International Court of Justice

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 630-634 ◽  

Case concerning the Aerial Incident of November 7, 1954 (United States v. Soviet Union): On July 7, 1959, an application instituting proceedings against die Soviet Union was filed in the Registry of the Court by the government of the United States. In its application the government of the United States alleged that on November 7, 1954, one of its aircraft was attacked and destroyed over the Japanese island of Hokkaido by fighter aircraft of the Soviet Union. It requested the Court to find that the Soviet Union was liable for the damages caused and to award damages in the sum of $756,604. It also stated that it had submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this case and that it was open to the government of the Soviet Union to do likewise. In accordance with Article 40 of the Statute of the Court, the application was thereupon communicated by the Registry to the government of the Soviet Union.

1960 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denys P. Myers

The press release issued by the Department of State in announcing the filing of an application with the International Court of Justice on July 7, 1959, in a damage suit for the destruction of an aircraft by a fighter aircraft of the Soviet Union stated:The present proceedings have been instituted in accordance with the well-established United States policy of resolving such disputes, whether of fact or law, in the International Court of Justice. The Court is the judicial organ of the United Nations for this purpose and is the appropriate international body before which such cases can be heard and decided.


1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson

The history of the International Court of Justice in its thirty-third year is contained in narrow compass. It is chiefly confined to one judgment rendered by the Court in the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed From Borne in 1943, and to the advisory opinion given by the Court on the Effect of Awards Made By the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Apart from these, in the Nottebohm Case between Liechtenstein and Guatemala, the time for the rejoinder of Guatemala to be filed was extended for one month, to November 2, 1954. Action was taken by the Court ordering that the “Électricité de Beyrouth” Company Case be removed from the list at the request of the French Government; the Court also ordered that two cases brought by the United States against Hungary and the Soviet Union, relating to the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America, should be removed from the list for lack of jurisdiction.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-557

Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America: On March 3, 1954, the United States filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice Applications dated February 16, 1954, instituting proceedings against the governments of Hungary and the Soviet Union in the matter of the treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of the United States. In two orders of July 12, 1954, the Court removed the cases from its list, since neither Hungary nor the Soviet Union had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in the matter.


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 532-533

ApplicationsAerial Incident of October y, 1952 (United States v. Soviet Union): On June 2, 1955, the United States filed with the International Court of Justice an application instituting proceedings against the Soviet Union, on the grounds of certain willful acts said to have been committed by Soviet fighter aircraft against a United States Air Force B-29 aircraft andits crew off Hokkaido, Japan, on October 7, 1952. The United States claimed that a Soviet fighter aircraft, unlawfully overflying the territory of Japan at the instigation of the Soviet government, had without any provocation attacked and destroyed the United States Air Force B-29, causing it to crashinto the sea at a point between Yuri Island and Akiyuri Island in territory rightfully belonging to Japan; that the crew of eight, all members of the United States Air Force and nationals ofthe United States, had failed to return, and that the Soviet government had concealed from the United States government information as to the fate of the crew, and had notmade provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it might still be holding or of whose whereabouts itwas informed. The United States application stated that the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this case was accepted by the United States. The damages the United States claimed to have suffered and for which it claimed the Soviet Union to beliable were specified in a note annexed to the application; the United States claimed that the actions withwhich it charged the Soviet government constituted serious violations of international obligation for which it demanded monetary and other reparation.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 720-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Preuss

It has been remarked that the Government of the United States “seldom loses an opportunity to profess its loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract. … The expression of this sentiment has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the actual policy of the United States.” This ambivalent attitude is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in a memorandum addressed by Mr. John Foster Dulles on July 10, 1946, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “The United States, since its formation,” Mr. Dulles states, “has led in promoting a reign of law and justice as between nations. In order to continue that leadership, we should now accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If the United States, which has the material power to impose its will widely in the world, agrees instead to submit to the impartial adjudication of its legal controversies, that will inaugurate a new and profoundly significant international advance.” Although the initial step of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would in itself be “of profound moral significance,” it would, Mr. Dulles continues, “assume greatly increased practical significance” only when “limiting factors” have been removed, for the “path is as yet so untried that it would be reckless to proceed precipitately,” the Court “has yet to win the confidence of the world community,” and “international law has not yet developed the scope and definiteness necessary to permit international disputes generally to be resolved by judicial rather than political tests.”


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis O. Wilcox

On August 2, 1946, the United States Senate approved the Morse resolution by the overwhelming vote of 62-2, thereby giving its advice and consent to the acceptance on the part of the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was the same Senate which, just one year and one week earlier, had cast a vote of 89-2 in favor of the United Nations Charter. On August 26 Herschel Johnson, acting United States representative on the Security Council, deposited President Truman’s declaration of adherence with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At long last the United States assumed far-reaching obligations to submit its legal disputes to an international court.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck

The decision of the International Court of Justice in the case between Nicaragua and the United States brims with important procedural and substantive implications for the future of law and adjudication in disputes between states.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Dingle

AbstractThis is a further contribution to the Squire Law Library Eminent Scholars Archive by Lesley Dingle. It is based on interviews with Stephen Schwebel about his distinguished career as an international jurist in the United States and at the International Court of Justice.


Proxy War ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 182-200
Author(s):  
Tyrone L. Groh

This chapter presents a case study for how India initially supported the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) covertly to protect ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka and then later had to overtly intervene to stop LTTE’s operations during efforts to broker peace. For the duration of the conflict, India’s support remained covert and plausibly deniable. Inside Sri Lanka, the character of the conflict was almost exclusively ethnic and involved the government in Colombo trying to prevent the emergence of an independent Tamil state. Internationally, the United States, the Soviet Union, and most other global powers, for the most part, remained sidelined. Domestically, India’s government had to balance its foreign policy with concerns about its sympathetic Tamil population and the threat of several different secessionist movements inside its own borders. The India-LTTE case reflects history’s most costly proxy war policy.


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