scholarly journals The Constitutional Status of Karlsruhe’s Novel “Jurisdiction” in EU Fundamental Rights Matters: Self-inflicted Institutional Vulnerabilities

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Karsten Schneider

AbstractThe First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has recently introduced the express promise that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself could directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. There are, however, differences between the Basic Law as the relevant standard of review and other standards of review that are dangerous to ignore. The constitutional status of the FCC’s jurisdiction depends crucially on whether the Court relies on the constitution or on EU fundamental rights. If the constitutional status of the novel jurisdiction covered any binding-effect, and that is a big if, the FCC still would not safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law. Leaving aside the fact that the First Senate is confined to reversing and remanding (unable to enforce anything directly), no beneficial effect on legal certainty grows apparent. Any binding-effect of the novel jurisdiction only provides for consistency without finality. And to venture further into the question: Even if anyone welcomed this novel kind of consistency without finality (virtually “provisional consistency”), this oddish consistency would still be a localized consistency, i.e. in German courts only.

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany


Author(s):  
Clara RAUCHEGGER

Abstract The binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.


Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis

This chapter examines the jurisprudence of national courts on crisis-related measures. The material presented in this chapter will be divided into two parts. First, this chapter will examine some of the most important judgments delivered by courts in lender states during the Euro crisis, the emphasis being on the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court. These cases primarily focus on the effects of financial assistance mechanisms and revised EU fiscal governance rules on the principle of democracy, parliamentary prerogatives, and national budgetary powers. A further strand of case law focuses on the measures adopted by the European Central Bank. Second, this chapter will look at review by national courts in borrower states, the principal focus being on social challenges brought by austerity-hit litigants in Greece. The comparative analysis sheds light on the different types of challenge facing courts in borrower and lender states, as well as the different starting points and the subtle differences in the reasoning provided by courts in their judgments. As regards borrower states in particular, the twin challenge is to examine to what extent litigants had any success in challenging in national courts the bailout conditions; and the extent to which arguments about civil or socio-economic rights had purchase at national level. The chapter further looks at review by national courts in other jurisdictions, as well as review by supranational and international courts or bodies. Last, it puts forward a number of ideas on fundamental rights adjudication in times of economic crisis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Dana Burchardt

AbstractThis article discusses two landmark judgements by the German Federal Constitutional Court (CC) on the relationship between domestic and EU fundamental rights protection (Right to be forgotten I and II). In these judgements, for the first time, the CC uses EU fundamental rights as a standard of review. In addition, the CC establishes a novel framework of “parallel applicability” of EU and domestic fundamental rights for subject matters that are not fully harmonized by EU law. The article first presents the new approach, showing that it structurally changes the parameters of the relationship between the CC and the CJEU. Second, the article assesses the legal-political tendency reflected in this change: is this constructive dialogue or rather pushback against the CJEU? The article argues that this new jurisprudence should be characterized as an instance of resistance. The CC resists against the CJEU in its function as fundamental rights court, attempting to reduce the authority of the CJEU and reversing a development that it considered to be unfavourable to its own authority. This is structural pushback aimed at the CJEU’s function rather than at individual decisions or norms - however, without rejection the CJEU as an institution altogether.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 1085-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Jacoby

On April 12, 2005, the Bundesverfassunsgreicht (German Federal Constitutional Court) ruled that regulations in the Strafprozessordnung (StPO – Code of Criminal Procedure) concerning police use of global positioning systems (GPS) did not violate the Grundgesetz (GG – German Constitution or Basic Law) so long as the investigators did not use the technology in conjunction with other surveillance methods that could lead to the construction of a personality profile of the suspect observed. The following comment examines the facts of the case and evaluates the Court's decision in detail.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document