HUMAN RIGHTS AND TAXPAYERS

1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN TILEY

Is it really worth having all this fuss and bother about the Human Rights Bill? Over the years the Convention has been interpreted to require United Kingdom courts to change their practices in various ways at the personal level, but what about protecting a person from an unjustified demand for tax? Suppose that the Inland Revenue demands tax from you which the courts later determine to be unlawful because the regulation under which the demand was made was not valid. You were not a party to that litigation but you are clearly within the ambit of the decision supplied by the courts. The Inland Revenue then persuades Parliament to deprive you of the benefit of the decision by retroactive legislation, although leaving the actual party to the litigation with the fruits of that enterprise. Is this the stuff on which the judges at Strasbourg will rush to protect the taxpayer from the State? The answer sadly is no — these judges are not going to risk embarrassing the contracting States by making rights bite where that would be expensive: National Provincial Building Society and others v. United Kingdom [1997] S.T.C. 1466. Of course these judges may fear that contracting States would reduce the powers of the court were they do so such a thing; such a fear would not be irrational since the German and UK Governments proposed that direct tax matters should be removed from the European Court of Justice in the sessions leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Perhaps a supra-national body is right to be cautious, but what should our own courts do? Once the Convention is incorporated into our domestic law, will our own judges feel a little more strongly about the matter and perhaps grant a declaration that the legislation is incompatible with the Convention? If they have a right to be incensed about the way in which Parliament protects the Revenue at the expense (literally) of the taxpayer, will they do something or will they just couch like lions under the throne of Parliamentary Sovereignty?

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-267
Author(s):  
Steve Foster

The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in October 2000, its purpose to allow victims of alleged violations of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) to pursue a remedy in the domestic courts. Thus, central to the Act’s purpose is to enable the access of the rights and remedies already provided by the machinery of the European Convention, subject only to those provisions of the Act which seek to retain the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. The purpose of this article is to study the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to cases brought against the United Kingdom in order to examine the United Kingdom’s record under the Convention and, hopefully, of identifying common themes of human rights violations for which the United Kingdom has consistently been held responsible, and for which they may remain vulnerable to challenge in the future. At this stage it will be submitted that the European Convention has exposed the limitations of human rights protection in domestic law, and that on many occasions both the courts and Parliament have failed to adopt the necessary jurisprudence of the European Court in their respective roles. Finally, in the light of that evidence the article will examine the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 in order to assess the likely impact of that Act on the protection of rights and liberties in the United Kingdom.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, European Court of Human Rights. This case concerned a book which breached the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The publisher, Handyside, contended that the domestic law (the 1959 Act) breached his Article 10 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The case introduced the concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ accorded to states as regards the implementation of convention rights. The case predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, European Court of Human Rights. This case concerned a book which breached the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The publisher, Handyside, contended that the domestic law (the 1959 Act) breached his Article 10 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The case introduced the concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ accorded to states as regards the implementation of convention rights. The case predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 223-244
Author(s):  
Bernard Keenan

This article foregrounds four key powers through which the UK intelligence and police agencies (broadly referred to hereafter as ‘law enforcement’) may access encrypted communications and data. It is structured as follows. First, a brief overview of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on communications surveillance contextualises the overarching normative framework that must be translated into domestic law. The four powers are then discussed, both in legal and practical terms. The first two powers operate covertly, without the knowledge of the target. The latter two operate coercively, allowing police to demand individuals unlock encrypted data on penalty of prosecution. The article argues that the overall effect is to weaken encryption systems globally.


Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-191
Author(s):  
Sabrina Praduroux

Abstract In the late 1950 s René Savatier foretold that the qualification of economic value itself as property (bien) would have been the ultimate evolution of the theory of property rights. This prediction has come true with regard to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU). This paper investigates the implications of the understanding of property developed by the two European Courts on the concept of expropriation itself as well as for the principles governing expropriation law. Hence, the paper illustrates the role played by both the ECtHR and the CJEU in laying down the parameters of legitimacy for national law, including property law. Within this context, the focus falls on cases in which the Courts characterize the facts as deprivation of property requiring for compensation, even though the relevant property could not be the object of expropriation under the domestic law of the defendant State. My contribution brings new insights into the current transformation of the traditional property categories and suggests the reinterpretation of some key concepts of expropriation law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-280
Author(s):  
Jill I. Goldenziel

In Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber or Court) released a landmark opinion with broad implications for how states must respect the individual rights of migrants. In the judgment, issued on December 15, 2016, the Court held that Italy's treatment of migrants after the Arab Spring violated the requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that migrants receive procedural guarantees that enable them to challenge their detention and expulsion. The Court also held that Italy's treatment of migrants in detention centers did not violate the ECHR's prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment, in part due to the emergency circumstances involved. The Court further held that Italy's return of migrants to Tunisia did not violate the prohibition on collective expulsion in Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR. Enforcement of the judgment would require many European states to provide a clear basis in domestic law for the detention of migrants and asylum-seekers. Given the global diffusion of state practices involving migrants, and other states’ desires to restrict migration, this case has broad implications for delineating the obligations of states to migrants and the rights of migrants within receiving countries.


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