Voter Rationality and Party Competition: A Comment on Laver's Suggested Approach

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Budge
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Party Identification ◽  
Rapid Change ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Suggested Approach ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Voting Choice

Laver is undoubtedly right in suggesting (a) that ideas of rationality are more of a hindrance than a help in explaining electors' behaviour, but (b) that a rational-choice theory of party competition can still be superimposed on an a-rational explanation of voting choice. Since he develops this position through a critique of Robertson's ‘wide’ definition of voter rationality, it is only fair to point out that Robertson's ascription of modified office-seeking to politicians forms the best developed rational – choice theory of party competition. The hypothesis that politicians seek votes by widening their issue-appeals when they think the election is competitive, but stress partisan appeals otherwise, has been validated for British and United States' elections from 1920 to 1974 – a more general and more rigorous check than has been applied to any competing hypothesis. Moreover it has already been incorporated with an a-rational account of voting behaviour in the form Laver advocates. The key elements of this synthesis are:(1) The location of electors and parties in a party-defined space, i.e. a space where individuals and groups are located in terms of their closeness to the election alternatives (party choices and non-voting). This is analogous to, but quite definitely not, the space produced by party identification, to which there are too many measurement objections.(2) The division of influences upon voting into predispositions (loyalties, social group traditions, etc.) and cues (current issues, candidates, etc.). Predispositions are associated with electoral stability, i.e. limited and slow movement in the party-defined space. Cues have the potential to produce rapid change and widespread movement of electors, often associated with the appearance of new parties.(3) Modified office-seeking by politicians. In elections which they expect to be competitive there is thus a premium on the introduction of new cues, while in other elections old partisan appeals will be made to existing predispositions.

Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN D. FISHER
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Election Study ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
First Choice ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Methodological Considerations

There has been substantial debate on the measurement of tactical voting in this Journal, much of which has actually been concerned with the definition of a tactical vote. For this reason it is necessary to go ‘back to basics’ to examine the notion of a tactical vote within rational choice theory and follow its implications for the measurement of tactical voting. This Note has four aims: to elucidate the formal theoretical concepts behind the notion of tactical voting; to provide a practical definition of tactical voting based on those concepts; to examine and use the implications of the theory and definition to evaluate existing measures of tactical voting; and to further appraise measures of tactical voting from general methodological considerations. This Note focuses on tactical voting in single-member simple-plurality electoral systems. The following section argues that the range of situations where it may be optimal to vote tactically is both broader and less well defined than previous authors have generally realized. This implies that both the definition, and therefore the measurement, of tactical voting rest mainly on the criteria of voting for a party other than the first choice and doing so in order to best influence who wins. The empirical section examines various approaches to the measurement of tactical voting and argues that the Heath et al. measure is a priori the most attractive available. Furthermore, detailed analysis using British Election Study (BES) data from English voters in 1987, 1992 and 1997, shows that whilst the Heath et al. measure is relatively robust, it can be usefully revised to improve consistency with the strength-of-feeling scores. A corresponding method for identifying a voter's preferred party is also presented.

Voting Choice and Rational Choice

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony McGann
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Voter Choice ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
Voting Choice ◽  
Traditional Understanding

Rational choice theory may seem like a separate theoretical approach with its own forbidding mathematics. However, the central assumptions of rational choice theory are very similar to those in mainstream political behavior and even interpretive sociology. Indeed, many of the statistical methods used in empirical political behavior assume axiomatic models of voter choice. When we consider individual voting behavior, the contribution of rational choice has been to formalize what empirical political scientists do anyway, and provide some new tools. However, it is when we consider collective voting choice—what elections mean and what kind of policy outcomes result—that rational choice leads to new, counterintuitive insights. Rational choice also has a normative dimension. Without voter rationality the traditional understanding of democracy as popular choice makes little sense.

Rational Choice Theory and the 1990 Party Merger in South Korea

OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory

POLITICS-LAW CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 'SMALL' POLITICAL PARTIES, REALPOLITIKAND SOUTH AFRICA'S 20 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Democratic Consolidation ◽  
Secondary Research ◽  
Extant Literature ◽  
African Charter

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.

Rational Choice Contractualism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Correct Choice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Decision Situation ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Traditional Understanding

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.

Two Theorists of Action: Ihering and Weber

1991 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Turner
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
German Philosopher ◽  
Historical Role

AbstractRudolf von Ihering was the leading German philosopher of law of the nineteenth century. He was also a major source of Weber’s more famous sociological definitions of action. Characteristically, Weber transformed material he found: in this case Ihering attempt to reconcile the causaland teleological aspects of action. In Ihering’s hands these become, respectively, the external and internal moments of action, or intentional thought and the factual consequences of action. For Weber they are made into epistemic aspects of action, the causal and the meaningful, each of which is essential to an account of action, but which are logically and epistemically distinct. Ihering thought purposes were the products of underlying interests, but included ‘ideal’ interests in this category. Weber radicalized this by expanding the category and making it historically central. This radicalization bears on rational choice theory: if ideal interests have a large historical role independent of material interests, and are not fully explicable on such grounds as ‘sour grapes’, the methods appropriate to the study of the transformation of ideas, meaning genealogies in the Nietzschean sense, are central to the explanation of action.

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