Lockerbie: The Other Case

2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Aust

To public international lawyers “Lockerbie” is more than likely to evoke the cases which Libya brought in the International Court of Justice in 1992 against the United Kingdom1 and the United States under the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971.2 The issues raised by the cases have spawned a huge literature. But, in truth, the ICJ proceedings have never been at the centre of, what might be called, the Lockerbie affair. Although they raise important constitutional issues for the United Nations, in terms of the crime committed—the sabotage of the Boeing 747 airliner on flight PA103 which exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1988 killing 270 people—the ICJ proceedings have never been more than a sideshow; or as that word was once, aptly for the present case, denned in The Times crossword, an incidental skirmish. The real story is how international action, and in particular the ingenious use of international law, was successful in achieving the appearance of the accused for trial before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. This example of what can be achieved in the cause of justice by legal inventiveness, imaginative diplomacy and sheer persistence, should be properly recorded.

2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe

The article reviews (i) the qualifications of judges of, and (ii) the distribution of seats in, the ICJ. (i) Since 1966 there has been only one judge elected who merely satisfied the requirement relating to highest national judicial office. It is clear that with the increase in the supply of competent public international ‘jurists’ from the developing countries and because of the increasingly complicated and specialized nature of international law national judicial office has become irrelevant and insufficient as a qualification. Recognized competence as a public international jurist should be the only valid criterion. On the other hand, the latter concept has been given an unwarranted and undesirable extension by the UN, especially in connection with candidates from developing countries. (ii) While, in keeping with Article 9 of the Statute, there is some agreed regional distribution of seats among the non-permanent members of the Security Council, equity seems to be disregarded, particularly among the non-Western European states, by rotation among states being ignored. This is not in keeping with the Statute.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Scott ◽  
Craig L. Carr

The refusal of the United States to consider itself bound by the recent decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, coupled with the earlier termination of its adherence to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has sparked a small storm of controversy and concern. Part of this concern involves how the United States, presumably a law-abiding and law-respecting nation, could possibly bring itself to snub the International Court of Justice and, by extension, the ideal of international law. Another part of this concern involves the likely consequences of the United States move on the vitality of the Court as the focal institution of a slowly evolving system of international law. A less obvious concern, but arguably one of paramount importance, calls into question the wisdom of insisting that the ICJ retain its optional compulsory jurisdiction. It is this less obvious concern that we propose to discuss here.


Author(s):  
Muhammad Naguib Abdul Malik

This article demonstrates that the cases decided by the ICJ and the arbitration tribunals are judge made law and are not derived from the rules of customary law. Judge made law, as enunciated by the ICJ and the arbitration tribunals are very general and imprecise. The decisions made by the ICJ and the arbitration tribunals beget unpredictability or unexpected results. Normally, state parties are not happy with the decision made by the ICJ and the arbitration tribunals and the discontented states are unable to take any actions as state parties need to comply with the decision of the ICJ. In this Article, two (2) cases, one in South America and the other one in Africa, were discussed in detail. The outcome of these two (2) cases is not palatable to some state parties. Since the decisions are not predictable and the outcome is not palatable to some state parties, this Article looks at possible solutions which are being offered in International Islamic Law (Siyar). Keywords: Islamic International Law (Siyar), International Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Made Law, Maritime Boundary Delimitations, Unpredictable Results, The Principle of Joint Administration, The Principle of Joint Development.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


Author(s):  
Ingo Venzke

This chapter investigates the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during the battle for international law circa the years of 1955–1975. It first draws attention to newly independent states that saw the Court in its role of reinforcing international law’s colonial imprints. The chapter then focuses on the Court’s captivating highpoint during the battle for international law: its 1962 and 1966 Judgments in South West Africa, and the jarring 1966 decision which, in the eyes of many states, presented the ICJ as a ‘white man’s court’ in a white man’s world. The chapter then shows the effects of the 1966 decision in judicial elections and the quest to change the composition of the bench. Finally, the chapter argues that the present inquiry serves as a vivid reminder that international law and its institutions are the product of a veritable struggle, then as now.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 867-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Muharremi

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-340
Author(s):  
Jack M. Goldklang

On December 17, 1982, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution supporting an expansion of the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The resolution (H.R. Con. Res. 86) urges the President to explore the appropriateness of establishing a United Nations committee to seek advisory opinions from the ICJ. The committee would act when asked by a national court seeking advice regarding any international law question under the national court’s jurisdiction.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Thomas Weatherall

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.


Author(s):  
Lindsay Moir

This chapter examines the problems that could arise when a state invokes self-defence to justify action against terrorist groups in another state. It first considers indirect armed attack against armed groups and the controversy surrounding the use of self-defence where armed groups are controlled by a foreign state, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence. It then discusses the possibility that an armed attack could occur, permitting a forcible response in the context of international law, without attribution to a state by citing the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ pronounced that self-defence is permissible against a host state in effective control of an armed group. The chapter also looks at the case of Afghanistan and its relationship to Al Qaeda as an example of a state’s claims of self-defence against terrorism.


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