DECLINING LEGISLATIVE DISSENT IN CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESS ELECTIONS

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-242
Author(s):  
Tao Li
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Method ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Diversity Index ◽  
National Level ◽  
Voter Preference ◽  
Standard Index ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
National Congress ◽  
Party Congress

AbstractUsing a novel statistical method, we estimate the vote counts of the secret elections held by the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party from 1945 to 2017. We also construct a metric for voter preference diversity based on a standard index of legislative party fractionalization. We find that both the number of dissenting votes and the voter preference diversity index plummeted to the bottom in 2017, which is an unprecedented phenomenon in the party's history. Applying the same method to provincial party congress elections from 2006–2017, we find that provincial dissenting votes also declined around the same time, though the magnitude is relatively smaller and there is a wide range of provincial variations. We suggest that President Xi's suppression of formal party institutions is complete at the national level but not yet at the provincial level.

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China

1983 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 108-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell Dittmer
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Daily Activities ◽  
New Members ◽  
National Congress ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Democratic Parties ◽  
General Effort ◽  
Typical Gesture

On 1 September 1982, 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates convened the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The meeting was announced in advance (at the seventh plenum of the 11th Central Committee, held in Beijing 4–10 August) and proceeded with well-rehearsed smoothness to its scheduled adjournment 15 days later. The meeting agenda conformed closely to established protocol, consisting of speeches and work reports, discussion and adoption of a new Party constitution, culminating in the election of new members to the Central Committee and other “standing” (i.e. permanently tenured) positions and convention of the first plenary meetings of these organs. The meeting began on 1 September with a relatively brief opening speech by Deng Xiaoping, the presiding chairman (though in a typical gesture to collective leadership there were no less than nine other presiding chairmen), and was followed by Hu Yaobang's comprehensive report and by speeches or reports by Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and others. These documents were all published as part of a general effort at greater publicity that included prior announcement of the dates of convention and adjournment, invitation of more than 70 responsible persons from democratic parties, non-Party patriots and other well-known personages from various circles to attend as observers (as had been done previously during the Eighth Congress), fairly detailed reporting of the election of deputies, their assembly and daily activities, arrangements and so forth, and even a sort of press conference that Zhu Muzhi, spokesman of the conference, held for Chinese and foreign reporters – although no foreign Communist Party members or foreign journalists were permitted to attend the Congress itself.

Party Congress will set China's course to 2022

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
100Th Anniversary ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sixth Generation ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Party Congress

Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.

Tibetans do the Housework, but Han are the Masters

2020 ◽  
pp. 146-160
Author(s):  
Benno Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
High Tide ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
Great Leap Forward ◽  
United Front ◽  
The One ◽  
The Great Leap Forward ◽  
Minority Nationality ◽  
Party Congress

This chapter looks at the events in Zeku County and beyond from the end of the High Tide in summer of 1956 through the eve of the Great Leap Forward in late 1957. This period, referred to as an “un-Maoist interlude,” was marked by a retreat from plans for rapid collectivization and even saw a push during the One Hundred Flowers campaign to encourage open criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) so that its mistakes could be rectified. A centerpiece was soliciting critiques from United Front figures, particularly Han intellectuals but also leading minority nationality figures. Among the latter, many complained that the autonomy the CCP promised non-Han communities at the time of “Liberation” had proved more mirage than fact. Far from a reactionary stance, in the months following the Eighth Party Congress, this critique was widely promoted in Party and government circles.

The Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession that Didn't Happen

2003 ◽  
Vol 173 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Fewsmith
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
National Party ◽  
Standing Committee ◽  
Real Power ◽  
Political Succession ◽  
Political Governance ◽  
General Secretary ◽  
Party Congress

Although the 16th National Party Congress was billed as one of political succession, the stage clearly belonged to 76-year-old Jiang Zemin, whose political report endorsed his major themes, including the controversial proposal to admit entrepreneurs into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Revisions to the Party charter endorsed Jiang's “three represents” and equated Jiang's accomplishments with those of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Hu Jintao, widely expected to be the star of the show, was reduced to applauding Jiang's accomplishments. Although Hu (59) was named general secretary of the CCP as expected, Jiang packed the Politburo and its Standing Committee with his allies and retained his position as head of the Party's Central Military Commission (CMC). Although Hu may eventually assume real power, the outcome of the congress made clear that meaningful political succession remains at least five years away. In forcefully asserting his power, Jiang opens up questions about the degree to which political governance, particularly at the top of the system, has been institutionalized.

scholarly journals An investigation whether the deputy president of the African National Congress can be the successor to the president during the National Elective Conference

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mavhungu E. Musitha ◽  
Mavhungu A. Mafukata
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
West African ◽  
African National Congress ◽  
The South ◽  
South West ◽  
National Congress ◽  
People’S Organisation ◽  
Policy And Procedure

This is a qualitative study which investigated whether the deputy president of the African National Congress (ANC) can be the heir and elected president in the December 2017 elective conference. The study found that the deputy president is not the heir to the position of the president but that anybody can be elected to the position in terms of the existing constitution. The study also found that while the ANC has a constitution that prescribes how members are elected to positions, it is open to manipulation by those who wish to position their preferred comrades. The ANC does not have a clear policy or procedure to decide who succeeds to the presidency. This lack of policy has led to infighting among the comrades along factional lines as they seek to capture the soul of the ANC. The study found that most former liberation ruling parties such as ZANU–PF and the South West African People’s Organisation are faced with the same challenge. The Chinese Communist Party has faced and overcome this challenge by formulating a clear policy and procedure on who becomes the president or leader of the party. The study recommends that the ANC should formulate clear policies and regulations to define and determine who becomes its president.

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