Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibiuty

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Bederman

On July 28, 1986, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Honduras in the International Court of Justice. Nicaragua alleged that Honduras had allowed armed bands, known as contras, to operate from its territory to the detriment of Nicaraguan sovereignty, that Honduran military forces had directly participated in attacks on Nicaragua and that the Government of Honduras had given material aid and logistical support to the rebels. Nicaragua requested that the Court declare the acts and omissions of Honduras to be violations of international law and order it to desist from all such activities and to make reparations to Nicaragua. Honduras objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. The parties subsequently agreed that the Court should first decide these questions before proceeding to the merits. Relying on the Pact of Bogotá for its jurisdictional rationale, the Court unanimously held: that it had jurisdiction and that the Application could be entertained.

1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-217 ◽  

Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): In an order of July 6, 1961, the International Court of Justice fixed the time limits for the filing of pleadings in the case concerning the Northern Cameroons as follows: for the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun, November 1, 1961; and for the countermemorial of the United Kingdom, March 1, 1962. Subsequently, in an order of November 2, 1961, the Court, in accordance with a request from the agent of the government of the Republic of Cameroun, extended to January 3, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the memorial of the Republic of Cameroun and to May 2, 1962, the time limit for the filing of the countermemorial of the United Kingdom.


1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-213 ◽  

Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria): On October 16, 1957, Israel filed an application instituting proceedings against the People's Republic of Bulgaria regarding an aerial incident which occurred on July 27, 1955. The application recalled that on that date an aircraft belonging to an Israeli airline company was shot down on Bulgarian territory by the Bulgarian Security Forces, fifty-one passengers and seven crew members being killed. The government of Israel requested the Court to declare Bulgarian responsibility under international law for the damage caused and to determine the amount of compensation.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 364-365

Following the decisions of the International Court of Justice on November 20 and 27, 1950 on the question of asylum for the refugee, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, the government of Colombia (on December 13, 1950) instituted new proceedings before the Court against the government of Peru. The applicationof Colombia requested the Court to adjudge and declare, in pursuance of Article 7 of the Protocol of Friendship and Cooperation of 1934 in force between Colombia and Peru, the manner in which effect should be given to the Court's judgment of November 20, 1950, and in particular whether Colombia was or was not bound to deliver Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a refugee in the Colombian embassy at Lima, to the government of Peru. As an alternative claim, in the event that the principal claim was disallowed, Colombia requested the Court to declare in exercise of its ordinary competence whether, in accordance with the law in force between Colombia and Peru and particularly American international law, the government of Colombia was or was not bound to deliver Haya de la Torre to the government of Peru.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-592

Following the judgments of the International Court of Justice on November 20, 1950 and November 27, 1950 (the request for an interpretation of the judgment), the government of Colombia filed a new claim requesting the Court to adjudge and declare the manner in which effect should be given to the judgment of November 20, and in particular whether Colombia was bound to deliver to the government of Peru Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. As an alternative claim Colombia requested that the Court declare whether in accordance with the law in force between the parties and particularly American international law Colombia was or was not bound to deliver the refugee to the government of Peru. In a letter the Colombian agent informed the Court that his government relied on the Convention on Asylum signed at Havana on February 29, 1928; under Article 63 of the Statute of the Court, the government of Cuba as a signatory to that convention submitted a declaration of intervention which contained Cuba's views on the construction of the Convention of Havana of 1928 as well as its general attitude on asylum. A public hearing was held by the Court on May 15 to determine the admissibility of the Cuban intervention to which the government of Peru had objected on the ground that the Court had given a judgment on the construction of the Havana Convention of 1928, and that it was an attempt by a third state to appeal against the judgment of November 20.


1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 556-557 ◽  

“Société Électricité de Beyrouth” Case: On August 15, 1953, an application instituting proceedings on behalf of the government of France against the government of Lebanon was filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice by André Gros, agent for the French government. The French government alleged that the Lebanese government, by a series of acts or omissions dating from the end of 1951 and culminating in placing the Société Électricité de Beyrouth under provisional state control by decrees of March 19 and April 4, 1953, had violated the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of January 24, 1948, and general principles of international law.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 788-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcom D Evans ◽  
JG Merrills

On 10 October 2002 the International Court of Justice gave its decision on the merits in the case brought by the Republic of Cameroon against the Federal Republic of Nigeria over their land and maritime boundary. The judgment, which addresses a number of issues of general international law concerning maritime boundaries and territorial sovereignty, as well as providing a detailed treatment of the particular facts, concludes a case that began in 1994 and has had an unusual history. As this background had a significant bearing on the eventual outcome, a brief recapitulation may be useful.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-512 ◽  

Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroun v. United Kingdom): On May 30, 1961, the government of the Republic of Cameroun filed in the Registry of the Court an application instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom.1 The applicant alleged that the United Kingdom had failed to respect certain obligations of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration of December 13, 1946. The application stated specifically: 1) that the Northern Cameroons had not been administered as a separate territory within an administrative union, but as an integral part of Nigeria; 2) that the objectives set forth in article 6 of the trusteeship agreement—the development of free political institutions and an increasing share for the inhabitants in the administrative services, as well as their participation in advisory and legislative bodies and in the government of the territory—had not been attained; 3) that the agreement did not authorize the administering power to govern the territory as two separate parts evolving differently politically; 4) that, with respect to General Assembly Resolution 1473 (XIV) of December 12, 1959, (a) provisions relating to the separation of the administration of the Northern Cameroons from that of Nigeria, had not been followed, and (b) conditions laid down for the drawing up of electoral lists had been interpreted in a discriminatory manner; and 5) that the acts of the local authorities in the period preceding the plebiscite authorized by the afore-mentioned resolution and during the subsequent election involved consequences in conflict with the trusteeship agreement.


1962 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 865-871 ◽  

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa): On October 2, 1962, the International Court of Justice held the first of the public hearings on the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, raised by the government of the Republic of South Africa in these cases. After opening the sitting and briefly recalling the stages in the written proceedings covered since the institution of the cases on November 4, 1960, the President of the Court proceeded to the installation of the two judges ad hoc designated by the parties in accordance with Article 31, paragraphs 3 and 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The two judges ad hoc were Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the High Court, Eastern Region of Nigeria, designated by Ethiopia and Liberia acting in concert, and the Honorable Jacques Theodore van Wyk, Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, designated by the government of the Republic of South Africa. The President announced that Judge Córdova was prevented by his health from sitting in the present proceedings.


1987 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Lapidoth

In its judgment concerning the frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali (1986), the Chamber ot the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) summarized its opinion on the applicability of equity as follows:It is clear that the Chamber cannot decideex aequo et bonoin this case. Since the Parties have not entrusted it with the task of carrying out an adjustment of their respective interests, it must also dismiss any possibility of resorting to equitycontra legem. Nor will the Chamber apply equitypraeter legem. On the other hand, it will have regard to equityinfra legem, that is, that form of equity which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force, and is one of its attributes. As the Court has observed: “It is not a matter of finding simply an equitable solution but an equitable solution derived from the applicable law”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Piotr Łubiński ◽  

This article aims to address the issue of alleged hybrid warfare attacks on Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. The scope of the article covers the Belarus operations conducted in 2021. Firstly, the author addresses the issue of pushing migrants from a descriptive perspective. Secondly, he debates whether Belarus operation was conducted within the scope of hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, and lawfare? The author concludes that the Republic of Belarus has operated lawfare falling within the hybrid threat spectrum. It means that the situation is not to be classified under the law of armed conflict from the perspective of international and non-international armed conflicts and ius ad bellum violation. Thirdly, the author claims that Belarus has violated international law, so certain legal redress is appropriate and justified. Belarus's actions may result in a court proceeding before the International Court of Justice and before other international institutions.


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