International Court of Justice

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 364-365

Following the decisions of the International Court of Justice on November 20 and 27, 1950 on the question of asylum for the refugee, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, the government of Colombia (on December 13, 1950) instituted new proceedings before the Court against the government of Peru. The applicationof Colombia requested the Court to adjudge and declare, in pursuance of Article 7 of the Protocol of Friendship and Cooperation of 1934 in force between Colombia and Peru, the manner in which effect should be given to the Court's judgment of November 20, 1950, and in particular whether Colombia was or was not bound to deliver Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a refugee in the Colombian embassy at Lima, to the government of Peru. As an alternative claim, in the event that the principal claim was disallowed, Colombia requested the Court to declare in exercise of its ordinary competence whether, in accordance with the law in force between Colombia and Peru and particularly American international law, the government of Colombia was or was not bound to deliver Haya de la Torre to the government of Peru.

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-592

Following the judgments of the International Court of Justice on November 20, 1950 and November 27, 1950 (the request for an interpretation of the judgment), the government of Colombia filed a new claim requesting the Court to adjudge and declare the manner in which effect should be given to the judgment of November 20, and in particular whether Colombia was bound to deliver to the government of Peru Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. As an alternative claim Colombia requested that the Court declare whether in accordance with the law in force between the parties and particularly American international law Colombia was or was not bound to deliver the refugee to the government of Peru. In a letter the Colombian agent informed the Court that his government relied on the Convention on Asylum signed at Havana on February 29, 1928; under Article 63 of the Statute of the Court, the government of Cuba as a signatory to that convention submitted a declaration of intervention which contained Cuba's views on the construction of the Convention of Havana of 1928 as well as its general attitude on asylum. A public hearing was held by the Court on May 15 to determine the admissibility of the Cuban intervention to which the government of Peru had objected on the ground that the Court had given a judgment on the construction of the Havana Convention of 1928, and that it was an attempt by a third state to appeal against the judgment of November 20.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojana Lakićević-Đuranović

This paper aims to show the significance of maritime delimitation in the Law of the Sea, as well as the contribution of international jurisprudence to the creation of the rules of maritime delimitation. The decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the awards of arbitration tribunals are especially significant in the part of the Law of the Sea dealing with maritime delimitation. Based on the analysis of the principle of equity and the method of equidistance, the jurisprudence of the courts is shown to have established precedents and to have an irreplaceable role in the development of the international Law of the Sea, particularly in the segment of maritime delimitations.


Author(s):  
Jan Klabbers

This chapter reflects on the uncertainties regarding the question of why international organizations would be bound by international law. It places these uncertainties in the broader framework of a vague and ill-defined ‘turn to accountability’. As the chapter shows, international organizations are often held to account for wrongdoing without it being clear whether they have also violated an international legal obligation resting upon them. The chapter then discusses in some detail the 1980 WHO–Egypt advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding whether the WHO could close their Alexandria office and move it to Jordan. Afterwards, the chapter reviews several recent attempts to overcome the ‘basis of obligation’ problem in the law of international organizations, such as the putative constitutionalization of international law or international organizations, the adoption of accountability models, and the emergence of Global Administrative Law.


Author(s):  
Joerg Kammerhofer

This chapter examines the resilience of the treaty, and perhaps also customary, law on self-defence since 2001. It first considers ‘resilience’ in the context of the jus ad bellum and how law can be resilient vis-à-vis changing circumstance, opinions, interpretation, and state practice. It then looks at the indicators for and against resilience by analysing post-2001 developments, paying particular attention to three areas: jurisprudence, scholarly literature in international law, and state and institutional practice. The chapter also explains what ‘resilience’ can and cannot be, and how the law and its perceptions change—or remain the same. Two avenues on the question of what is resilient are evaluated: either the norm or its interpretation (perception) change. Finally, the chapter considers a number of cases in which the International Court of Justice has made pronouncements on and partial clarifications of important aspects of the law on self-defence since 2001.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-484
Author(s):  
Graham Melling

Due to the nature of the international legal system, the International Court of Justice (icj) is regularly presented with new questions about which international law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend – and is thereby incomplete. The approach of the icj when faced with such gaps raises some fundamental questions about the nature of the international legal system and the judicial function of the icj. The purpose of this article is to revisit and the critically evaluate the issue of how the icj responds when faced with a gap or lacuna in the law.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McKeever

AbstractIn recent years, the International Court of Justice has been presented with opportunities to pronounce on important dimensions of the law on the use of force. An assessment of the court's handling of these issues must consider first the role attributed to the Court within the international legal regime for preventing and mitigating the use of force, and thus what exactly would amount to 'success' for the Court in such cases. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations on the Court's capacity in this area, this article argues that the Court has largely failed to provide clear guidance on pressing legal questions. An unwarranted caution in utilising the judicial tools at its disposal is one important factor in this regard. Finally, this article highlights some potential consequences of the Court's recent work for the development of international law on the use of force.


1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-213 ◽  

Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria): On October 16, 1957, Israel filed an application instituting proceedings against the People's Republic of Bulgaria regarding an aerial incident which occurred on July 27, 1955. The application recalled that on that date an aircraft belonging to an Israeli airline company was shot down on Bulgarian territory by the Bulgarian Security Forces, fifty-one passengers and seven crew members being killed. The government of Israel requested the Court to declare Bulgarian responsibility under international law for the damage caused and to determine the amount of compensation.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Bederman

On July 28, 1986, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Honduras in the International Court of Justice. Nicaragua alleged that Honduras had allowed armed bands, known as contras, to operate from its territory to the detriment of Nicaraguan sovereignty, that Honduran military forces had directly participated in attacks on Nicaragua and that the Government of Honduras had given material aid and logistical support to the rebels. Nicaragua requested that the Court declare the acts and omissions of Honduras to be violations of international law and order it to desist from all such activities and to make reparations to Nicaragua. Honduras objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. The parties subsequently agreed that the Court should first decide these questions before proceeding to the merits. Relying on the Pact of Bogotá for its jurisdictional rationale, the Court unanimously held: that it had jurisdiction and that the Application could be entertained.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan G. Lammers

The subject-matter of this article is the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. Following an exposition of the relevant facts, it continues with a critical analysis of the Judgment of the Court. In addition to a brief analysis of the issues involving the law of treaties, the law of state responsibility, the law of state succession, and the treaty obligations of Hungary and Slovakia relating to the use of Danube water and the protection of its environment, it focuses on the rules and principles of general international law concerning the use of international watercourses and the protection of the environment that were applied by the Court in this case.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-683
Author(s):  
SERGEY M. PUNZHIN

AbstractOn the basis of a thorough empirical analysis, the article comes to a number of theoretical conclusions which have never previously been discussed in the literature. In particular, it demonstrates that the Court's procedure is governed not only by ‘procedural law’ but also by norms which are non-legal. Moreover, it clearly circumscribes which norms in the documents relating to the functioning of the Court are procedural and which lack this character. In their entirety, provisions governing the Court's procedure form a ‘normative system’, with the law being only one of its elements. The Court's procedural norms originate both from the traditional sources of international law as well as from sources which, according to the usual classification, do not necessarily belong to that category. The procedural norms that are derived from all of these sources, while not tending towards uniformity in terms of their characteristics and effect, nevertheless form a system which operates as a whole. The procedure of the International Court of Justice does not fit neatly within the general scheme of ‘legal versus non-legal norms’; neither can one readily apply the theory of traditional sources of international law to a procedural system which brings together heterogeneous elements and must therefore be explained keeping in mind its own logic and nature.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document