Rorty and James

This chapter documents unexplored parallels between the pluralistic, “unfinished” universe heralded by James, and the contingent, linguistically mediated landscape open to endless redescription embraced by Rorty. Both are philosophers of agency who evoke a conception of knowledge in which humans are active participants in the construction of what is right and true. They reject an ethics that appeals to fixed principles, yet nonetheless combine their fallibilism and pluralism with an account of commitment and responsibility that manifests in an acute attentiveness to what James called the “cries of the wounded” and to the obligations that the claims of concrete others place on us. Read alongside James, Rortyan irony emerges as an ethical form of antiauthoritarian fallibilism. The combination of epistemic modesty and willingness to listen and learn from others with an account of ethical responsiveness is a signal contribution of their pragmatisms.

Thinking with Robert Sokolowski about phenomenology and personalism

Robert Sokolowski wishes to provide what he calls “glimpses” that provide essential philosophical clarifications regarding the nature of the human person, whom the author also calls “the agent of truth.” He claims that our rationality constitutes us as human persons and wishes to explain such rationality in action to reveal its existing manifestations. He calls for epistemic modesty, pointing out our inability to fully understand the mystery of human personhood. Our article reflects on the way Sokolowski approaches the study of what constitutes the human person, underlining his preference for basing his ideas on dissecting distinct human activities, which helps us identify how human rationality and personhood manifest themselves. We further reflect on what Sokolowski means by emphasizing that human rationality is “essentially a disclosure of things” as opposed to the ability to note, describe, evaluate and/or infer ideas in your brains. Finally, we argue that to understand what constitutes the human person, we must take into account the human essential relationality and openness to the other/Other

On Maximal Simplicity

This essay engages with Oliver D. Crisp’s parsimonious model of divine simplicity while offering a defense of a maximal account of simplicity. Specifically, I clarify (1) the way in with Reformed orthodox theologians, like Gisbertus Voetius, anticipate something like Crisp’s model, (2) that pure actuality is an explication, rather than an entailment, of the doctrine of simplicity, and (3) that the doctrine of simplicity remains consistent with epistemic modesty in relation to theological matters.

Population health AI researchers’ perceptions of the public portrayal of AI: A pilot study

This article reports how 18 UK and Canadian population health artificial intelligence researchers in Higher Education Institutions perceive the use of artificial intelligence systems in their research, and how this compares with their perceptions about the media portrayal of artificial intelligence systems. This is triangulated with a small scoping analysis of how UK and Canadian news articles portray artificial intelligence systems associated with health research and care. Interviewees had concerns about what they perceived as sensationalist reporting of artificial intelligence systems – a finding reflected in the media analysis. In line with Pickersgill’s concept of ‘epistemic modesty’, they considered artificial intelligence systems better perceived as non-exceptionalist methodological tools that were uncertain and unexciting. Adopting ‘epistemic modesty’ was sometimes hindered by stakeholders to whom the research is disseminated, who may be less interested in hearing about the uncertainties of scientific practice, having implications on both research and policy.

An Audacious Argument for Modesty

It is notable that Pardis Dabashi's paper at the 2019 MLA convention, “the pressure to intervene: A case for the modest (Young) Critic,” caused such a stir—insofar as it mounted a gentle argument against ritual stir-causing, and the gentleness of the argument was central to its point. As Dabashi wrote, “the language of the scholarly intervention—that is, the articulation of the stakes of one's argument—has a way of ossifying hunches into convictions” (4). The idea, clearly, was to ratchet down the level of agon and hubris in scholarly debate and to foreground the perspectives of younger scholars making their first forays into the fray: “since thus far the post-critical debates held in widely circulated and visible academic forums have mostly been conducted among professionally secure, mid-late career scholars, we've not yet had the chance to discuss the kind of epistemic modesty that matters very deeply to early-career-stage scholars now, that is, scholars entering graduate programs in or around 2008” (2). Dabashi suspects, at least as this professionally secure, mid-to-late-career scholar hears her, that the cohort entering the desiccated post-2008 (and especially post-2015) job market does not see the profession in the terms that have dominated debate about the purpose of criticism over the past ten or twelve years: The field of critical production for us is deeply heterogenous, syncretic: the mixing of critical and (at least some) postcritical methods has become something we take for granted. And early-career scholars of this generation—who don't really have a horse in the race of re-orientating ourselves vis-à-vis the text—would advocate instead, it seems to me, for re-orienting ourselves vis-à-vis each other—that is, laterally, scholar to scholar. (3)

My objectivity is better than yours: contextualising debates about gender inequality

Absract In this paper, we contribute to a growing literature in the philosophy of social science cautioning social scientists against context-independent claims to objectivity, by analyzing the recent proposal of a new Basic Index of Gender Inequality (BIGI) by Gijsbert Stoet and David Geary. Despite the many internal problems with BIGI, Stoet and Geary have had some success in positioning the index as an important corrective to the way in which gender inequality is measured in mainstream metrics like the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). We argue that this success is facilitated at least in part by the failure of GGGI’s proponents to adequately justify the methodological choices underpinning the index in relation to the context in which the index’s findings are intended to be used. In so doing, the authors of GGGI oversell the objectivity of the metric’s assessment of the state of global gender inequality—and it is this overselling that allows Stoet and Geary to present BIGI as a metric that corrects what they claim are systematic biases within GGGI. The case of BIGI and GGGI, we argue, suggests that the kind of epistemic modesty exhibited by recent operational approaches to objectivity is particularly important for social research on highly politically contested topics.

Plato's Phaedo on Disagreement and Its Role in Epistemic Improvement

Recent studies suggest that the form and style of Plato's dialogues have significant associations with their philosophical contents. Few scholars, however, have focused on the role of disagreements in epistemic improvement within the context of Plato's Phaedo. This paper seeks to unearth a ‘theory of disagreement’ underpinning the Phaedo by examining the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. In doing so, I will highlight the epistemic importance of recognizing disagreements. It is shown that there is a positive relationship between the correct method of philosophical argument and epistemic modesty, which plays a crucial role in solving disagreements and facilitating epistemic improvement.

Reasonableness as a virtue of citizenship and the opacity respect requirement

This article defends a specific account of reasonableness as a virtue of liberal citizenship. I specify an account of reasonableness that I argue is more consistent with the phenomenology of intersubjective exchanges among citizens over political matters in contexts of deep disagreement. My reading requires reasonable citizens to undertake an attitude of epistemic modesty while deliberating public matters with agents who hold views different from theirs. In contrast with my view, I debate Martha Nussbaum’s and Steven Wall’s accounts of reasonableness and specify why I believe that these proposals, although interesting, both require revisions. Distinguishing my account from theirs, I specify the normative relation between reasonableness and a general framework of political legitimacy that identifies citizens as ‘co-authors of democratic decisions’. Here, I argue that the liberal ideal of ascribing to each member of the constituency the status of putative epistemic authority can be properly fulfilled if coupled with a correct specification of the political ideal of mutual respect. I conclude claiming that opacity respect, a notion of respect according to which the recognition respect that is owed to individuals is expressed by the idea that we have to treat them as ‘opaque’, is the most adequate concept of political respect when dealing with interpersonal deliberations at political level in contexts of deep disagreement.