in the past. What we have is an ideal setting for the calculation of a priori probabilities. We have a field of distinct events having no logical or evidential ties to one another. The attempt to justify induction that I wish to present is an appeal to a priori probability.

The ‘Corroborative Rule’ from a comparative and critical perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-298
Author(s):  
Guy Ben-David
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Clear Trend ◽  
Single Piece ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Anglo American

In general, a conviction may be based on a single piece of evidence or a single testimony if the court is convinced that it proves the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions special cases were established by statute and case law in which a single piece of evidence cannot suffice to prove a defendant’s guilt and additional evidence is required to support the main evidence. This rule, known as the Corroborative Rule (hereinafter ‘the rule’ or ‘CR’) constitutes a barrier against conviction on the basis of individual evidence, without the judge or jury cautioning themselves against reliance on a single piece of evidence in order to convict the accused. In general, the requirement for additional evidence exists in cases where there is a single piece of incriminating evidence, but there is concern regarding its reliability. In order to reduce the risk of a mistake that will lead to a false conviction (conviction of an innocent defendant), the law requires additional evidence as a condition for conviction. The first purpose of this article is to provide a comparative-descriptive perspective on the CR as practised in Anglo-American and Israeli law. While in continental law a defendant’s conviction is not subject to any requirement for a specific quantity of evidence, in Anglo-American law there is a clear trend to reduce the application of a requirement for additional evidence. Yet in Israeli law, an opposite trend is evident, expressed in increased application of the Corroborative Rule in order to convict the accused. The second purpose of the article is to undertake a critical examination of the theoretical infrastructure underpinning the CR. According to this infrastructure, the justification for the CR is epistemic and relates, as a rule, to testimony whose reliability is, a priori, dubious. Thus the CR is linked to one of the purposes of some of the rules of criminal proceedings, which is to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. However, at the same time, the CR restricts judicial discretion and harms the prosecutor’s and the court’s ability to ensure conviction of guilty defendants, even in cases where there is a single piece of evidence, which the court trusts. The first section provides a comparison of the use of the CR in English, Canadian, Scottish, American and Israeli law. The second section is devoted to the description of the theoretical infrastructure of the CR, while the third section contains a critical discussion on both the theoretical infrastructure described in the second section and also the requirement for evidential supplements, in general. To conclude the article, I provide a summary of its contents.

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