Citizenship and Autonomy

This chapter argues that an adult’s right to citizenship follows from her right to securely pursue her good in the liberal state where she already has a moral right to live permanently. It defends the claim that when people migrate on a permanent basis to a liberal state in adulthood, they develop the legitimate expectation that they are allowed to pursue core projects and relationships that are territorially located and that extend across time. It also defends the claim that when adults start pursuing core projects and relationships, they acquire an autonomy-based moral claim to pursue them reliably into the future, as well as to engage in political actions that bear on how such projects and relationships can be pursued in the future.

5. The ‘Cambridge School’

‘The ‘Cambridge School’’ talks about the Cambridge School of the History of Political Thought, which rejected Marxist approaches for propagating bad history. Cambridge School’s story is very complex and is the product of John Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and John Dunn. The three scholars formulated their ideas about how the history of political thought should become a field in the 1960s. It is worth considering the history of political thought in Britain and Cambridge as a way to understand why Pocock, Skinner, and Dunn wanted to do things differently. The story of the three scholars is tied to the history of liberalism or the story of Britain as a liberal state.

Living According to Conscience

We discuss the proposal of Chandran Kukathas engaged in one of the goals of‎liberal theories: the protection of freedom of conscience. Kukathas proposes‎the metaphor of a liberal archipelago where different communities are sovereign‎in enforcing their worldview on their territory. We share Kukathas’s‎intention to strongly protect freedom of conscience, but we think that Kukathas’s‎theory fails to adequately protect it. In Kukathas’s view, freedom of‎conscience is protected through freedom of association and the related freedom‎to exit an association. But freedom of exit, intended only as a right not‎to be coerced when one wants to leave, is insufficient. It must be sustained by‎the provision of capabilities to leave that one can exercise, as well as by capabilities‎to evaluate her condition. We discuss, then, a more promising proposal‎of an egalitarian libertarian archipelago proposed by Michael Otsuka. After‎explaining why this system isn’t sufficiently stable, we conclude that the constitutional‎egalitarian liberal state is a better candidate.‎

The faces of freedom in the concepts of a liberal and non-liberal state

The last decade has exposed the recession of freedom throughout the world. It arises from the latest Freedom in the World 2020 report that civil liberties and political rights have deteriorated in 64 countries, while only 37 have seen a slight improvement in these areas. The principles of liberal democracy (the rule of law, free elections, minority rights and freedom of expression) in Europe, historically the best-performing region in terms of freedom in the world, have come under serious pressure in recent years. In the article, starting from an analysis of the categories of freedom presented in many aspects, followed by a discussion of the assumptions and concepts of liberalism, as well as the political project referred to as non-liberal democracy, which has grown out of their criticism, the author identifies the problem of instrumentalization and relativization of freedom, which leads to the restriction of freedom of speech, freedom of minorities, religious freedom and sexual freedom, replacing the individual freedoms of the citizens with the so-called collective freedom.

O niektórych powiązaniach między ekspansywnością prawa karnego a państwową ingerencją w gospodarkę (perspektywa indywidualistyczna)

The article deals with the issue of common elements between expansion of criminal law regulations and state intervention in the economy. Taking the perspective of individualism, the author assumes that the paternalism behind these phenomena is difficult to accept. In a liberal state, the law should not be used to impose certain moral attitudes on citizens.

Pacifying Leviathan: Back to basics in peace-building out of conflict

<p>This thesis focuses critically on contemporary theory and practice of peace-building where there has been conflict. The commonality of the resumption of violence after peace processes in many recent examples, suggests that both theory and practice have not worked as intended. The thesis explores insights that might improve the odds that governing institutions (or, more particularly, the people who work in them) can put aside violence. In the terms used in this thesis: how might Leviathan be pacified? Therefore, the thesis deals with basics evident in all recorded (and probably pre-historic) human experience. For the modern states of Western Europe and North America, pacifying Leviathan followed centuries of conflict (including two world wars), interspersed with governance reforms and constitutional adjustments. The process is ongoing, but by the middle of the 20th century “the liberal state” clearly emerged, with features that included constitutions, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the market system. There appeared to be a widespread view after World War II that the liberal state apparatus’ essence could be written down in documents, transplanted into many different historical and cultural contexts and would work much as the model predicted i.e. was easily reproducible, perhaps infinitely, even in smaller and smaller versions. From 1945 to 2010, the numbers of states at the United Nations almost quadrupled (51 to 192). Member 193 (South Sudan) may emerge from decades of conflict in 2011. In all that state formation, the optimistic view was that the new documents and institutions would provide structures within which political and/or ethnic competitors/combatants would engage in non-violent political competition. In this thesis, “reverse-engineering” is the term given to this notion. Such optimism was severely dented by the experiences of many newly-independent states in the mid-late 20th century. As violence escalated in new and existing states all over the world after the Cold War ended (taken, for convenience, as 1990), reverse-engineering remained at the core of the formula for peace-building after conflict. As with the post-colonial period, liberal peace-building since 1990 have also been repeated failures to work as intended, including the resumption of conflict. The most fragile states have posed the hardest problems, not only for the suffering citizens but for the international community seeking how best to help. With this in mind, and accepting that each state and society is unique, this thesis sets out building blocks for alternative approaches. It does not suggest there are simple answers in pacifying Leviathan, either generally or in relation to any particular example. If it is indeed possible in any place (e.g. Haiti) to reduce ongoing conflict, the argument is that these blocks should be amongst the foundations of theory to inform practice. The core thesis is thus that the chances of pacifying Leviathan might be significantly improved if domestic and international actors: • Adopt a conflict transformation approach to guide theory and practice; • Come to terms with groupism – how/why humans bond into groups and the potential this poses for violence and peace; • Understand the importance of receptivity - the notion that critical masses of key actors should squarely face (often when they have become exhausted by) the consequences of violent competitiveness and seek alternatives; • Translate receptivity into learned constitutionalism – learning to govern by rules amongst sufficient actors; and • Develop international assistance guided by the above perspectives, and which, with the consent of the peoples concerned, find ways to stay appropriately engaged for the time needed to strengthen the factors that should pacify Leviathan. The thesis does not focus on future strategies of conflict-reduction – such as economic development to give people stakes in the society, along with disarmament of combatants. Many other studies explore these. Here, the exploration is of the nature of human society, informed by history, examples, case studies and a sweep of cross-disciplinary analysis. Understanding why pacifying Leviathan is so hard is the basic first step, which forms the bulk of this thesis. Putting such understanding into practice involves many further steps. Important as these might be for current and future policy and practice in peace-building, their full development is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some suggestions are made, especially in the conclusion, but elaboration will have to await further work.</p>

Pacifying Leviathan: Back to basics in peace-building out of conflict

<p>This thesis focuses critically on contemporary theory and practice of peace-building where there has been conflict. The commonality of the resumption of violence after peace processes in many recent examples, suggests that both theory and practice have not worked as intended. The thesis explores insights that might improve the odds that governing institutions (or, more particularly, the people who work in them) can put aside violence. In the terms used in this thesis: how might Leviathan be pacified? Therefore, the thesis deals with basics evident in all recorded (and probably pre-historic) human experience. For the modern states of Western Europe and North America, pacifying Leviathan followed centuries of conflict (including two world wars), interspersed with governance reforms and constitutional adjustments. The process is ongoing, but by the middle of the 20th century “the liberal state” clearly emerged, with features that included constitutions, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the market system. There appeared to be a widespread view after World War II that the liberal state apparatus’ essence could be written down in documents, transplanted into many different historical and cultural contexts and would work much as the model predicted i.e. was easily reproducible, perhaps infinitely, even in smaller and smaller versions. From 1945 to 2010, the numbers of states at the United Nations almost quadrupled (51 to 192). Member 193 (South Sudan) may emerge from decades of conflict in 2011. In all that state formation, the optimistic view was that the new documents and institutions would provide structures within which political and/or ethnic competitors/combatants would engage in non-violent political competition. In this thesis, “reverse-engineering” is the term given to this notion. Such optimism was severely dented by the experiences of many newly-independent states in the mid-late 20th century. As violence escalated in new and existing states all over the world after the Cold War ended (taken, for convenience, as 1990), reverse-engineering remained at the core of the formula for peace-building after conflict. As with the post-colonial period, liberal peace-building since 1990 have also been repeated failures to work as intended, including the resumption of conflict. The most fragile states have posed the hardest problems, not only for the suffering citizens but for the international community seeking how best to help. With this in mind, and accepting that each state and society is unique, this thesis sets out building blocks for alternative approaches. It does not suggest there are simple answers in pacifying Leviathan, either generally or in relation to any particular example. If it is indeed possible in any place (e.g. Haiti) to reduce ongoing conflict, the argument is that these blocks should be amongst the foundations of theory to inform practice. The core thesis is thus that the chances of pacifying Leviathan might be significantly improved if domestic and international actors: • Adopt a conflict transformation approach to guide theory and practice; • Come to terms with groupism – how/why humans bond into groups and the potential this poses for violence and peace; • Understand the importance of receptivity - the notion that critical masses of key actors should squarely face (often when they have become exhausted by) the consequences of violent competitiveness and seek alternatives; • Translate receptivity into learned constitutionalism – learning to govern by rules amongst sufficient actors; and • Develop international assistance guided by the above perspectives, and which, with the consent of the peoples concerned, find ways to stay appropriately engaged for the time needed to strengthen the factors that should pacify Leviathan. The thesis does not focus on future strategies of conflict-reduction – such as economic development to give people stakes in the society, along with disarmament of combatants. Many other studies explore these. Here, the exploration is of the nature of human society, informed by history, examples, case studies and a sweep of cross-disciplinary analysis. Understanding why pacifying Leviathan is so hard is the basic first step, which forms the bulk of this thesis. Putting such understanding into practice involves many further steps. Important as these might be for current and future policy and practice in peace-building, their full development is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some suggestions are made, especially in the conclusion, but elaboration will have to await further work.</p>

Allal Al-Fassi’s Utopia: Liberalism and Democracy within the Revivalist System of Thought

This paper examines the political writings of the Moroccan nationalist Allal Al-Fassi (1910-1974). It argues that there exists a considerable political tendency in these writings with excessive utilisation of jargon related to liberalism and political theory. In his intellectual and political project, Al-Fassi theorises about the possibility of creating a modern state on solid democratic and liberal foundations. Yet, however legitimate and seemingly liberal his theorisation might seem, the paper argues that the formation of a liberal state and a democratic society appears to be a mere dream given the fact that Al-Fassi grounds his conceptions within the Salafist and revivalist intellectual systems. Reading between the lines of his political works, nevertheless, reveals the dominance of Salafist intellections which deem the past and Islam as restorative in attaining a modern renaissance, at the political, economic, and cultural levels. This work, thus, problematizes three central points: the political tendency of Al-Fassi’s project, his religious and Salafist remnants and conceptions, and finally the possible ideological implications and interests that Al-Fassi seems to defend.