Theological determinism and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEAL JUDISCH
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
God's Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Per Se

AbstractI argue that the free-will defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz, that (1) God intentionally necessitates all human actions, and (2) no human has it within her power to influence causally God's will – is entailed by any version of theological determinism. Contrary to widespread opinion, therefore, the viability of the free-will defence does not depend upon the viability of libertarianism per se but on the falsity of theological determinism.

scholarly journals Getting off the Omnibus: Rejecting Free Will and Soul-Making Responses to the Problem of Evil

Open Theology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Brian C. Macallan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
John Hick ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Greater Good ◽  
The Dead ◽  
Powerful Process

AbstractThe nature of suffering and the problem of evil have been perennial issues for many of the world’s religious traditions. Each in their own way has sought to address this problem, whether driven by the all too present reality of suffering or from philosophical and religious curiosities. The Christian tradition has offered numerous and diverse responses to the problem of evil. The free-will response to the problem of evil, with its roots in Augustine, has dominated the landscape in its attempt to justify evil and suffering as a result of the greater good of having free will. John Hick offers a ‘soul-making’ response to the problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. Neither is effective in dealing with two key issues that underpin both responses – omnipotence and omniscience. In what follows I will contrast a process theological response to the problem of evil and suffering, and how it is better placed in dealing with both omnipotence and omniscience. By refashioning God as neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, process theodicy moves beyond the dead ends of both the free will and soul-making theodicy. Indeed, a process theodicy enables us to dismount the omnibus in search of a more holistic, and realistic, alternative to dealing with the problem of evil and suffering.

God’s Devils: Pragmatic Theodicy in Christian Responses to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s Conquest of Jerusalem in 1187

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-164
Author(s):  
Keagan Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Twelfth Century ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face

Abstract This paper considers Christian responses to the problem of evil following Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s conquest of Jerusalem. Among Catholics, Audita Tremendi offered the orthodox response that God was punishing Christian sin. However, the logical conclusion of this view is that the Muslims were agents of God despite being “evil” for having captured Jerusalem from Christians. Twelfth-century theologians believed that God could use demons in the service of good. In response to 1187, while many Christians portrayed the Muslims as evil, some expressed that they were divine agents. Meanwhile, others murmured that Muslim gods (including, to some, Muḥammad) were superior to Christian ones; that the Christian god was apathetic, violent, or wicked; that the crusade of 1189–92 was against God’s will; and that crusaders were murderers. Thought-terminating clichés centring on the divine mysteries permitted the continuance of Christianity in the face of this profound theodical controversy.

scholarly journals "Sufficient to Have Stood, Though Free to Fall": Free Will in John Milton's Paradise Lost

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Martineau
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
John Milton ◽  
Paradise Lost ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Garden Of Eden ◽  
Adam And Eve ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Book Of Genesis ◽  
The Way

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.

The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
Free Will Defense

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

A Defence of the Free Will Defence

1972 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen T. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.

scholarly journals The problem of evil and moral indifference

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-345
Author(s):  
TIM MAWSON
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
General Nature ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Qualities ◽  
Moral Indifference ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Libertarian Free Will

In this paper, I argue that if the libertarian free will defence were seen to fail because determinism were seen to be true, then another solution to the problem of evil would present itself. I start by arguing that one cannot, by consideration of agents' choices between morally indifferent options, reach any conclusion as to these agents' moral qualities. If certain forms of consequentialism were false, determinism true, and if there were a God who chose to create this universe, then His choice would have been between such options. Consideration of the general nature of the universe God putatively chose to create would not then license any conclusion as His moral qualities.

Religion and Hope

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-174
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Natural Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Chapter 7 defends the rationality of hope for humanity on both theistic and non-theistic grounds. Hope is appropriate when our interest lies in an unknown outcome due to factors completely beyond our control, as is the case if our future is rendered inevitable by theological determination or by the past and the laws of nature. Conceptions of divine providence, whether or not they endorse free will, are challenged by moral wrongdoing and natural evil that appear not to be justified by any good to which they contribute. Responses to the problem of evil, e.g. theodicies, are not decisive, but they allow for rational hope that a providential God exists. There is a related hope that is rational on either theistic or atheistic presuppositions, a counterpart of John Dewey’s “common faith,” a faith in the survival and progress of humanity embedded in a thriving natural environment.

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