Council of Foreign Ministers

1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-394

On January 24, 1948, the Soviet proposals for the settlement of Soviet claims against German assets in Austria were communicated to the permanent secretariat of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. These proposals, which Secretary of State Marshall (United States) had urged the Soviet to submit during the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (December 1947), although representing approximately a 50 per cent reduction in former Soviet claims, demanded for the Soviet Union 1) concession rights to two-thirds of current oil production and two-thirds of the exploitation privilegesin all undeveloped oil. areas in eastern Austria for a period of 25 years; 2) possession of oil refineries with a total annual capacity of 450,000 tons of crude oil; 3) possession of all assets of the Danube Shipping Company located in Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Austria; 4) surrender by the four powers of all property rights to former German enterprises in Austria and payment by Austria in compensation of $200,000,000 in United States currency to the Soviet Union and of undetermined amounts to the other three powers; 5) transfer of such assets to the Soviet Union subject to alienation only with the consent of the Soviet Union, and free from obligations accrued prior to Soviet possession; and 6) settlement of disputes arising in connection with the application of treaty provisions relating to German assets on a bilateral basis between Austria and the Soviet Union. After receiving the Soviet proposals, Secretary Marshall proposed that the Foreign Ministers' Deputies meet in London in February to work for further progress on the drafting of the Austrian treaty.

Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines tensions in the grand alliance between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as well as the growing confrontation involving the three countries during the period 1945–1947. It begins with a discussion of the Yalta Conference held in February 1945, taking into account the US, Soviet, and British approach to Yalta as well as the conference proceedings. It then considers the Potsdam Conference and how the issue of atomic bombs was addressed at the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in 1945. It also analyses the growing confrontation in the Near East and Mediterranean, focusing on the crises in Iran and Turkey. Finally, it explores containment, confrontation, and the Truman Doctrine during the years 1946–1947.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-36
Author(s):  
William I. Hitchcock

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.


1965 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 633-637
Author(s):  
Homer C. Sherman ◽  
Robert E. Belding

Authorities have long agreed that the textbook is the most indispensable teaching instrument used in the classrooms of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, if the arithmetic program of one nation is superior to that of the other, a comparison of the texts used in each nation may well reveal some important reasons for the effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, of each nation's arithmetic program.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 646-650

On April 9, 1951, the deputies of the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union began their sixth week of Paris meetings in an attempt to frame an agenda for a conference of the foreign ministers.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229

Proposed Meeting of the Council: Meeting in Prague on October 20 and 21, 1950, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, eastern Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement in reply to the communiqué on Germany released on September 19 by the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Charging that the position of the three western governments was merely a screen to conceal the aggressive objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the creation of mobile police formations was nothing less than the reconstitution of a German army, the eight foreign ministers stated that they considered as urgent 1) the publication by the three western powers and the Soviet Union of a statement of their intent to refuse to permit German rearmament and of their unswerving determination to create a united peace-loving German state; 2) the removal of all restrictions hindering the development of the peaceful German economy and the prevention of a resurgence of German war potential; 3) the conclusion of a German treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year of its conclusion; and 4) the creation of an all-German constituent council to prepare for a provisional German government. The text of the communiqué was communicated to the United Kingdom, the United States and France under cover of a Soviet note on November 3. Stating that the Prague declaration possessed “the greatest significance for the cause of assuring international peace and security” and touched the “fundamental national interests of the peoples of Europe,” the Soviet government proposed the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers „for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-278
Author(s):  
Nalin Kumar Mohapatra

The ‘sustainable peace’ is eluding Afghanistan over centuries. This can largely be attributed to both external geopolitical factors as well as the internal domestic realignments. Often these two factors operate in isolation and at times collude with each other, thus accentuating both domestic and regional instability. The fallout of protracted conflict in Afghanistan in the last few decades has resulted in the emergence of weak governance structure along with the proliferation of radicalism and the flow of narcotics to the neighbouring regions. Eurasia is one such region which has largely been affected by the developments in Afghanistan. The Eurasian states’ engagement with Afghanistan can be looked both through the prism of geopolitical developments that took place in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union and post-9/11 developments which resulted in the intervention of external actors. The present geopolitical imbroglio is largely emanating from the decision of the United States to leave Afghanistan and the Russian’s desire to fill the vacuum. Iran and China are also engaged in shaping the geopolitical dynamics of this trouble-torn state. India, on the other hand, perceives security and stability of Afghanistan are important for greater regional economic cooperation which will facilitate its effective engagement in Eurasia.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Matz

This article provides an in-depth examination of the U.S. government's role in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the courageous Swedish envoy who died mysteriously in the Soviet Union after being arrested by Soviet occupation forces at the end of World War II for unknown reasons. The article recounts how U.S. officials, particularly the diplomat Herschel V. Johnson, tried to alleviate the plight of Hungarian Jews after German forces occupied Hungary in 1944. A key part of this policy was their effort to work with Sweden in enlisting Wallenberg's help. The U.S.-Swedish relationship was never particularly close, and the mistrust that officials in each country felt toward the other side impeded any coordinated action. The article discusses the bureaucratic impediments on the U.S. side and highlights some of the obstacles that Johnson strove to overcome. The article builds on the report produced by the Eliasson Commission documenting the Swedish government's handling of the Wallenberg case. Although the Swedish authorities bore by far the greatest amount of blame for doing nothing in the face of Soviet stonewalling, Matz argues that U.S. officials also made significant misjudgments that may have exacerbated the situation.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter illustrates that many Americans took part in struggles for rights during the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Though it was a fertile period for those promoting rights within the United States, few Americans were concerned in those years with efforts to secure rights in other parts of the world. The emergence of a rights movement in the Soviet Union in the 1960s was little noted, and relatively few in the United States joined Amnesty International, which developed far more rapidly in Europe. Americans concerned about rights in that era could be mobilized to deal with American violations of rights, but not with rights abuses by other governments. Inattention to such matters by those deeply engaged in domestic rights struggles was, in a way, a counterpart to the disdain for international law frequently expressed by partisans of American exceptionalism.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-662

Examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and France, including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany; the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the USSR, United States, United Kingdom and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.


Author(s):  
Steven Lapidus

In October of 1941, twenty-nine rabbis and rabbinical students left Shanghai and eventually arrived in Montreal, under an unusual Canadian government visa program to help Orthodox rabbis. Among these refugees were the future chief rabbi of Montreal, Pinchas Hirschprung, as well as nine shlichim of the Lubavitcher rebbe. This article offers a detailed account of Hirschprung’s journey from his hometown of Dukla, Poland, through Lithuania, Latvia, the Soviet Union, Japan, Shanghai, and the United States, until his arrival in Montreal. Through Hirschprung’s personal experience, the article highlights the complexities and difficulties of searching for refuge during this particular period of the war, prior to the US entry after Pearl Harbor. As well, this article brings together previously untranslated archival and biographical information on the other rabbinical refugees who travelled with Hirschprung including students and teachers from some of the best-known prewar yeshivot of Lithuania and Poland. The article also addresses the tensions between the Orthodox and secular rescue organizations during the Holocaust.


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