International Court of Justice

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 532-533

ApplicationsAerial Incident of October y, 1952 (United States v. Soviet Union): On June 2, 1955, the United States filed with the International Court of Justice an application instituting proceedings against the Soviet Union, on the grounds of certain willful acts said to have been committed by Soviet fighter aircraft against a United States Air Force B-29 aircraft andits crew off Hokkaido, Japan, on October 7, 1952. The United States claimed that a Soviet fighter aircraft, unlawfully overflying the territory of Japan at the instigation of the Soviet government, had without any provocation attacked and destroyed the United States Air Force B-29, causing it to crashinto the sea at a point between Yuri Island and Akiyuri Island in territory rightfully belonging to Japan; that the crew of eight, all members of the United States Air Force and nationals ofthe United States, had failed to return, and that the Soviet government had concealed from the United States government information as to the fate of the crew, and had notmade provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it might still be holding or of whose whereabouts itwas informed. The United States application stated that the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this case was accepted by the United States. The damages the United States claimed to have suffered and for which it claimed the Soviet Union to beliable were specified in a note annexed to the application; the United States claimed that the actions withwhich it charged the Soviet government constituted serious violations of international obligation for which it demanded monetary and other reparation.

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 630-634 ◽  

Case concerning the Aerial Incident of November 7, 1954 (United States v. Soviet Union): On July 7, 1959, an application instituting proceedings against die Soviet Union was filed in the Registry of the Court by the government of the United States. In its application the government of the United States alleged that on November 7, 1954, one of its aircraft was attacked and destroyed over the Japanese island of Hokkaido by fighter aircraft of the Soviet Union. It requested the Court to find that the Soviet Union was liable for the damages caused and to award damages in the sum of $756,604. It also stated that it had submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this case and that it was open to the government of the Soviet Union to do likewise. In accordance with Article 40 of the Statute of the Court, the application was thereupon communicated by the Registry to the government of the Soviet Union.


1960 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denys P. Myers

The press release issued by the Department of State in announcing the filing of an application with the International Court of Justice on July 7, 1959, in a damage suit for the destruction of an aircraft by a fighter aircraft of the Soviet Union stated:The present proceedings have been instituted in accordance with the well-established United States policy of resolving such disputes, whether of fact or law, in the International Court of Justice. The Court is the judicial organ of the United Nations for this purpose and is the appropriate international body before which such cases can be heard and decided.


1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson

The history of the International Court of Justice in its thirty-third year is contained in narrow compass. It is chiefly confined to one judgment rendered by the Court in the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed From Borne in 1943, and to the advisory opinion given by the Court on the Effect of Awards Made By the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Apart from these, in the Nottebohm Case between Liechtenstein and Guatemala, the time for the rejoinder of Guatemala to be filed was extended for one month, to November 2, 1954. Action was taken by the Court ordering that the “Électricité de Beyrouth” Company Case be removed from the list at the request of the French Government; the Court also ordered that two cases brought by the United States against Hungary and the Soviet Union, relating to the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America, should be removed from the list for lack of jurisdiction.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-557

Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America: On March 3, 1954, the United States filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice Applications dated February 16, 1954, instituting proceedings against the governments of Hungary and the Soviet Union in the matter of the treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of the United States. In two orders of July 12, 1954, the Court removed the cases from its list, since neither Hungary nor the Soviet Union had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in the matter.


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 578-579

From its 880th through its 883d meetings the Security Council considered the charge by the Soviet Union that the United States had, through aggressive acts committed by its Air Force against the Soviet Union, created a threat to universal peace. Mr. Kuznetsov (Soviet Union) was the first speaker. Noting that it had been a mere two months since the Council had last debated the aggressive actions of the United States in a similar situation, he indicated that members of the Council were aware of the fact that on July 1, 1960, an RB–47 six-engined armed bomber reconnaissance aircraft of the United States Air Force had violated the state border of the Soviet Union, whereupon it had been shot down, two of the crew members subsequently being picked up in Soviet territorial waters. It seemed clear, he continued, that there had been no substance to the promise of the United States President to suspend flights of United States aircraft over Soviet territory; moreover, those allies of the United States which allowed the latter to use bases on their territory “for aggressive purposes against the Soviet Union" must be considered accomplices of the United States in these aggressive acts. Believing it necessary for the Security Council to take measures to make the United States stop provocative actions against other countries, Mr. Kuznetsov presented a draft resolution” to the Council, whereby it would condemn the violations of the sovereign rights of other states by the United States Air Force and regard them as aggressive acts, and would, further, insist that the government of the United States take immediate steps to put an end to such acts and to prevent their recurrence.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229

Proposed Meeting of the Council: Meeting in Prague on October 20 and 21, 1950, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, eastern Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement in reply to the communiqué on Germany released on September 19 by the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Charging that the position of the three western governments was merely a screen to conceal the aggressive objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the creation of mobile police formations was nothing less than the reconstitution of a German army, the eight foreign ministers stated that they considered as urgent 1) the publication by the three western powers and the Soviet Union of a statement of their intent to refuse to permit German rearmament and of their unswerving determination to create a united peace-loving German state; 2) the removal of all restrictions hindering the development of the peaceful German economy and the prevention of a resurgence of German war potential; 3) the conclusion of a German treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year of its conclusion; and 4) the creation of an all-German constituent council to prepare for a provisional German government. The text of the communiqué was communicated to the United Kingdom, the United States and France under cover of a Soviet note on November 3. Stating that the Prague declaration possessed “the greatest significance for the cause of assuring international peace and security” and touched the “fundamental national interests of the peoples of Europe,” the Soviet government proposed the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers „for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany.”


1946 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 456-474
Author(s):  
N. S. Timasheff

On the two victory days, military action on the fronts stopped. But peace did not return, nor does anyone know when it will. Peace is not simply absence of military .ction. It is a state of international relations corresponding to “periods of normalcy” in the internal affairs of a nation. Peace exists, when these relations are dominated by good will, mutual understanding and friendly cooperation.The post-war world longs for peace. But there is no peace because, among the sovereign states, there is one which acts against peace. This is the Soviet Union. Is it, however, certain that the foreign policy of the Soviets is aggressive? Is it not true that, in Moscow, aggressiveness is ascribed to the United States and to the alleged Western bloc headed by it?In March, 1946, Professor E. Tarle, an authoritative spokesman of the Soviet government, placed in opposition “the old imperialistic concept of international relations” practiced by London and Washington and “the Soviet conception which is based on respect for the rights of the peoples and their real independence.”


Slavic Review ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip S. Gillette

In 1921 a young American doctor named Armand Hammer went to Russia, met Lenin, and undertook the first American concession in Soviet Russia. Interest in this episode has been heightened by the fact that fifty years later Armand Hammer, as chairman of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, forged new commercial links between the United States and the Soviet Union. This article provides a new interpretation of Hammer’s meeting with Lenin and his receipt of the first American concession granted by the Soviet government. It throws light on how Soviet national security objectives and personal relations can influence Soviet government decisions on American trade.


1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Lawrence Preuss

The recent Kasenkina and Samarin affairs, which led to a breach of consular relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, have raised a number of legal issues relating to the status of foreign consular officials. The legal principles involved, however, have been beclouded by widespread misunderstanding of the nature and scope of consular privileges and immunities, by obviously baseless charges made by the Soviet Government against that of the United States, and by the apparent reluctance of the latter to press to its fullest extent a sound legal case.


2020 ◽  
pp. 263-284
Author(s):  
Kevin Riehle

Several lessons emerge from these defectors’ revelations. First, the motivations of defectors changed based on the circumstances around them, which reflected Soviet policy changes. Those policy changes, such as purges and increased domestic repression, were often at the foundation of defector’s motivations. Second, vetting standards for Soviet personnel assigned to sensitive national security positions fluctuated, depending on the stability in the Soviet government and the level of urgency for hiring new personnel. When the Soviet Union was stable, it had the luxury of enforcing strict standards. When the Soviet Union needed a lot of people fast—such as during purges or wartime—it did not vet them as thoroughly. Finally, the Soviet perception of threat evolved, beginning with Great Britain as the primary threat in the early Soviet era, and joined by Germany after 1933, although Stalin never abandoned hope for an accommodation with Hitler. However, even before Germany was defeated in 1945, Soviet intelligence began targeting its wartime allies. By the late 1940s, when the United States assumed the role of the leader of the democratic world, the label “main enemy” was coined and applied to the United States, which stuck for the rest of the Soviet era.


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