Are Soviet arithmetic books better than ours?

1965 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 633-637
Author(s):  
Homer C. Sherman ◽  
Robert E. Belding

Authorities have long agreed that the textbook is the most indispensable teaching instrument used in the classrooms of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, if the arithmetic program of one nation is superior to that of the other, a comparison of the texts used in each nation may well reveal some important reasons for the effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, of each nation's arithmetic program.

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-36
Author(s):  
William I. Hitchcock

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-278
Author(s):  
Nalin Kumar Mohapatra

The ‘sustainable peace’ is eluding Afghanistan over centuries. This can largely be attributed to both external geopolitical factors as well as the internal domestic realignments. Often these two factors operate in isolation and at times collude with each other, thus accentuating both domestic and regional instability. The fallout of protracted conflict in Afghanistan in the last few decades has resulted in the emergence of weak governance structure along with the proliferation of radicalism and the flow of narcotics to the neighbouring regions. Eurasia is one such region which has largely been affected by the developments in Afghanistan. The Eurasian states’ engagement with Afghanistan can be looked both through the prism of geopolitical developments that took place in the region following the collapse of the Soviet Union and post-9/11 developments which resulted in the intervention of external actors. The present geopolitical imbroglio is largely emanating from the decision of the United States to leave Afghanistan and the Russian’s desire to fill the vacuum. Iran and China are also engaged in shaping the geopolitical dynamics of this trouble-torn state. India, on the other hand, perceives security and stability of Afghanistan are important for greater regional economic cooperation which will facilitate its effective engagement in Eurasia.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Matz

This article provides an in-depth examination of the U.S. government's role in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the courageous Swedish envoy who died mysteriously in the Soviet Union after being arrested by Soviet occupation forces at the end of World War II for unknown reasons. The article recounts how U.S. officials, particularly the diplomat Herschel V. Johnson, tried to alleviate the plight of Hungarian Jews after German forces occupied Hungary in 1944. A key part of this policy was their effort to work with Sweden in enlisting Wallenberg's help. The U.S.-Swedish relationship was never particularly close, and the mistrust that officials in each country felt toward the other side impeded any coordinated action. The article discusses the bureaucratic impediments on the U.S. side and highlights some of the obstacles that Johnson strove to overcome. The article builds on the report produced by the Eliasson Commission documenting the Swedish government's handling of the Wallenberg case. Although the Swedish authorities bore by far the greatest amount of blame for doing nothing in the face of Soviet stonewalling, Matz argues that U.S. officials also made significant misjudgments that may have exacerbated the situation.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter illustrates that many Americans took part in struggles for rights during the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Though it was a fertile period for those promoting rights within the United States, few Americans were concerned in those years with efforts to secure rights in other parts of the world. The emergence of a rights movement in the Soviet Union in the 1960s was little noted, and relatively few in the United States joined Amnesty International, which developed far more rapidly in Europe. Americans concerned about rights in that era could be mobilized to deal with American violations of rights, but not with rights abuses by other governments. Inattention to such matters by those deeply engaged in domestic rights struggles was, in a way, a counterpart to the disdain for international law frequently expressed by partisans of American exceptionalism.


Author(s):  
Steven Lapidus

In October of 1941, twenty-nine rabbis and rabbinical students left Shanghai and eventually arrived in Montreal, under an unusual Canadian government visa program to help Orthodox rabbis. Among these refugees were the future chief rabbi of Montreal, Pinchas Hirschprung, as well as nine shlichim of the Lubavitcher rebbe. This article offers a detailed account of Hirschprung’s journey from his hometown of Dukla, Poland, through Lithuania, Latvia, the Soviet Union, Japan, Shanghai, and the United States, until his arrival in Montreal. Through Hirschprung’s personal experience, the article highlights the complexities and difficulties of searching for refuge during this particular period of the war, prior to the US entry after Pearl Harbor. As well, this article brings together previously untranslated archival and biographical information on the other rabbinical refugees who travelled with Hirschprung including students and teachers from some of the best-known prewar yeshivot of Lithuania and Poland. The article also addresses the tensions between the Orthodox and secular rescue organizations during the Holocaust.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Ariel Davis

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been a leading proponent of liberal internationalism and Western democratic values around the world. Modern historians generally agree that the post-war order, which produced multi-national institutions and promoted democracy, free trade, and peace, was largely shaped by the United States and the other two Allied powers, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This paper explains how the Tehran and Yalta Conferences served as early examples of President Franklin Roosevelt’s vision for international cooperation and American global leadership. Specifically, this essay analyzes how Roosevelt used these conferences to unite the other Allied powers in an effort to end World War II and establish the foundations for the liberal international post war order. To demonstrate the significance of these conferences and their role in the development of the liberal post-war order, conference minutes between the leaders of the Allied powers and their respective foreign policy experts are analyzed. Academic writings from military and international historians are also used to evaluate the execution and outcomes of the agreements reached during these conferences.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milton Leitenberg

This article provides an overview of the perils of U.S. and Soviet nuclear war planning during the Cold War. In particular, the article discusses instances of false alarms, when one side or the other picked up indications of an imminent attack by the other side and had to take measures to determine whether the indicators were accurate. None of these incidents posed a large danger of an accidental nuclear war, but they illustrate the inherent risks of the war preparations that both the United States and the Soviet Union took for their immense nuclear arsenals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Kallen

One of the most enduring legacies of the Cold War period was the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is especially true if one considers the ‘Space Race,’ of the mid 1950s-1960s, where each country tried to out-do the other in all manner of space technology. This paper, while acknowledging the importance held by military and scientific goals, argues that it was matters of nationalism and prestige that provided the biggest motivation for the creation of new space technologies during this time.


2021 ◽  
pp. 193-234
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter examines U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War (1985-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how American and Soviet decision makers viewed each other’s intentions, focusing on the Soviet Union’s early unilateral arms control initiatives; Moscow’s efforts to forge a “grand compromise”; the negotiation and aftermath of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and Moscow’s retrenchment, including its withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement that it would make significant cuts to its conventional forces in Europe. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Washington and Moscow were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each case, the chapter then describes the resulting U.S.-Soviet security competition. Finally, the chapter examines the last two years of the Cold War and demonstrates that although neither side came close to trusting the other, only the United States continued to compete for security, because the Soviet Union could not afford to sustain the effort.


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