The Conservative Party and the Formation of the National Government: August 1931

1986 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Ball

On 24 August 1931 the prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, tendered the resignation of the second Labour government. In its place he became the premier of an all-party ‘National’ cabinet. This included both the leader of the Conservative party, Stanley Baldwin, and the acting-leader of the Liberal party, Sir Herbert Samuel, together with a number of their senior colleagues. This temporary emergency administration went on to win a landslide majority in the general election of October 1931, and to govern for the ensuing decade. The crisis which created the National government has proved to be of enduring fascination, as a result of its intrinsic interest as the major political crisis of the inter-war period and its profound consequences for subsequent British history. However, historical attention has been principally focused upon the problems of the Labour government, the decisions of Ramsay MacDonald, and the contribution of King George V. As a result the role of the Conservative party – often portrayed as having been the sole benefactor from these events – has been either neglected for its supposed passivity or misunderstood in its mood and intention.

2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1403-1422
Author(s):  
CAROLYN J. KITCHING

AbstractThe career and reputation of James Ramsay MacDonald are generally influenced by his actions in 1931, and yet, as Donald Cameron Watt has stated, it is ‘not really possible to blackguard him for 1931 without having to cast aspersions on his extraordinary achievements earlier on’. This article examines some of these ‘extraordinary’ achievements by considering the role of MacDonald himself in the formation and leading of the 1924 minority Labour Government. It considers the difficulty he experienced in creating a Cabinet from colleagues whom he generally considered to be unsuitable and incapable, and which led him to become both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. He faced criticism from many in his party for his failure to implement a measure of socialist reforms, yet given the nature of the domestic problems with which his government was faced, and the tenuous nature of this government, held in place, as it was, by a fractured Liberal Party, this ‘failure’ is scarcely surprising. However, this article maintains that in foreign policy, and in his powerful joint role, MacDonald's reputation in 1924 really can be described as outstanding.


1980 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Fair

The creation of the National Government of 1931 has been a theme of unending comment and controversy. Politicians and writers of the left, with their party suddenly decapitated and bereft of office, not surprisingly were bitter. Their tendency was to castigate anyone who had played an obvious role in the crisis. Therefore, Ramsay MacDonald, who presided over the change, has been branded a traitor by his former colleagues and by later generations of Labour supporters. Even for historians he has remained at the center of the controversy.From a slightly wider perspective, it has been possible to suspect a “bankers' ramp,” and the king has been singled out for special abuse on the charge of misleading the prime minister. Although some of these elements have been dismissed as myths in Reginald Bassett's 1958 treatise, the controversy hardly has been brought closer to a solution. In his review of that polemical study, Richard Crossman contended that “no one has yet succeeded in writing about this crisis without violent partisanship” and that it remained “the kind of live political issue about which no one except a political eunuch can write dispassionately.” That the debate continues is evident from the recent biography of MacDonald by David Marquand, who, in an attempt to vindicate his subject, once more reverts to the king as the agent most responsible for the creation of a coalition. Amazingly, no writer has yet interpreted the formation of the National Government as a Conservative Party bid for power, despite the control manifested by that party in the ensuing general election and the eventual successions of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain to the premiership.


2020 ◽  
pp. 89-112
Author(s):  
Rodney Brazier

A person normally becomes Prime Minister either after winning a General Election, or after the Government party has elected a new leader to succeed a Prime Minister. Leadership of one of the main political parties is therefore a prerequisite for entering Number 10 Downing Street. This chapter examines exactly how the main parties have elected their leaders since 1902, setting the processes in their historical contexts, and explaining why the systems have been changed down the years. The Conservative Party did not have a formal system until after a major crisis in 1963; Labour has always elected its leader; but the systems which have been used have been altered for political reasons. Recent leadership elections, e.g. of Theresa May, Boris Johnson, and Jeremy Corbyn, are examined. The chapter also explains the ways in which an opposition party can get rid of a leader who doesn’t want to quit.


2020 ◽  
pp. 83-108
Author(s):  
Stephen Wall

Poised to begin negotiations for EEC accession, Prime Minister Wilson called a snap general election and lost to Edward Heath’s Conservative Party. Heath was a life-long pro-European but there were opponents of EEC entry, led by the disgraced rebel, Enoch Powell, within Tory ranks. The Conservatives adopted the Labour government’s accession strategy. But, out of government, the Labour Party turned against membership. Pro-EEC Labour rebels, led by former Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins, voted with Heath to secure parliamentary approval for accession. To prevent the Labour Party voting to take the UK out of the EEC, Wilson promised that he would renegotiate the terms agreed by Heath and put them to the electorate. The EEC countries, especially France, struck a hard deal with the UK and Heath was obliged to accept disadvantageous terms for UK accession.


Leadership ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-132
Author(s):  
Keith Grint

Power, however defined, is something we usually consider as indelibly linked to leadership, as something all leaders and followers seek to obtain, retain, and deploy for good or ill, for themselves or others. But there are occasions when power might be something to avoid, especially when it comes tainted with deleterious consequences, rather like the Christian fable of the poisoned chalice. In this brief provocation, I provide examples where this is self-evident but often only in retrospect. Thus, the infamous ‘stab-in-the-back’ saw the German Social Democrats take power, just before the armistice was signed in 1918. At the time of writing (October 2019), the British are on the verge of a General Election and whoever wins, whoever becomes Prime Minister, will also be held responsible for the fallout from BREXIT – irrespective of their role in generating the political crisis; sometimes, it might be better not to seek power.


Subject Norway's economy. Significance Even as the global price for oil recovers slowly, Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg's government hopes to encourage Norway to transition to a post-petroleum economy. The main contours of the 2017 budget suggest that the Norwegian economy has turned two significant corners: the prognosis for economic recovery is promising, and the Norwegian economy will slowly transition to a broader base. Impacts Spending rules for the GPFG could be tightened next spring. The expansive budget may help Solberg's Conservative Party win back votes in the run-up to the 2017 general election. The Christian Democrats could emerge as kingmakers from the 2017 election and possibly facilitate a centre-left coalition.


Author(s):  
Michael Llewellyn-Smith

This book is about the life and times of Eleftherios Venizelos, one of the greatest political leaders of Greece in the twentieth century. It covers first his upbringing, education, and political apprenticeship in Ottoman Crete. Venizelos played a major part in the Cretan struggle for Union with Greece. He worked under Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner of the Powers, when Crete became an autonomous regime, and broke with him in the uprising at Therisso which moved Crete a step nearer to Union. Venizelos moved to Greece in 1910, resolved a political crisis provoked by a military uprising, and became prime minister. He founded his own liberal party, and introduced a new constitution and major reforms of Greece's political, economic, and social affairs. He negotiated an alliance with Bulgaria and Serbia and in 1912-13 these Balkan allies attacked the Turks in Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus and were victorious. The territory and population of Greece was almost doubled as a result. These wars, in the second of which Greece and Serbia defeated former ally Bulgaria, won great gains for Greece including Salonika, but left multiple issues unresolved including the fate of the Aegean islands and a naval arms race with Turkey. But these problems were sidelined on the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Venizelos's career will be explored further in a second volume taking the story on from 1914 to his death in 1936.


1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. T. Stannage

Only at four by-elections in twentieth-century British history has there been a turnover of more than 18,000 votes: at Dudley in 1968, at Orpington in 1962, at East Fulham in 1933 and at Dartford in 1920. Dartford and Orpington have been commented upon as landmarks in the histories of the Labour and Liberal Parties respectively, and Dudley is likely to be seen as the outstanding manifestation of discontent with the economic policies of the Labour Government in the 1960s. East Fulham, however, is the most notorious of all the “boilover’ by-elections. Taking place in a decade troubled by depression and fear of war, it resulted in a National Government majority of 14,521 votes being transformed into a Labour Party majority of 4,840, on a massive swing of 26–5 per cent.


1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Williamson

The Conservative party's preparations for the 1929 general election have been harshly treated by historians. Because the election was lost, they have understandably concentrated on explaining the defeat and so looked for weaknesses in Conservative leadership, policies and organization. It is also understandable that in the light of subsequent economic analysis, the Conservative election platform of ‘Safety First’ has suffered badly from comparison with the Keynesian-style policies of the Liberal party programme, We can conquer unemployment. But the contention here is that all too easily such hindsight has impeded a proper understanding of Conservative policies and tactics.


1977 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Lemieux

This article examines the motivations of voters who supported the Liberal Party in the February, 1974, General Election. The analysis consists of two major sections. In the first, the role of the Party in the election campaign is outlined with special emphasis on the part played by the polls and by Jeremy Thorpe in encouraging Liberal support. The second, and major section, analyses polling data to ascertain the motivations of Liberal supporters. It is argued that Liberal voters chose that party in order to express dissatisfaction with the policy stands and office performance of the major parties. Such voters are shown to have had specific policy disagreements with the major parties and were not simply voicing diffuse discontent in a period of serious crisis.


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