A Theory of the Calculus of Voting

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Explanatory Theory ◽  
Apparent Paradox ◽  
Political Act ◽  
Do So ◽  
As If

Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return.1 This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational.2 This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.3

A Theory of the Calculus of Voting

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Explanatory Theory ◽  
Apparent Paradox ◽  
Political Act ◽  
Do So ◽  
As If

Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return. This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational. This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.

Rational Choice as If the Choosers Were Human

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Boettke ◽  
Rosolino Antonio Candela
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
As If

Part Four

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Fogelin
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Do So ◽  
As If

Philo presses arguments as if drawn from a Pyrrhonist handbook: attempts to put religious belief on a rational footing fail to do so, and even more, they undercut the very commitments they are intended to establish.

scholarly journals Which Diagnostic Approach Is More Valid? The DSM or the Rational-Choice Theory of Neurosis

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yacov Rofé
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Diagnostic Criteria ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Diagnostic Approach ◽  
Diagnostic Categories ◽  
Integrate Research

<p>This article challenges the validity of the DSM-III to exclude neurosis, a decision that has led the DSM to become  “an expanding list of disease, from a few dozen disorders in the first edition to well over 200” (Grinker, 2010, p. 169; see also Warelow &amp; Holmes, 2011). It points out the unanimous consensus that the best diagnostic approach would be a theory that can account for the development and treatment of certain diagnostic categories and, at the same time, provide measurable criteria that can distinguish them from other behaviors. Accordingly, it shows that a new theory, the Rational-Choice Theory of Neurosis (RCTN) (Rofé, 2000, 2010, 2016; Rofé &amp; Rofé, 2013, 2015), which despite profound differences is similar to psychoanalysis in several fundamental respects, can offer practical diagnostic criteria that differentiate neurosis from other disorders. Three types of evidence, including a review of research literature, case studies and a new study that directly examined the validity of RCTN’s diagnostic criteria, support the validity of neurosis. The greatest advantage of RCTN’s diagnostic approach is not only is based on empirical evidence instead of the consensus of biased researchers. Rather, their main contribution is that it emerged out of a theory that succeeded to integrate research and clinical data pertaining to the development and treatment of neurosis.</p>

scholarly journals Data Access, Transparency, and Replication: New Insights from the Political Behavior Literature

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stockemer ◽  
Sebastian Koehler ◽  
Tobias Lentz
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Data Access ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Binding Data ◽  
Electoral Studies ◽  
Quantitative Results ◽  
The Times ◽  
Initial Results ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACTDo researchers share their quantitative data and are the quantitative results that are published in political science journals replicable? We attempt to answer these questions by analyzing all articles published in the 2015 issues of three political behaviorist journals (i.e., Electoral Studies, Party Politics, and Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties)—all of which did not have a binding data-sharing and replication policy as of 2015. We found that authors are still reluctant to share their data; only slightly more than half of the authors in these journals do so. For those who share their data, we mainly confirmed the initial results reported in the respective articles in roughly 70% of the times. Only roughly 5% of the articles yielded significantly different results from those reported in the publication. However, we also found that roughly 25% of the articles organized the data and/or code so poorly that replication was impossible.

Assertiveness level 1

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy D. Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expression ◽  
Behavioral Compliance ◽  
Class A ◽  
Level 1 ◽  
Do So ◽  
As If

We are almost completely non- assertive when we operate in level 1. We say yes when we want to say no. We com­pliment someone simply because she expected it. We acted as if his joke was funny, even though we wanted to tell him how crude it was. Of the Five Levels of Assertiveness, level 1 behaviors are the most deceptive. Functioning at this level hides us. We sacrifice our own peace in order to keep peace with others. We apologize for actions that warrant no apology. We agree publicly and fume privately. We can become so accustomed to repressing our own opinions that it may take some effort to regain our voice. Subjugation and sublimation can become the unhealthy hab­its of level 1. Inauthentic and incongruous messages and behav­iors can result. • “Oh sure, I’m happy to do that for you” (resenting the request, but pretending otherwise). • “I’m so very sorry that I didn’t submit the report on time” (using untrue or inauthentic messages to save face). • “You are so artistic. Your room is beautiful, and mine is so plain” (complimenting to invite a reciprocal compliment). • “If you’ll sit down and get quiet, maybe we can end class a few minutes early” (using a weak, non- authoritative plea to bargain for behavioral compliance from students). A problem of level 1 behavior is that we go overboard to hide our feelings. And we do so to make other people believe we are not bothered by what they have said or done. We become a cha­meleon to fit in, for others’ comfort. Our facial expression is often smiling with soft eyes, and we may use a highly inflected voice. In level 1, we are approval- seekers, willing to sublimate our own sense of authority in order to maintain peace. We appear sweet, kind, and gentle, but under the surface lie repressive discord and disharmony. To be sure, there are times when we knowingly choose to respond in level 1.

scholarly journals Alternative Spaces & Artist Agency in the Art Market

Arts ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Olga Kanzaki Sooudi
Keyword(s):  
Social Bonds ◽  
Art Market ◽  
Future Market ◽  
Art Practice ◽  
Creative Activity ◽  
Ethnographic Fieldwork ◽  
Alternative Spaces ◽  
Do So ◽  
As If ◽  
Market Success

This article explores what alternative, or artist-led, spaces are in Mumbai today and their role within the city’s artworld. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in two alternative spaces, it argues that these are artist attempts to exercise agency in their work for an uncertain market context. In other words, these spaces are a strategy for artists to exercise control over their work in an uncertain art market, and a means to counterbalance their dependence on galleries in their careers. Furthermore, artists do so through collectivist practices. These spaces, I argue, challenge models of artistic and neoliberal work that privilege autonomy, independence, and isolation, as if artists were self-contained silos of productive creative activity and will. Artists instead, in these spaces, insist on the importance of social bonds and connection as a challenge to the instrumentalization and divisive nature of market-led demands on art practice and the model of the solo genius artist-producer. At the same time, their collective activities are oriented towards supporting artists’ individual future market success, suggesting that artist-led spaces are not separate from the art market, and should be considered within the same analytical frame.

Executive Bonus Contract Characteristics and Share Repurchases

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 289-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sunyoung Kim ◽  
Jeff Ng
Keyword(s):  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Compensation Design ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Do So ◽  
As If

ABSTRACT We examine the importance of bonus contract characteristics, specifically, with respect to the relation between EPS-based bonuses and share repurchases. We find that managers are more (less) likely to repurchase shares and spend more (less) on repurchases when as-if EPS just misses (exceeds) the bonus threshold (maximum) EPS level. We find no such relation when as-if EPS is further below the threshold. We find weak evidence that managers of firms with as-if EPS just below the EPS target are more likely to repurchase shares and spend more on repurchases relative to firms with as-if EPS just above the EPS target. We further find that the incentive-zone slopes specified in the bonus contracts are positively associated with share repurchases. Managers making bonus-motivated repurchases do so at a higher cost. Together, our results highlight the importance of compensation design in motivating managers' behavior and aligning managers' incentives with shareholders. JEL Classifications: M41; M52.

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