scholarly journals Developing an Innovative Pandemic Treaty to Advance Global Health Security

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-508
Author(s):  
Lawrence O. Gostin ◽  
Benjamin Mason Meier ◽  
Barbara Stocking

AbstractRecognizing marked limitations of global health law in the COVID-19 pandemic, a rising number of states are supporting the development of a new pandemic treaty. This prospective treaty has the potential to clarify state obligations for pandemic preparedness and response and strengthen World Health Organization authorities to promote global health security. Examining the essential scope and content of a pandemic treaty, this column analyzes the policymaking processes and substantive authorities necessary to meet this historic moment.

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 568-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M. Burkle

AbstractIf the Ebola tragedy of West Africa has taught us anything, it should be that the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) Treaty, which gave unprecedented authority to the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide global public health security during public health emergencies of international concern, has fallen severely short of its original goal. After encouraging successes with the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic, the intent of the legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats has shamefully lapsed. Despite the granting of 2-year extensions in 2012 to countries to meet core surveillance and response requirements, less than 20% of countries have complied. Today it is not realistic to expect that these gaps will be solved or narrowed in the foreseeable future by the IHR or the WHO alone under current provisions. The unfortunate failures that culminated in an inadequate response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa are multifactorial, including funding, staffing, and poor leadership decisions, but all are reversible. A rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas has been crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the G20 as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the IHR Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of ongoing failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction worldwide. Practitioners and health decision-makers worldwide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:568–580)


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-378
Author(s):  
Sophie Harman

AbstractThe response to COVID-19 demonstrates an inclusive and dispersed form of global health security that is less reliant on the UN Security Council or the World Health Organization (WHO). While WHO remains central to fighting the pandemic, the dispersed global health security addressing the crisis is inclusive of the wider UN system, civil society, and epistemic communities in global health. As part of the special issue on “The United Nations at Seventy-Five: Looking Back to Look Forward,” this essay argues that instead of facing crisis or criticism like WHO, this inclusive and dispersed form of global health security provides mechanisms of resilience and support to the UN at the height of global political tensions surrounding COVID-19.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael McAleer

A novel coronavirus was reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) in China on 31 December 2019. The WHO named the disease COVID-19 on 11 February 2020. As of 26 February 2020, the disease has been detected on all continents, except for Antarctica. Daily updates on COVID-19 since early February 2020 have made headline news worldwide for much of 2020. This editorial evaluates risk management based on the Global Health Security (GHS) Index of global health security capabilities in 195 countries. The GHS Index lists the countries best prepared for an epidemic or pandemic. COVID-19 is compared with two related coronavirus epidemics, SARS and MERS, in terms of the number of reported human infections, deaths, countries, major country clusters, timelines, and the likelihood of discovering a safe, effective, and approved vaccine.


Author(s):  
Pascale Ondoa ◽  
Tjeerd Datema ◽  
Mah-Sere Keita-Sow ◽  
Linda Oskam ◽  
Jean-Bosco Ndihokubwayo ◽  
...  

Background: Functional national laboratory networks and systems are indispensable to the achievement of global health security targets according to the International Health Regulations. The lack of indicators to measure the functionality of national laboratory network has limited the efficiency of past and current interventions to enhance laboratory capacity in resourcelimited-settings.Scorecard for laboratory networks: We have developed a matrix for the assessment of national laboratory network functionality and progress thereof, with support from the African Society of Laboratory Medicine and the Association of Public Health Laboratories. The laboratory network (LABNET) scorecard was designed to: (1) Measure the status of nine overarching core capabilities of laboratory network required to achieve global health security targets, as recommended by the main normative standards; (2) Complement the World Health Organization joint external evaluation tool for the assessment of health system preparedness to International Health Regulations (2005) by providing detailed information on laboratory systems; and (3) Serve as a clear roadmap to guide the stepwise implementation of laboratory capability to prevent, detect and act upon infectious threats.Conclusions: The application of the LABNET scorecard under the coordination of the African Society of Laboratory Medicine and the Association of Public Health Laboratories could contribute to the design, monitoring and evaluation of upcoming Global Health Security Agenda-supported laboratory capacity building programmes in sub Saharan-Africa and other resource-limited settings, and inform the development of national laboratory policies and strategic plans. Endorsement by the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa is foreseen.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 796-799
Author(s):  
Benjamin Mason Meier ◽  
Allyn Taylor ◽  
Mark Eccleston-Turner ◽  
Roojin Habibi ◽  
Sharifah Sekalala ◽  
...  

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