Political Knowledge and Misinformation in the Era of Social Media: Evidence From the 2015 UK Election

Author(s):  
Kevin Munger ◽  
Patrick J. Egan ◽  
Jonathan Nagler ◽  
Jonathan Ronen ◽  
Joshua Tucker

Abstract Does social media educate voters, or mislead them? This study measures changes in political knowledge among a panel of voters surveyed during the 2015 UK general election campaign while monitoring the political information to which they were exposed on the Twitter social media platform. The study's panel design permits identification of the effect of information exposure on changes in political knowledge. Twitter use led to higher levels of knowledge about politics and public affairs, as information from news media improved knowledge of politically relevant facts, and messages sent by political parties increased knowledge of party platforms. But in a troubling demonstration of campaigns' ability to manipulate knowledge, messages from the parties also shifted voters' assessments of the economy and immigration in directions favorable to the parties' platforms, leaving some voters with beliefs further from the truth at the end of the campaign than they were at its beginning.

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-321
Author(s):  
Rasmus Fleischer ◽  
Christopher Kullenberg

This article discusses the political significance of the streaming music company Spotify in Sweden, taking as a case a coordinated campaign in late spring 2016, known by the hashtag #backaspotify (translated as “support Spotify!”), which was mainly played out on the social media platform Twitter. The campaign is analysed using a set of data retrieved from Twitter, examining both the content and the interactions in 1,791 messages. Results show that the main political issue concerned the lack of access to rented apartments in central Stockholm, and that the main actors in the campaign were predominantly associated with public affairs consultants and the youth wings of political parties belonging to the centre-right. The campaign, however, was very short-lived and had diminished significantly already after two days. We conclude that Spotify transcends its role as a streaming music company, and additionally can be used as a point of reference in political campaigns to promote issues that are of wider scope than the music industry alone.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 771-781 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T Daniel ◽  
Lukas Obholzer ◽  
Steffen Hurka

In this article, we examine the static and dynamic factors that explain the use of the Twitter social media platform by all active Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the Fall and Winter of 2015–2016. Our analysis demonstrates that MEPs have an incentive to take to Twitter that varies across the European Parliament's (EP) highly segmented legislative calendar, but that MEPs are also affected by more constant differences in their national political parties and electoral systems of origin, as well as by their home constituencies. Our findings contribute to a picture of the EP as a diverse legislature that fosters diverse legislator interests with respect to voter outreach.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 553-555
Author(s):  
Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz

Political knowledge today is studied primarily at the explicit level. Measures of political knowledge often rely on testing whether voters are aware of various “facts” about political life, such as the names and offices of prominent political actors, the institutional structures of the political system, and the ideological or policy differences between the major political parties (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). These various kinds of political information are considered to be important by political scientists and other social scientists because they facilitate the informed voting decisions that are needed to hold elected leaders accountable (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Pande 2011).


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-119
Author(s):  
Wenhao Bi

The ‘danmu’ system in the Chinese video-sharing social media platform Bilibili, in allowing comments to sync to any specific playback time, has constructed a community where separated viewers can join in the seemingly simultaneous conversations at the same time they watch videos. The participatory design of such co-presence demonstrates the political and cultural gesture of speaking out and exchanging ideas as the main orientation of the platform. Through danmu comments are the living networks connected both in the videos they are attached to, and in Bilibili as a whole. Despite the instantaneous emotions displayed in individual danmu comments, there are affective connections that shape the temporal quality of participation. The playfulness embedded in the interface design has further directed the gratification of speaking out on the platform.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis LF Lee

Social media have become the main channel of news and public affairs information for the public. They have also become the platform on which new actors in public communication emerge. As the institutions of public communication are reconfigured, the way news flows and evolves also changes. This article draws upon and revises Chadwick’s conception of political information cycle and argues that news should be understood as circulating and evolving in the political information cycles embedded in an integrated media system. Within a political information cycle, various actors other than mainstream media outlets can serve as intermediaries and engage in agenda-steering and frame generation. The arguments are illustrated with a case study of the 2017 Chief Executive election in Hong Kong. An examination of the overall prominence of different types of actors in social media and analyses of a number of incidents during the election illustrate the multifarious ways the political information cycle can operate.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Amanda Richardson

<p><b>This thesis investigates responses in voting behaviour and media perceptions to the presence of media scandals about politicians and associated political parties during the 2017 New Zealand general election. A repeated measures design was used wherein 351 participants were recruited before the start of the election campaign, primarily from an Introductory Psychology course at Victoria University of Wellington. Follow-up surveys were conducted at three time points throughout the two month campaign. Participants were randomly allocated into one of two conditions for each follow-up survey. Half the participants were given a real news article to read about a media scandal, the other half read an article about a policy platform by the same political party. At the end of the election campaign, participants were asked about their voting behaviours. A second study was conducted after Labour Party leader, Jacinda Ardern, was announced Prime Minister with participants recruited via social media sites ‘Twitter’ and ‘Facebook’. In this study, 153 participants recalled information about scandals that were present in the media during the election campaign.</b></p> <p>Results showed that political scandals in news media do have an influence on voter perceptions, but not in an easily predictable way. Prior perceptions of political parties were the best predictors of who participants intended to vote for. Participants responded most strongly to public policy articles rather than scandal information, particularly those more knowledgeable of New Zealand’s political system, and therefore likely more engaged with politics in general. Further, there was evidence that information presented in the media influenced how participants viewed political parties that were not involved in the scandal, which is an important under a proportional voting system like MMP which requires understanding of the relationships between parties.</p> <p>Evidence was also found for a backlash effect towards the media wherein participants who were exposed to scandal information would displayed a decrease in trust towards the general media, consistent with the idea that one reason why voters may not respond negatively to scandal information reflects the decision that the source of the information is not credible. Future research should consider more targeted analysis on the different sources of news media, especially new media like blogs, social media, and entertainment news.</p>


Author(s):  
Thomas Swann

Chapter Seven presents a schematic account of the functions a social media platform would need to have in order to fulfil the roles required of it by anarchist cybernetics. Drawing on the negative critiques of existing social media platforms and the positive requirements outlined by activists and scholars, this chapter asks what an alternative social media platform would look like and how it would be different from the commercial platforms we use everyday. The chapter identifies four broad lines of critique aimed at the use of social media in anarchist cybernetic organising: (1) the privacy critique (2) the political economy critique; (3) the weak ties critique; and (4) the political subjectivity critique. The chapter provides a sketch of what such an alternative platform would look like, identifying the key features that aid the functionality of such a platform for self-organisation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (23) ◽  
pp. eabf1234
Author(s):  
R. Kelly Garrett ◽  
Robert M. Bond

The idea that U.S. conservatives are uniquely likely to hold misperceptions is widespread but has not been systematically assessed. Research has focused on beliefs about narrow sets of claims never intended to capture the richness of the political information environment. Furthermore, factors contributing to this performance gap remain unclear. We generated an unique longitudinal dataset combining social media engagement data and a 12-wave panel study of Americans’ political knowledge about high-profile news over 6 months. Results confirm that conservatives have lower sensitivity than liberals, performing worse at distinguishing truths and falsehoods. This is partially explained by the fact that the most widely shared falsehoods tend to promote conservative positions, while corresponding truths typically favor liberals. The problem is exacerbated by liberals’ tendency to experience bigger improvements in sensitivity than conservatives as the proportion of partisan news increases. These results underscore the importance of reducing the supply of right-leaning misinformation.


Author(s):  
Dan Mercea

This article leverages social media and survey data to probe the scope and depth of political knowledge possessed by participants in the Romanian 2017 #rezist protests. For several months, demonstrators gathered in town squares around the country to oppose a project law intended to water down penalties for corruption in high office. Against the backdrop of well-founded scepticism regarding exposure to and engagement with political knowledge on social media, we scrutinize the social media usage of protestors with an interest in the formulation and circulation of political knowledge. We find evidence of applied political knowledge as a prominent component of public activist communication on Facebook. An examination of the network structure further revealed bottlenecks in the circulation and brokerage of knowledge, a result that helps qualify the aforementioned scepticism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (26) ◽  
pp. e2024292118
Author(s):  
Steve Rathje ◽  
Jay J. Van Bavel ◽  
Sander van der Linden

There has been growing concern about the role social media plays in political polarization. We investigated whether out-group animosity was particularly successful at generating engagement on two of the largest social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter. Analyzing posts from news media accounts and US congressional members (n = 2,730,215), we found that posts about the political out-group were shared or retweeted about twice as often as posts about the in-group. Each individual term referring to the political out-group increased the odds of a social media post being shared by 67%. Out-group language consistently emerged as the strongest predictor of shares and retweets: the average effect size of out-group language was about 4.8 times as strong as that of negative affect language and about 6.7 times as strong as that of moral-emotional language—both established predictors of social media engagement. Language about the out-group was a very strong predictor of “angry” reactions (the most popular reactions across all datasets), and language about the in-group was a strong predictor of “love” reactions, reflecting in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. This out-group effect was not moderated by political orientation or social media platform, but stronger effects were found among political leaders than among news media accounts. In sum, out-group language is the strongest predictor of social media engagement across all relevant predictors measured, suggesting that social media may be creating perverse incentives for content expressing out-group animosity.


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