scholarly journals “Outside Lobbying” over the Airwaves: A Randomized Field Experiment on Televised Issue Ads

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
JOSHUA L. KALLA ◽  
DAVID E. BROOCKMAN
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
Persuasive Power ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Interest Group Influence

We present the first field experiment on how organized interest groups’ television ads affect issue opinions. We randomized 31,404 voters to three weeks of interest group ads about either immigration or transgender nondiscrimination. We then randomly assigned voters to receive ostensibly unrelated surveys either while the ads aired, one day after they stopped, or three days afterwards. Voters recalled the ads, but three ads had a minimal influence on public opinion, whereas a fourth’s effects decayed within one day. However, voters remembered a fact from one ad. Our results suggest issue ads can affect public opinion but that not every ad persuades and that persuasive effects decay. Despite the vast sums spent on television ads, our results are the first field experiment on their persuasive power on issues, shedding light on the mechanisms underpinning—and limits on—both televised persuasion and interest group influence.

Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America. By Kenneth M. Goldstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 170p. $49.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-210
Author(s):  
Beth L. Leech
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Research Projects ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Convincing Argument ◽  
Mass Participation ◽  
Interest Group Influence

Studies of interest-group influence on politics and studies of mass participation in politics typically have been quite separate undertakings. With a few notable exceptions, research projects have been designed to examine one or the other, not both, and the influence of interest-group activity on mass political activity is too seldom considered. In this broadly integrative book, Kenneth Goldstein makes a convincing argument for why this should not be the case.

The Two Energy Crises and Canadian Oil and Gas Interest Groups: A Re-examination of Berry's Propositions

1986 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen Toner ◽  
G. Bruce Doern
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Energy Crisis ◽  
Policy Response ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Canadian Association ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Interest Group Influence ◽  
Policy Interest

AbstractThis article examines the impact of two policy crises on the structure and behaviour of Canadian oil and gas interest groups. It first retests Glyn Berry's three propositions developed in 1974 after the first energy crisis, in light of the second energy crisis in 1979–1980. It then generates and examines two further propositions. The three propositions retested are: that interest group influence declines during a crisis; that if the crisis necessitates intensive federal-provincial bargaining, this tendency is accentuated, and that when facing a serious governmental threat the group under attack will seek to exert its influence as widely as possible. The article shows that the evidence from the second crisis supports the validity of the above propositions, but in addition two further hypotheses are examined and found valid. These are: that in post-crisis periods interest group influence is re-established, but that where crises broaden the scope of policy, interest groups are restructured so as to accommodate the broadened interests which both benefit from and are harmed by the crisis policy response. The interest groups examined are the Canadian Petroleum Association, the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada, the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors, and the Canadian Gas Association.

How to measure interest group influence: Italy’s professional orders and liberalization policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Andrea Pritoni
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Conceptual Definition ◽  
Liberalization Policy ◽  
Interest Group Influence

The question of who wins or loses in the policy process lies at the heart of recent research into both interest groups and public policy. However, one of the most difficult challenges when empirically analysing interest groups consists in knowing exactly how to measure their influence: despite the fact that this question has been addressed by political scientists for decades, significant problems remain regarding both the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of influence. In order to develop a better understanding of interest group influence, I recommend as follows: (a) that such influence be conceptualized as a degree of preference attainment; (b) that the degree of generality of the concept be downgraded, by breaking it up on the basis of two fundamental dimensions: the lobbying direction (pro-status quoor anti-status quo) and the policy-making stage (agenda setting; decision making; implementation); (c) to proceed with a manual hand-coding in order to obtain a list of the policy issues around which interest groups lobby; (d) to resort to an expert survey in order to evaluate these issues. This methodological approach is used to empirically measure the influence that Italy’s professional orders had on the liberalization process championed by the second Prodi government in 2006.

Interest Groups and Order in Global Economic Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Osgood
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Order And Disorder ◽  
Prime Movers ◽  
The Many ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Interest Group Influence

Scholars of international relations have long pointed to organized interest groups as prime movers in the creation of order and disorder in global economic relations. This review introduces interest groups, illustrating the many types—representing producers, workers, consumers, issues, ideologies, and identities—that are examined in current scholarship. The costs, benefits, and challenges of collective organization are highlighted. It also provides a synthetic overview of four stylized varieties of interest group explanations for international order, focusing on: preferences and group size; organization and parties; domestic political institutions; and international institutions and organizations. Each of these factors shaping interest group influence has been treated as fixed in some accounts and as an endogenous outcome of interest group activity in others. Interest group-centered explanations for global order remain a vital and variegated approach within International Political Economy (IPE).

Influence without Bribes: A Noncontracting Model of Campaign Giving and Policymaking

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Fox ◽  
Lawrence Rothenberg
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Policy Preference ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Interest Group Influence

Efforts to find empirical evidence that campaign money impacts policymaking choices have offered scant support for interest group influence. A possible explanation is that the hypothesis that those receiving campaign monies should adjust their policy choices to favor their donor requires the untenable assumption that interest groups and legislators can implement contracts. We develop a new, alternative, model in which legislators and interest groups cannot engage in any form of contracting, and legislators care about both the policy and fundraising implications of their policy choices. In our model, an interest group gives only to those it believes shares its policy preferences. Nonetheless, we show that the group's giving impacts incumbent policy choices. Importantly, when groups ideologically match, the relationship between actual contributions and bias is not straightforward. As long as a group is uncertain about a member's primitive policy preference, it can influence her policymaking even when it contributes to her challenger or abstains from giving altogether.

scholarly journals When do political parties listen to interest groups?

2022 ◽  
pp. 135406882110628
Author(s):  
Maiken Røed
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Group Information ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Source Of Information ◽  
Interest Group Influence ◽  
Issue Emphasis

This paper examines when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. Interest group information can help parties bolster their positions, and by taking their input into account, parties show that they are responsive to the groups’ interests which can increase their appeal to their constituents. Listening to interest groups can, however, also repel voters who disagree with the groups’ positions. This paper argues that party and issue-level characteristics affect whether the benefits of listening to interest groups exceed the costs. Examining more than 25,000 party-interest group observations on 88 Norwegian policy proposals and using a text reuse approach to measure interest group influence, the findings indicate that public salience, party issue emphasis, interest group coalitions, and government status affect parties’ propensity to listen. This implies that interest groups can be a pertinent source of information for parties under certain circumstances which affects the link between voters and parties.

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