The Lawless Case

1962 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-251
Author(s):  
P. O'Higgins

On November 4, 1950, at Rome, thirteen member nations of the Council of Europe signed a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The purpose of the Convention was to give practical effect to some of the ideals embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. In contrast to the Universal Declaration, which is a statement of long-term ideals having no binding force in law, the European Convention guarantees to everyone within the jurisdiction of the signatory states certain rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention. Chief among these are the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman punishment; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; the right not to be deprived of personal liberty save in certain specified circumstances; freedom of religion, thought and conscience; freedom of assembly and association; the right to marry, and the right to respect for private and family life. By a Protocol signed on March 20, 1953, three further rights were added, namely the right to property; the right to educate one's children in conformity with one's conscience, and the right to free elections. As one of the architects of the Convention, Sean MacBride S.C., former Irish Minister for External Affairs and subsequently counsel for the applicant in the Lawless case, has said:“In effect, the Convention of Human Rights is a supranational constitution which binds the states accepting it to secure to all human beings within their jurisdiction the rights defined in the Convention.”

1989 ◽  
Vol 29 (270) ◽  
pp. 196-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hernán Salinas Burgos

It is generally acknowledged by the international community that the taking of hostages is one of the most vile and reprehensible of acts. This crime violates fundamental individual rights—the right to life, to liberty and to security—that are protected by binding legal instruments such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the worldwide level, and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the regional level. The United Nations General Assembly has stated that the taking of hostages is an act which places innocent human lives in danger and violates human dignity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 1439-1444
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Marina M. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper is dedicated to ne bis in idem principle, which is a fundamental human right safeguarded by Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This principle is sometimes also referred to as double jeopardy.The principle implies that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted (internal ne bis in idem principle), and that in some other State or before the International Court (ne bis in idem principle in respect of the relations between the states or the State and the International Court) the procedure may not be conducted if the person has already been sentenced or acquitted. The identity of the indictable act (idem), the other component of this principle, is more complex and more difficult to be determined than the first one (ne bis).The objective of this principle is to secure the legal certainty of citizens who must be liberated of uncertainty or fear that they would be tried again for the same criminal offence that has already been decided by a final and binding decision. This principle is specific for the accusative and modern system of criminal procedure but not for the investigative criminal procedure, where the possibility for the bindingly finalised criminal procedure to be repeated on the basis of same evidence and regarding the same criminal issue existed. In its legal nature, a circumstance that the proceedings are pending on the same criminal offence against the same accused, represents a negative procedural presumption and, therefore, an obstacle for the further course of proceedings, i.e. it represents the procedural obstacle which prevents an initiation of new criminal procedure for the same criminal case in which the final and binding condemning or acquitting judgement has been passed (exceptio rei iudicatae).The right not to be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted is provided for, primarily, by the International Documents (Article 14, paragraph 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The International framework has also been given to ne bis in idem principle through three Conventions adopted by the Council of Europe and those are the European Convention on Extradition and Additional Protocols thereto, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, and the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.Ne bis in idem principle is traditionally associated with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Likewise, no derogation from Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention at the time of war or other state of emergency which is threatening the survival of the nation (Article 4, paragraph 3 of Protocol No. 7). Thereby it is categorised as the irrevocable conventional right together with the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, and the legality principle. Similarly, ne bis in idem principle does not apply in the case of the renewed trials by the International criminal courts where the first trial was conducted in some State, while the principle is applicable in the reversed situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia could have conducted a trial even if a person had already been adjudicated in some State, in the cases provided for by its Statute and in the interest of justice.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 420-421

Complainant, a woman who had been deputy head of a school art department since 1971, had applied for the post of head of the department in 1975; however, the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) appointed a man to the position. She then filed a complaint with the Industrial Tribunal in London, charging the ILEA with sex discrimination in violation of Sections 6(1)(c) and 2(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Article 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), and Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. She also contended that her rights were protected by the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women of 1967, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The Industrial Tribunal dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction and also held that Article 119 of the EEC Treaty did not confer a right upon complainant which could be enforced by an industrial tribunal.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-385
Author(s):  
Yana Litins’ka ◽  
Oleksandra Karpenko

Abstract COVID-19 became a stress-test for many legal systems because it required that a balance be found between rapid action to prevent the spread of the disease, and continued respect for human rights. Many states in Europe, including Ukraine, chose to enforce an obligation to self-isolate. In this article we review what the obligation to self-isolate entails in the case of Ukraine. We also analyse whether such an obligation should be viewed as a deprivation or a mere restriction of liberty, and if it is permissible under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irini Papanicolopulu

In a unanimous judgment in the case Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Court) held that Italy’s “push back” operations interdicting intending migrants and refugees at sea and returning them to Libya amounted to a violation of the prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention), the prohibition of collective expulsions under Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the Convention, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Hirsi Jamaa is the Court’s first judgment on the interception of migrants at sea and it addresses issues concerning the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as well as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.


10.12737/5251 ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-74
Author(s):  
Габриэлла Белова ◽  
Gabriela Belova ◽  
Мария Хаджипетрова-Лачова ◽  
Maria Hadzhipetrova-Lachova

The authors analyze certain cases considered in recent years by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of European Union in Luxembourg and associated with providing of asylum to the third country nationals. In individual EU member states there are huge differences in the procedures and protective mechanisms for asylum seekers in their access to work, as well as in the use of mechanism of forced detention. Due to accession of the EU to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU should comply the standards set by the Council of Europe. The authors analyze the new approach of the Strasbourg Court in decision MSS v. Belgium and Greece unlike other "Dublin" cases. They also consider certain new judgements of the Court of European Union in Luxembourg, some of which were accepted in order of urgent prejudicial production.


Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Normann Witzleb

In Campbell v MGN Ltd, the House of Lords endorsed an expansive interpretation of the breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests. The scope and content of this transformed cause of action have already been subject to considerable judicial consideration and academic discussion. This paper focuses on the remedial consequences of privacy breaches. It undertakes an analysis of the principles which govern awards for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, the availability of gain-based relief, in particular an account of profits, and exemplary damages.Even in its traditional scope, the monetary remedies for breach of confidence raise complex issues, mainly resulting from the fact that this doctrine draws on multiple jurisdictional sources such as equity, contract and property law. The difficulties of determining the appropriate remedial principles are now compounded by the fact that English law also aims to integrate its obligation to protect the right to privacy under Art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 into the conceptual framework of the breach of confidence action.The analysis provided in this paper supports the contention that not only the scope of the cause of action but also important remedial issues are likely to remain in doubt until the wrong of ‘misuse of private information’ is freed from the constraints of the traditional action for breach of confidence. A separate tort would be able to deal more coherently and comprehensively with all wrongs commonly regarded as privacy breaches.


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