“UMBRELLA EFFECTS” AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 510-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne

UMBRELLA effects arise where anti-competitive conduct by one or more market actors results in general price rises across the sector concerned. The Court of Justice of the European Union has, with its preliminary ruling in Case C-557/12, Kone and others v OBB-Infrastruktur AG, Judgment of 5 June 2014, EU:C:2014:1317, now addressed the potential legal implications of such umbrella effects. In confirming that the right to compensation stemming from breach of EU competition law extends to umbrella claims as a matter of principle, the Court of Justice has offered its most expansive, and arguably most emphatic, interpretation of the scope and importance of private antitrust enforcement to date.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
João Pateira Ferreira

Summary The Court of Justice of the European Union (“Court of Justice”) issued its first ruling on pay-for-delay agreements, in reply to a reference for a preliminary ruling from the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) during its review of the appeal of a Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) decision applying a fine to GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) and five generic manufacturers for having entered into agreements settling patent disputes relating to GSK’s antidepressant paroxetine, on the basis that such agreements infringed competition rules. In its Paroxetine ruling of 30 January 2020[1], the Court of Justice found that patent settlements are not, by their very nature, anticompetitive; however, generic manufacturers can be regarded as potential competitors to the originator manufacturers when they have announced their intention to compete in the same market as the originator and, as such, patent settlement agreements are to be reviewed as horizontal agreements between competitors. Finally, a payment from the originator to the generic manufacturer in a patent settlement agreement is not enough to qualify such an agreement as a restriction of competition by object (the agreement is not anticompetitive by its very nature), unless there is no other justification for the payment other than to compensate the generic manufacturer for accepting to delay its entry in the market. In those circumstances, the Court finds that such an agreement will constitute a restriction of competition by object[2]. In this comment, we review the Court’s findings in relation to the issue of potential competition between the originator and the generics manufacturers and the qualification of this agreement as a restriction of competition by object. Keywords: pay-for-delay; restriction; competition; agreement; settlement; patent


Author(s):  
Arie Reich

This chapter presents the findings of the author on the impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the Israeli legal system. After a short description of the Israeli legal system and its judiciary, including figures on the use of foreign legal sources by the courts, the chapter describes briefly the relations between the EU and Israel and notes the weak legal approximation provision in the Association Agreement. Despite the lack of obligation on Israel’s part to rely on CJEU judgments, the author has found steadily growing numbers of citations of these judgments by various Israeli courts and tribunals. The chapter presents the statistics of these citations over the years, the types of tribunals that cite the CJEU, and the fields of law where these citations are mostly found (mainly in trade marks, competition law, and labour law). It also lists the CJEU cases that are most cited by Israeli tribunals. It then assesses the impact of the citations by a coding system that allows us to observe the relative influence that the citations had in the various tribunals. After having presented a statistic overview on the citation patterns, the chapter zooms into some specific cases where the CJEU was cited in order to put the citation into context and better understand its significance. Finally, the chapter discusses instances of CJEU impact on Israeli regulation, not case law, namely in the field of competition law, sports (the Bosman case), and privacy (‘the right to be forgotten’).


Author(s):  
Matthew Homewood

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. EU Law Concentrate provides essential information on all aspects of EU law, starting with the origins, institutions, and sources of law in the EU. It then moves on to consider supremacy, direct and indirect effect, and state liability. Chapter 4 looks at direct actions in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Articles 258–260, 263, 265, 277, and 340 are examined in detail. The next couple of chapters describe the free movement of goods and persons. The book ends with a consideration of EU Competition law, in particular Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have become a pattern for competition rules provided in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994. Both EU competition law and EEA competition law can be enforced before national courts. Lodging damage claims in the EU was facilitated by Directive 2014/104/EU. The so-called Antitrust Damages Directive was highly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Although Directive 2014/104/EU has not been incorporated into the EEA law, damage claims resulting from violations of EEA competition rules are judged by national courts in the EEA Member States, which is why some aspects of private enforcement of competition law have become a point of interest for the EFTA Court, being – together with the Court of Justice of the European Union – the EEA court. Firstly, the article aims at checking if the EFTA Court jurisprudence on antitrust damage claims follows the guidelines formulated in the case law of the Court of Justice. Since the positive answer to this question is highly probable, secondly, the article aims at identifying the extent of the impact of EU jurisprudence in private enforcement cases on judgments of the EFTA Court. The article concludes that the EFTA Court’s activities regarding antitrust damage claims follow the route indicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Four identified judgments regarding – directly or indirectly – antitrust damage claims (Nye Kystlink, Fjarskipti, Schenker I and Schenker V), delivered by the EFTA Court, seem to strengthen its position as an institution that is able to guarantee a coherence between EEA and EU competition law. EFTA Court’s judgments in private enforcement cases are also a point of interest and reference for EU Advocates General and can become an inspiration for both EU and national case law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Salim S. Sleiman

On September 3, 2020, following a request from the Dutch Supreme Court, the First Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered its preliminary ruling in Supreme Site Services and Others v. SHAPE on the interpretation of Articles 1(1) and 24(5) of the European Union (EU) Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast Brussels Regulation).


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-220
Author(s):  
Giulio Allevato ◽  
Fernando Pastor-Merchante

The preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Google Ireland case turned on the compatibility with the rules on free movement of some of the administrative arrangements put in place by Hungary in order to administer its controversial advertisement tax (namely, the obligation to register and the penalties attached to the failure to comply with that obligation). The preliminary ruling offers some interesting insights on the way in which the Court assesses the compatibility with the freedom to provide services of national administrative arrangements aimed at ensuring the effective collection of taxes. This is a topical issue in the context of the recent efforts made by Member States to tax the digital economy more effectively.


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