18. Instability in Latin America

This chapter examines the reasons for the instability in Latin America during the Cold War. The oil crisis of 1973–1974, followed by trade deficits, depression, and high inflation, helped promote revolutionary ideas among the landless peasants and urban poor of many Latin American countries. Under Jimmy Carter, with his interest in promoting human rights, a more active and enlightened US policy towards Latin America might have been expected. However, his aims were inconsistent, as the moral cause of human rights clashed with local realities and other American interests. The chapter first considers the Reagan Doctrine and Ronald Reagan’s meddling in El Salvador before discussing the United States’s involvement in Nicaragua and the ‘Contragate’ scandal. It concludes with an assessment of the US invasions of Grenada and Panama.

15. The Return to Confrontation, 1979–80

This chapter examines why the United States and the Soviet Union returned to confrontation during the period 1979–1980. Despite the slow progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), there were at least some efforts to control strategic weapons. Short-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in contrast, continued to grow in number and sophistication, particularly in Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces still prepared for war against each other, despite détente. The failure to control theatre nuclear weapons led to a new twist in the European arms race at the end of the 1970s which helped to undermine recent improvements in East–West relations. The chapter first considers NATO’s ‘dual track’ decision regarding theatre nuclear weapons before discussing the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It concludes with an assessment of the revival of the Cold War, focusing on the so-called Carter Doctrine.

14. Détente in Decline, 1977–9

This chapter examines the decline of détente during the period 1977–1979. Détente suffered in part from being identified with Richard Nixon. After 1973, conservatives increasingly questioned détente, felt that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) benefited the Soviet Union most, and were disturbed by an apparent pattern of communist adventurism abroad, in the 1973 Middle East War, Angola, and South-East Asia. The chapter first considers détente and policy-making during the time of Jimmy Carter before discussing the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the Lebanon Civil War, and the Camp David summit of 1978 that resulted in an Egyptian–Israel peace treaty. It then analyses the Ogaden conflict of 1977–1978), the ‘normalization’ of Sino-American relations, and the Sino–Vietnamese War. It concludes with an assessment of the SALT II treaty.

10. The Vietnam War

This chapter focuses on the United States’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the Vietnam conflict in difficult circumstances. He had not been elected president in his own right and so, perhaps, believed that he should carry on with John F. Kennedy’s policies. It was unclear what exactly Kennedy would have done in Vietnam, but Johnson retained his predecessor’s foreign policy team and did not question the basic principle of America’s foreign policy, which called for communism to be resisted. The chapter first considers the escalation of US involvement in Vietnam during the period 1963–1965 before discussing the conflict between the US and North Vietnam in the succeeding years, along with the Tet offensive and its implications. It concludes with an assessment of Richard Nixon’s decision to restart large-scale US bombing of North Vietnam.

8. Collapsing Empires: The Cold War Battle for Hearts and Minds, 1953–63

This chapter examines how the United States and the Soviet Union sought to win the hearts and minds of people in various parts of the world as empires began to collapse during the period 1953–1963. It begins with a discussion of the end of the French Empire, taking into account the loss of French Indo-China and the start of American involvement in Vietnam, along with the collapse of French rule in Morocco and Tunisia. It then considers the crises in the Congo, Angola, and the Middle East, focusing on the zenith of the Cold War in Black Africa, Britain’s declining power, and the Suez crisis. It concludes by looking at the end of the British Empire in Africa.

2. Two Worlds East and West, 1945–8

This chapter examines how the world was divided into two opposing blocs, East and West, during the period 1945–1948. It begins with a discussion of the Marshall Plan, focusing on its implementation and its Cold War consequences, and the Western economic system. It then considers the Soviet Union’s takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, with emphasis on the split between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It also looks at the struggle for influence in East Asia and concludes with an assessment of the division of Germany. The chapter suggests that the Berlin crisis was in many ways a symbolic crisis in a city which came to epitomize Cold War tensions until 1989; the crisis has also been regarded as an important cause of the militarization of the Cold War and the formation of NATO.

1. Tensions in the Grand Alliance and Growing Confrontation, 1945–7

This chapter examines tensions in the grand alliance between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as well as the growing confrontation involving the three countries during the period 1945–1947. It begins with a discussion of the Yalta Conference held in February 1945, taking into account the US, Soviet, and British approach to Yalta as well as the conference proceedings. It then considers the Potsdam Conference and how the issue of atomic bombs was addressed at the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in 1945. It also analyses the growing confrontation in the Near East and Mediterranean, focusing on the crises in Iran and Turkey. Finally, it explores containment, confrontation, and the Truman Doctrine during the years 1946–1947.

12. An Era of Negotiations, 1972–3

This chapter examines the negotiations pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. The most dramatic change in international diplomacy in the early 1970s was the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington. After two decades of enmity, it was announced on 15 July 1971 that Richard Nixon was to visit China. The ‘Opening to China’ was in accord with the Nixon–Kissinger hope of maintaining a favourable position vis-à-vis the Soviets despite America’s problems in Vietnam. The chapter first considers the so-called ‘triangular diplomacy’ involving the US, USSR, and China as well as the East Asian balance before discussing the Moscow Summit and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). It concludes with an assessment of the Nixon administration’s Vietnam settlement in 1972–1973 via the the Paris peace accords.

11. Other Regional Conflicts

This chapter examines conflicts in Latin America, South-East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East during the Cold War in which the United States and the Soviet Union were involved. Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in Vietnam may have been encouraged in the spring of 1965 by events in the Caribbean, where armed intervention by US Marines put a quick end to a supposed communist menace in the Dominican Republic. Arguably, this action reflected a change of priorities from the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies, when there were hopes of the US stimulating Latin American economic development. The chapter first considers US intervention in the Dominican Republic before discussing the Malaysia–Indonesia ‘confrontation’ of 1963–1966, the Indo–Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, and the Six Day War in 1967 between Arabs and Israel.

3. Empire, Cold War, and Decolonization, 1945–53

This chapter examines decolonization and the changes that took place within the European empires during the early years of the Cold War. Decolonization constituted a crucial element of the new international order after the Second World War and formed part of the broader shift in the global balance of power. The war marked the end of the European-dominated system of nation states and was followed by the decline of the major European powers, with international dominance lying for a quarter of a century with the United States, challenged only by the Soviet Union. The chapter considers the challenges to colonial rule that were evident in both Africa and Asia during the inter-war years. It also discusses the imperialism and the struggles against it that have formed part of a post-war landscape in the Middle East.