Rational Choice and Politics: Empirical Evidence and Norms

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yacov Rofé

<p>This article challenges the validity of the DSM-III to exclude neurosis, a decision that has led the DSM to become  “an expanding list of disease, from a few dozen disorders in the first edition to well over 200” (Grinker, 2010, p. 169; see also Warelow &amp; Holmes, 2011). It points out the unanimous consensus that the best diagnostic approach would be a theory that can account for the development and treatment of certain diagnostic categories and, at the same time, provide measurable criteria that can distinguish them from other behaviors. Accordingly, it shows that a new theory, the Rational-Choice Theory of Neurosis (RCTN) (Rofé, 2000, 2010, 2016; Rofé &amp; Rofé, 2013, 2015), which despite profound differences is similar to psychoanalysis in several fundamental respects, can offer practical diagnostic criteria that differentiate neurosis from other disorders. Three types of evidence, including a review of research literature, case studies and a new study that directly examined the validity of RCTN’s diagnostic criteria, support the validity of neurosis. The greatest advantage of RCTN’s diagnostic approach is not only is based on empirical evidence instead of the consensus of biased researchers. Rather, their main contribution is that it emerged out of a theory that succeeded to integrate research and clinical data pertaining to the development and treatment of neurosis.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. p30
Author(s):  
Ingo Fiedler

The standard microeconomic assumption is that consumers’ choices maximize consumers’ utility. This theoretical article challenges this assumption by presenting a framework of an extreme case: compulsive consumption. Backed by a wide range of existing empirical evidence it is shown by the example of pathological gamblers that some consumers (1) have inconsistent preferences, (2) underestimate the time horizon and the frequency of consumption, and (3) underestimate the costs and overestimate the benefits of consumption. The results do not necessarily violate rational choice theory if interpreted as intra-personal externalities. By applying the perspective of picoeconomics, it is possible to reconcile fully rational but competing agents within an individual with inconsistent aggregate decisions. Yet, from a welfare perspective, the results imply that bounded rationality can be interpreted as a source of inefficiency and can thus constitute a rationale for regulatory intervention.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook

Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return.1 This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational.2 This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.3


2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Mehlkop ◽  
Robert Neumann

ZusammenfassungBei der Frage nach den Determinanten der Zustimmung zu sozialstaatlichen Maßnahmen seitens der Bevölkerung wird in der Literatur entweder auf die Werterwartungstheorie oder auf die Bedeutung ergebnisunabhängiger Wertorientierungen und Einstellungen zurückgegriffen. In dieser Arbeit werden beide Ansätze am Beispiel inter- generationaler Transferleistungen für Familien mit Kindern (Erhöhung des Kindergeldes) diskutiert und mithilfe der Entscheidungsheuristik des Modells der Frame Selektion berücksichtigt. Nach Auswertung von Befragungsdaten zur Salienz von familiären Einstellungen und instrumentellen Anreizen kann geschlussfolgert werden, dass beide Ansätze jeweils für unterschiedliche Teile der Bevölkerung eine Erklärung liefern können. Eine vollständige Erklärung variierender Zustimmung mithilfe eines einzigen Erklärungsansatzes kann indes als nicht ausreichend angesehen werden. Die fallspezifische Auswertung von Interaktionseffekten zwischen der generellen Einstellung zur Familie sowie der individuellen Abwägung von Kosten und Nutzen liefert neue Einsichten in die Entscheidungsprozesse. Insbesondere können Unterschiede in den Erwartungen an den Sozialstaat zwischen Befragten aus Ost- und Westdeutschland herausgearbeitet werden.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook

Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return. This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational. This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.


ORDO ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
René Ruske ◽  
Johannes Suttner

ZusammenfassungDer vorliegende Beitrag analysiert Unterschiede zwischen Ökonomen und Nicht-Ökonomen im Hinblick auf die Bewertung verschiedener Mechanismen zur Allokation einer knappen Ressource sowie den isolierten Einfluss von Rational Choice auf die Einstellung von Ökonomen. Zu diesem Zweck führten wir basierend auf Frey et al. (1993) und Haucap und Just (2010) unter über 600 Studenten verschiedener Fachrichtungen der Universität Münster eine Umfrage durch. Es zeigt sich, dass sich abhängig von ihrer Fachrichtung unterschiedliche Ansichten insbesondere über die Fairness des Marktmechanismus ergeben. Hauptsächlich ist dies auf Selbstselektionseffekte unter den Ökonomen zurückzuführen. Eine Konfrontation mit Rational Choice, mit der wir die Indoktrination der Ökonomen messen, führte aber kaum zu Änderungen bei der Einstellung der Ökonomen.


2010 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciana Cingolani

RESUMEN: El artículo se propone ofrecer un análisis integral sobre la manera en que ha sido abordada la cuestión de la inestabilidad de las políticas públicas: su impacto en el desarrollo económico de los países, la heterogeneidad de enfoques teóricos que la estudian, las maneras en que ha sido conceptualizada y las posibles causas que la literatura ha delineado explicando el fenómeno. Ofrece asimismo un diagnóstico sobre los niveles de inestabilidad de las políticas en Argentina y Brasil entre los años 1995 y 2006 y discute brevemente algunas previsiones de la teoría a la luz de los resultados observados. Estos resultados arrojan una serie de conclusiones: a) hay un nivel sustancialmente más alto de inestabilidad de las políticas en Argentina que en Brasil; b) hay una desproporción entre la importancia del concepto como determinante del desarrollo y su sistematización como variable independiente, y c) se produce una serie de contradicciones entre diferentes corrientes neoinstitucionales, y entre algunas de estas teorías y la evidencia empírica. ABSTRACT: The article aims to present a comprehensive analysis of different aspects concerning the concept of policy instability: its impacts on economic development, the multiple and hetereogeneus theoretical approaches that address it, the construction of its definition and the possible causes behind it. It also offers a diagnosis of policy instability levels in Argentina and Brazil between 1995 and 2006, and discusses some of the theoretical previsions in light of the evidence found. The general findings suggest that: a) there is a significantly higher level of policy instability in Argentina than in Brazil, b) there is a mismatch between the importance of policy stability as a determinant of development and its systematization as independent variable, and c) a series of contradictions can be found between different rational choice neoinstitutionalist theories, and between some of these theories and the empirical evidence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirko Uljarević ◽  
Giacomo Vivanti ◽  
Susan R. Leekam ◽  
Antonio Y. Hardan

Abstract The arguments offered by Jaswal & Akhtar to counter the social motivation theory (SMT) do not appear to be directly related to the SMT tenets and predictions, seem to not be empirically testable, and are inconsistent with empirical evidence. To evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the SMT and identify scientifically testable alternatives, advances are needed on the conceptualization and operationalization of social motivation across diagnostic boundaries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Corbit ◽  
Chris Moore

Abstract The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer two additions to this framework: a description of the developmental process through which second-personal competence emerges from early triadic interactions, and empirical evidence that collaboration with a concrete goal may provide an essential focal point for this integrative process.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document