Faith and Reason: A Response to Duncan Pritchard

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-247
Author(s):  
Roberto di Ceglie

AbstractIn a recent essay Duncan Pritchard argues that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between religious belief and ordinary or non-religious belief. Both of them – so he maintains in the footsteps of Wittgenstein's On certainty – are ultimately grounded on a-rational commitments, namely, commitments unresponsive to rational criteria. I argue that, while this view can be justified theologically, it cannot be advanced philosophically as Pritchard assumes.I offer an account of Aquinas's reflection on faith and reason to show that the theologian – not the philosopher – is entitled to deal with a-rational commitments, because the truths of faith can be seen as simply intellectual – like the rational statements considered by the philosopher – but also as decisions made by way of divine grace. I also suggest that Pritchard's thesis may be re-proposed on a new basis, if Aquinas's theological stance were reinterpreted so as to point out unexpected connections between theology and philosophy.

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard

AbstractA novel account of the rationality of religious belief is offered, called quasi-fideism. According to this proposal, we are neither to think of religious belief as completely immune to rational evaluation nor are we to deny that it involves fundamental commitments which are arational. Moreover, a parity argument is presented to the effect that religious belief is no different from ordinary rational belief in presupposing such fundamental arational commitments. This proposal is shown to be rooted in Wittgenstein's remarks on hinge commitments in On Certainty, remarks which it is claimed were in turn influenced by John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.


Author(s):  
Rik Van Nieuwenhove

Contemplation, according to Thomas Aquinas, is the central goal of our life; yet a scholarly study on this topic has not appeared for over seventy years. This book fills that obvious gap. From an interdisciplinary perspective this study considers the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the contemplative act; the nature of the active and contemplative lives in light of Aquinas’s Dominican calling; the role of faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in contemplation; and contemplation and the beatific vision. Key questions addressed are: What is contemplation? What is truth? How can we know God? How do faith and reason relate to one another? How does Aquinas envisage the relations between theology and philosophy? What role does charity play in contemplation? Throughout this book the author argues that Aquinas espouses a profoundly intellective notion of contemplation in the strictly speculative sense, which culminates in a non-discursive moment of insight (intuitus simplex). In marked contrast to his contemporaries Aquinas therefore rejects a sapiential or affective brand of theology. He also employs a broader notion of contemplation, which can be enjoyed by all Christians, in which the gifts of the Holy Spirit are of central importance. This book should appeal to all those who are interested in this key aspect of Aquinas’s thought. It provides a lucid account of central aspects of Aquinas’s metaphysics, epistemology, theology, and spirituality. It also offers new insights into the nature of the theological discipline as Aquinas sees it, and how theology relates to philosophy.


Author(s):  
Geertjan Zuijdwegt

Richard Whately (1787-1863) is an intriguing figure in John Henry Newman’s development. Through his mentoring and academic support, he taught the gifted young Newman to think for himself. But intellectual independence came at a price. After a close relationship in the mid-1820s, Newman began to steer a course of his own. In the tumultuous early 1830s, their friendship foundered, as they clashed over key theological issues: the authority of the church, the doctrine of the Trinity, the nature of revelation, and the reasonableness of religious belief. Newman had come to think that Whately's theology endangered orthodox Christianity. This conviction shaped his later opposition to other Oriel Noetics, who thought like Whately. Despite their conflicts, Newman drew on Whately's work in logic and rhetoric to formulate his own theory of the relation between faith and reason.


1994 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira

Søren Kierkegaard (in the Climacus writings) and John Henry Newman have starkly opposed formulations of the relation between faith and reason. In this essay I focus on a possible convergence in their respective understandings of the transition to religious belief or faith, as embodied in metaphors they use for a qualitative transition. I explore the ways in which attention to the legitimate dimension of discontinuity highlighted by the Climacan metaphor of the ‘leap’ can illuminate Newman's use of the metaphor of a ‘polygon inscribed in a circle’, as well as the ways in which Newman's metaphor can illuminate the dimension of continuity operative in the Climacan appreciation of qualitative transition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-243
Author(s):  
Jeroen de Ridder ◽  

Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.


Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.


2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (106) ◽  
pp. 211
Author(s):  
Mario Miranda SJ

O artigo constitui uma reflexão sobre a problemática atual sobre Deus, mais precisamente sobre o acesso a Deus. Inicialmente são examinadas algumas razões para certo agnosticismo presente, sobretudo no meio acadêmico. Em seguida o texto aborda a fragmentação da razão clássica numa pluralidade de racionalidades” que acabam por condicionar o conhecimento humano (horizontes de compreensão) e, consequentemente, seu acesso ao Transcendente. A terceira parte do artigo propugna uma maior unidade de fé e razão, de teologia e filosofia e busca recuperar a verdade da clássica teologia negativa ou apofática. Finalmente, a partir de uma teologia da criação e numa perspectiva agostiniana, se defende o acesso existencial a Deus, que deveria ser mais valorizado na teologia e na pastoral.ABSTRACT: This article is a reflection on the present-day issue of God, more precisely concerning access to God. First there is an examination of a number of reasons for a certain current agnosticism, especially in academic circles. This is followed by a discussion of the fragmentation of classical reason in a plurality of reasoning which end up by conditioning human knowledge (horizons of comprehension) and consequently its access to the transcendent. The third part of this article argues for a greater unity between faith and reason, between theology and philosophy and seeks to recover the truth of classical negative or apophatic theology. Finally, through a Trinitarian theology of the creation and from an Augustinian perspective, the author defends an existential access to God, to which greater importance ought to be attached in theology and in pastoral work.


2008 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Ignacio VERDÚ BERGANZA

This paper examines the value awarded by Duns Escoto to the defence of god -understood as Lave- who acts in a completely free mannner and is omnipotent. I also studies the implications of his philosophical position when confrontingthe relationships between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, intellect and will, necessity and contingency. His analysis of The Philosopher, Aristotle, is also discussed.


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