scholarly journals Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Laurier

ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative.

2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989606
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Emir Efendic ◽  
Marek A. Vranka

When asked whether to sacrifice oneself or another person to save others, one might think that people would consider sacrificing themselves rather than someone else as the right and appropriate course of action—thus showing an other-serving bias. So far however, most studies found instances of a self-serving bias—people say they would rather sacrifice others. In three experiments using trolley-like dilemmas, we tested whether an other-serving bias might appear as a function of judgment type. That is, participants were asked to make a prescriptive judgment (whether the described action should or should not be done) or a normative judgment (whether the action is right or wrong). We found that participants exhibited an other-serving bias only when asked whether self- or other-sacrifice is wrong. That is, when the judgment was normative and in a negative frame (in contrast to the positive frame asking whether the sacrifice is right). Otherwise, participants tended to exhibit a self-serving bias; that is, they approved sacrificing others more. The results underscore the importance of question wording and suggest that some effects on moral judgment might depend on the type of judgment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. A364
Author(s):  
P Hanly ◽  
R Maguire ◽  
M Balfe ◽  
L Sharp

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ognjen Arandjelović
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 687-696
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer

In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgments, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory.


2001 ◽  
Vol 58 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 70-100
Author(s):  
Dennis P. Scanlon ◽  
Michael Chernew ◽  
Hilary E. Doty ◽  
Dean G. Smith

This article examines and discusses various alternatives for measuring the quality of care and services provided by preferred provider organizations (PPOs). The topic is approached from both a conceptual and a practical perspective, outlining key assumptions that underlie the desire to measure the quality of PPOs, while considering the current limitations and difficulties associated with existing PPO arrangements. Although the article does not provide normative judgments about which approach is best, it attempts to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of possible approaches in an unbiased manner. Significant attention is given to accreditation and profiling as possible methods for assessing the quality of care in PPOs.


2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralf Stoecker

AbstractThere is a widely accepted view in action theory (most prominently defended by Donald Davidson) according to which (1) actions are events, (2) reasons are intentional attitudes of the agent (pairs of beliefs and desires), and (3) acting for a reason entails that the reason rationalizes as well as causes the action. In the first part of my contribution I list seventeen difficulties for this standard account; in the second part I give an outline of how a more plausible conception of reasons and actions could look like. According to this conception, which is based on Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of a mechanistic understanding of psychological concepts, agency is due to a special kind of disposition of the agent, namely the disposition to behave as if the agent were permanently deliberating about what to do. The conception has surprising consequences for the ontological status of intentional attitudes and actions and for the relationship between action and responsibility.


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