Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability: Richard Seddon and the Art of Majority Rule

1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack H. Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Political System ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Institutional Barriers ◽  
Frequent Change ◽  
Barriers To Change ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
The Will

Because New Zealand's majoritarian political system presents few institutional barriers to change, social choice theory would predict that it should experience frequent change in governments and policies. Although some periods in New Zealand history confirm this expectation, a striking exception is the Liberal era of 1890–1912. To explain the anomaly, this article applies Riker's concept of heresthetics, the strategic manipulation of decision processes and alternatives. The Liberal leader, Richard Seddon, masterfully exploited four main heresthetic devices that offer enduring insight about how to sustain a popular majority. While extending the scope of heresthetics as an explanatory principle, the article rebuts Riker's normative dismissal of populism. In terms compatible with social choice theory itself, Seddon's strategies can be interpreted as having enabled the will of the majority to prevail.

scholarly journals ”Hvorfor så meget stabilitet”? Stabiliserende elementer i det danske politiske system

Politik ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malthe Munkøe
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Political System ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Collective Preference

Social choice research has shown that collective preference aggregation mechanisms under some conditions will produce arbitrary results, and are prone to endless cycles or strategic manipulation. is prompted Tul- lock (1981) to ask the question “Why so much stability”? at is to say, what explains the discrepancy between these results which implicates that politics is chaotic and random, and general understanding of how politics works in practice. e literature has identi ed a number of mechanisms, including “structure-inducing” in- stitutions that have a stabilizing e ect on the political system. As such it is ultimately an empirical question to what extent a political system is stable or not, and what institutions, norms and arrangements engender stability. is article considers the Danish political system from the point of view of social choice theory and discusses which institutions and arrangements work to stabilize it. 

scholarly journals Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gal Shahaf ◽  
Ehud Shapiro ◽  
Nimrod Talmon
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Online Community ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Will ◽  
Effective Group ◽  
Decision Mechanisms

Sybil attacks, in which fake or duplicate identities (a.k.a., Sybils) infiltrate an online community, pose a serious threat to such communities, as they might tilt community-wide decisions in their favor. While the extensive research on sybil identification may help keep the fraction of sybils in such communities low, it cannot however ensure their complete eradication. Thus, our goal here is to enhance social choice theory with effective group decision mechanisms for communities with bounded sybil penetration. Inspired by Reality-Aware Social Choice, we use the status quo as the anchor of Sybil Resilience, characterized by Sybil Safety -- the inability of sybils to change the status quo against the will of the genuine agents, and Sybil Liveness -- the ability of the genuine agents to change the status quo against the will of the sybils. We consider the social choice settings of deciding on a single proposal, on multiple proposals, and on updating a parameter. For each, we present social choice rules that are sybil-safe and, under certain conditions, satisfy sybil-liveness.

Majority Judgment

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Order Function ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Majority Judgment

This chapter describes the majority judgment method used to elect officials; to classify wines; and to judge Olympic competitors in skating, diving, and gymnastics. It also provides ways to counteract cheating and strategic manipulation of the judges or the voters. The desirable properties of classical social choice theory are satisfied by the majority judgment method. The chapter also explains several key ideas, including majority-grade, majority-ranking, majority-value, majority-gauge, abbreviated majority-value, and kth-order function. It demonstrates the superiority of the majority judgment to any other method of voting and judging competitions by comparing the basic principles of the traditional theory of social choice.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document