Patterson Brown on God's Will as the Criterion of Morality

1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Reeder
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Christian Morality ◽  
Per Se

On Patterson Brown's analysis of the logic of Judeo-Christian morality, God's will is the criterion of what is right. The believer simply commits himself to or chooses God's will to the exclusion of all other criteria. Brown does not say that to obey God is a moral duty which always overrides other moral considerations. Nor does he say that God ‘transcends’ human morality either in the sense that he is the perfect exemplar of human standards or that the standard he exhibits and requires meets but also exceeds human standards. Nor does he say that God's will is to be obeyed over against morality per se. Rather, his view is that for the believer God's will is the standard of all moral judgments. For the believer, if and only if God commands something is it right. God ‘transcends’ human morality in the sense that his will need not accord with human standards.

scholarly journals Murka Allah atas Kebebalan Seksual Manusia dalam Roma 1:18-32

MELINTAS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-341
Author(s):  
R. F. Bhanu Viktorahadi
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Natural Will ◽  
Wrath Of God

Among the myriad of human behaviours, few may provoke the wrath of God such as that of ‘sexual asininity’ (pathe atimias). An expression literally meaning ‘lust for impurity’ or ‘shameful desire’, this refers to homosexual acts be they feminine or masculine. In his letter to Rome 1:18-32, Paul asserts the gravity of this sin as evoking the ire of God upon their heads, the reasons being not only this sin confronts the natural will of the Creator, but even more so for its inclination in leading human to idolatry. Paul clarifies that homosexuality is not the issue per se, but all acts in whatever form they be, should they violate God’s will are displeasing to God. Paul’s starting point was not that of homosexuality leading up to idolatry. On the contrary, the text quotes Paul as explaining that idolatry is the result of erroneous relationship between human and God mirrored in aberrant sexuality. Human errs due to the bond between human and God is not firm. The logical consequence of God’s wrath is punishment. In other words, human’s transgression brings the wrath of God. God’s wrath is not part of the judgment, but a logical consequence streaming from the ill-relationship between the Creator and the creation. Punishment befalls the humankind because of the deviation of the creation’s nature.

scholarly journals The Passive Body and States of Nature: An Examination of the Methodological Role State of Nature Theory Plays in Williams and Nietzsche

Genealogy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Brian Lightbody
Keyword(s):  
Functional Explanation ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Christian Morality ◽  
Per Se ◽  
States Of Nature ◽  
New System

In his work Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams offers a very different interpretation of philosophical genealogy than that expounded in the secondary literature. The “Received View” of genealogy holds that it is “documentary grey”: it attempts to provide historically well-supported, coherent, but defeasible explanations for the actual transformation of practices, values, and emotions in history. However, paradoxically, the standard interpretation also holds another principle. Genealogies are nevertheless polemical because they admit that any evidence that would serve to justify a genealogical account is indexical to a perspective. In short, genealogies are not true per se. This view of genealogy leaves it vulnerable to three criticisms. I call these three: (1) the reflexive, (2) the substantive, and (3) the semantic. In contrast, Williams argues that all genealogies provide a functional account for the manifestation of something and further, that a State of Nature story subtends these accounts. The upshot of Williams’ approach is that it makes for strange philosophical bedfellows. For example, Nietzsche’s account for the rise of Christian morality shares methodological features with Hobbes’ functional explanation for the emergence of civilization and yet Nietzsche seems to take issue with genealogists who are hypothesis mongers gazing haphazardly into the blue. In the following article, I flesh out, more fully, how to make sense of Williams’ novel reclassification of genealogy. I show that Nietzsche’s genealogies are State of Nature stories and, just like Hobbes’ State of Nature story in chapter thirteen of Leviathan, are subtended by our collective corporeality. I then demonstrate how Nietzsche’s three stories in the Genealogy, when brought together, serve to undermine what Williams refers to as “… a new system (of reasons)—which very powerfully resists being understood in such terms …” Finally, I explain how my reconstruction of Williams’ interpretation of the genealogy immunizes it against the three criticisms noted above.

Theological determinism and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEAL JUDISCH
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
God's Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Per Se

AbstractI argue that the free-will defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz, that (1) God intentionally necessitates all human actions, and (2) no human has it within her power to influence causally God's will – is entailed by any version of theological determinism. Contrary to widespread opinion, therefore, the viability of the free-will defence does not depend upon the viability of libertarianism per se but on the falsity of theological determinism.

I. Fact and Value

1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
W. D. Hudson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Factual Belief ◽  
Moral Philosophers

What connexion is there between factual statements concerning God or man and moral judgments? That is the question which occasions this paper. Not long ago moral philosophers were wont to say that there is a logical gap between the two sorts of utterance to which I have just referred: that nothing follows in terms of moral value from a statement of fact, no ‘ought’ from any ‘is’. They recognised only one restriction on what may be said in terms of ‘ought’ by what has been said in terms of ‘is’, namely that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. It is manifest nonsense to say that anyone ought to do what he cannot do. But, this apart, they thought it possible without contradiction or anomaly to hold any conceivable factual belief and at the same time subscribe to any conceivable moral judgment. They would have held that it makes perfectly good sense to say, for example, ‘This is God’s will but it ought not to be done’ or ‘Men are not pigs but a good man will live like a pig’. Bizarre such judgments may be, they would have said, but nonsensical they are not. They conceived it to be their main business, as moral philosophers, to erect warning notices along the edge of the is-ought gap so that contemporary moralists would not fall headlong into it as so many of their predecessors, in less enlightened ages, had done.

Are there Absolute Rights?

2020 ◽  
pp. 167-189
Author(s):  
Nigel Biggar
Keyword(s):  
Natural Rights ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Right

During the discussion of natural rights-talk in Chapters 1 to 5, it was argued that claims to an absolute status do not survive scrutiny. Moreover, a main conclusion was that such rights-talk, trading on the legal paradigm’s connotations of stability and security, tends to obscure the conditionality of a putative natural right upon a range of moral considerations. Further, John Finnis’s absolute rights were judged to be either not natural, or too abstract and unspecified to be practically illuminating. This chapter returns to the topic, to consider whether, and how, it can make good sense to talk of absolute rights—that is, rights against kinds of action wrong per se, which must therefore be always granted and never suspended, regardless of the circumstances, especially the consequences. Since the right against torture is the paradigm of an absolute right, that is the focus here. The chapter concludes that there are kinds of action that are absolutely wrong by definition, and one of these is (sadistic, domineering, humiliating) ‘torture’. Therefore, there is a natural moral duty never to perform such an action. However, since there are no natural moral rights at all, there is no natural right against this. Nonetheless, there are good moral reasons of prudence why there should always be an absolute legal right against ‘torture’, so defined as to encompass all instances of non-consensual pain infliction, even though rare cases of the latter might be morally permissible. There is, therefore, at least one absolute legal right.

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

Origin of Hepatic Nuclear Inclusion Bodies

1973 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 426-427
Author(s):  
F. G. Zaki ◽  
J. A. Greenlee ◽  
C. H. Keysser
Keyword(s):  
Inclusion Bodies ◽  
Storage Disease ◽  
Glycogen Storage ◽  
Nutritional Deficiencies ◽  
Nuclear Inclusion ◽  
Electron Microscopic ◽  
Human Liver Cells ◽  
Microscopic Studies ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Experimental Liver

Nuclear inclusion bodies seen in human liver cells may appear in light microscopy as deposits of fat or glycogen resulting from various diseases such as diabetes, hepatitis, cholestasis or glycogen storage disease. These deposits have been also encountered in experimental liver injury and in our animals subjected to nutritional deficiencies, drug intoxication and hepatocarcinogens. Sometimes these deposits fail to demonstrate the presence of fat or glycogen and show PAS negative reaction. Such deposits are considered as viral products.Electron microscopic studies of these nuclei revealed that such inclusion bodies were not products of the nucleus per se but were mere segments of endoplasmic reticulum trapped inside invaginating nuclei (Fig. 1-3).

The Eleventh Circuit Holds that Agreements in which Pharmaceutical Companies Pay Generic Companies Not to Compete May be Valid

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Patent Holder ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Us ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Appeals Court ◽  
Two Sides

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.

Fusion and Fission Processes in Exocytosis: Possible Roles for Synexin and Osmotic Lysis in the Two Events

1980 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 594-597
Author(s):  
H.B. Pollard ◽  
C.E. Creutz ◽  
C.J. Pazoles ◽  
J.H. Scott
Keyword(s):  
Small Molecules ◽  
Chromaffin Cells ◽  
Adrenal Glands ◽  
General Concept ◽  
Extracellular Calcium ◽  
Large Protein ◽  
Granule Membrane ◽  
Osmotic Lysis ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Chemical Evidence

Exocytosis is a general concept describing secretion of enzymes, hormones and transmitters that are otherwise sequestered in intracellular granules. Chemical evidence for this concept was first gathered from studies on chromaffin cells in perfused adrenal glands, in which it was found that granule contents, including both large protein and small molecules such as adrenaline and ATP, were released together while the granule membrane was retained in the cell. A number of exhaustive reviews of this early work have been published and are summarized in Reference 1. The critical experiments demonstrating the importance of extracellular calcium for exocytosis per se were also first performed in this system (2,3), further indicating the substantial service given by chromaffin cells to those interested in secretory phenomena over the years.

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