scholarly journals The Passive Body and States of Nature: An Examination of the Methodological Role State of Nature Theory Plays in Williams and Nietzsche

Genealogy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Brian Lightbody

In his work Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams offers a very different interpretation of philosophical genealogy than that expounded in the secondary literature. The “Received View” of genealogy holds that it is “documentary grey”: it attempts to provide historically well-supported, coherent, but defeasible explanations for the actual transformation of practices, values, and emotions in history. However, paradoxically, the standard interpretation also holds another principle. Genealogies are nevertheless polemical because they admit that any evidence that would serve to justify a genealogical account is indexical to a perspective. In short, genealogies are not true per se. This view of genealogy leaves it vulnerable to three criticisms. I call these three: (1) the reflexive, (2) the substantive, and (3) the semantic. In contrast, Williams argues that all genealogies provide a functional account for the manifestation of something and further, that a State of Nature story subtends these accounts. The upshot of Williams’ approach is that it makes for strange philosophical bedfellows. For example, Nietzsche’s account for the rise of Christian morality shares methodological features with Hobbes’ functional explanation for the emergence of civilization and yet Nietzsche seems to take issue with genealogists who are hypothesis mongers gazing haphazardly into the blue. In the following article, I flesh out, more fully, how to make sense of Williams’ novel reclassification of genealogy. I show that Nietzsche’s genealogies are State of Nature stories and, just like Hobbes’ State of Nature story in chapter thirteen of Leviathan, are subtended by our collective corporeality. I then demonstrate how Nietzsche’s three stories in the Genealogy, when brought together, serve to undermine what Williams refers to as “… a new system (of reasons)—which very powerfully resists being understood in such terms …” Finally, I explain how my reconstruction of Williams’ interpretation of the genealogy immunizes it against the three criticisms noted above.

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 596-627
Author(s):  
Eric Bahel ◽  
Yves Sprumont

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEX TUCKNESS

The standard interpretation of Locke assumes symmetry between punishment by individuals in the state of nature and punishment by states in the state of nature. The standard interpretation is incorrect because in cases where the punishment is altruistic, the state is not the functional equivalent of a person, having a more restricted power to punish. The asymmetry arises from Locke's contractualism because individuals in the state of nature might reasonably refuse to give governments the power to punish altruistically. This interpretation clarifies some ongoing puzzles about Locke's theory of property where questions about coerced sacrifices to benefit others also arise. Locke's argument is vulnerable to important objections, specifically that he equivocates on the meaning of the word “body,” that he places too much emphasis on the right of self-preservation, and that he legitimates nearly unlimited appropriation by states.


1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Reeder

On Patterson Brown's analysis of the logic of Judeo-Christian morality, God's will is the criterion of what is right. The believer simply commits himself to or chooses God's will to the exclusion of all other criteria. Brown does not say that to obey God is a moral duty which always overrides other moral considerations. Nor does he say that God ‘transcends’ human morality either in the sense that he is the perfect exemplar of human standards or that the standard he exhibits and requires meets but also exceeds human standards. Nor does he say that God's will is to be obeyed over against morality per se. Rather, his view is that for the believer God's will is the standard of all moral judgments. For the believer, if and only if God commands something is it right. God ‘transcends’ human morality in the sense that his will need not accord with human standards.


2021 ◽  
pp. 270-289
Author(s):  
Michael Smith

The chapter assumes that the state of nature is the state of the world prior to the existence of social rules, and then goes on to argue for the following claims. (1) We have reasons for action in the state of nature. (2) In those state of nature worlds in which we all know what reasons for action we have and are motivated to act on them—for short, those worlds in which we are ideal—these reasons for action would support our exiting the state of nature, that is, our creating and maintaining certain social rules. (3) The social rules we have reasons to create would include social rules telling us what to do in both worlds in which we are ideal and nearby worlds in which we are non-ideal. (4) These need not be rules that we have any reason to abide by in the actual world in which we are non-ideal. (5) Thinking about the role of social rules in fixing what we have reason to do in those states of nature in which we are ideal and non-ideal suggests a complicated and novel story about what we have knowledge of, insofar as we have knowledge of what we have reason to do in the actual world in which social rules exist willy-nilly.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (Suppl. 1) ◽  
pp. 141-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt J. Engemann ◽  
Ronald R. Yager

We introduce comfort decision modeling for decision problems in which an alternative is to be selected based on a measure of satisfaction we refer to as comfort. We define comfort as the difference between the payoff received by selecting a particular strategy and the worst payoff that could have been received under the manifestation of the same state-of-nature. We define the effective comfort associated with an alternative as the aggregation of an alternative’s comforts across all possible states-of-nature. We study several methods of aggregating an alternative’s individual comforts across the different states-of-nature, incorporating various types of information about the uncertainty associated with the states-of-nature. We provide a Comfort Decision Model to determine the value of alternatives utilizing attitudinal measures of the decision maker. We demonstrate a process of performing sensitivity of the resulting decision to a measure of the attitude of the decision maker. Lastly, we use an illustration to show the practicability and cogency of the new method.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 342-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Luisetti

The article argues that environmental planetary discourses have coalesced into the Anthropocene crisis narrative and reformulated the state of nature apparatus of Western political theory. The Anthropocene, as an ecological state of nature of late capitalism, casts light on the logics of geopower, which assembles species thinking, a fascination with nonlife and sovereignty, and the imaginary of extinction and mutation. Geopower shifts governmental technologies from human populations and their ‘milieu’ to nonhuman species, energy flows and ecosystems, from political economy and biopower to Earth science and systems ecology. This configuration of power suggests a shift in the neoliberal agenda and imposes the Earth as a political personage, generating threatening political myths and figures of chaos and sovereignty, such as Gaia, Chthulu and Climate Leviathans.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 727-739
Author(s):  
Alan J. Kellner

From an analysis of Kant’s states of nature in each division of the Doctrine of Right—the state of nature in general and the international state of nature—this paper reinterprets Cosmopolitan Right and the duty to exit the state of nature as more colonial than previously recognized. Kant places “savages” in the state of nature, depicting them and their lawless condition as bellicose. As such, states may force them to exit the state of nature; those who encounter hostile peoples on foreign lands may be justified in aggressing. Having shown that colonial features of the Doctrine of Right cannot be wrested from the text, this paper unsettles the interpretive dominance of the established view that Kant is staunchly anti-colonial. Nevertheless, anti-colonial features of the text remain. The paper shows that interpreters must accept that Kant’s text is both colonial and anti-colonial. Kant’s global vision remained too statist to appropriately include indigenous politics. The paper closes by briefly indicating a path for future research whereby contemporary Kantian cosmopolitan projects become more attuned to—and modified in light of—the political agency and particular struggles of indigenous peoples.


Thesis Eleven ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 144 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Buğra Yasin

This paper reexamines Adorno’s conception of utopia within the context of his critique of the concept of progress. It contests the standard interpretation which conveys Adorno’s conception of utopia to be imbued with an essentially extra-historical idea of redemption. I argue, contrary to this view, that the motif of redemption surfacing in Adorno’s conception of utopia negates a specific type of historical life – life under which historical consciousness sinks into oblivion – rather than history per se. In order to reveal the historicality of Adorno’s conception of utopia, I examine his fragmentary yet consistent critique of the concept of progress, which, far from calling for total abandonment, aims to access and unearth its truth-content. Last but not least, I visit Adorno’s suggestion regarding the consonance of utopia with genuine progress, assessing its implications vis-à-vis a characteristic feature of mythological life, the ratio of self-preservation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-314
Author(s):  
Amirpasha Tavakkoli

Résumé: Influencé par la philosophie des Lumières et hostile à l’égard de la morale chrétienne, Sade envisage de déconstruire le discours philosophico-moral de son temps. Il s’intéresse à l’idée de l’état de nature sous un angle différent de celui des philosophes et des moralistes. En plaçant le Mal au centre de ses réflexions, l’objectif pour lui est de renverser le discours dominant de son temps en prenant l’inceste, le meurtre et les perversions comme étant les maximes conductrices de sa pensée. Malgré l’apparence immorale de ses écrits, Sade tombe dans un schéma moralisant reposant sur l’idéal du Mal qu’il adore. Agir et penser selon les commandements du Mal, deviennent les fondements de l’éthique sadienne. Une réflexion que nous allons approfondir à la lumière des réflexions de Klossowski, Bataille et Jacques Lacan.Mots-clés : mal; état de nature; loi; éthique; transgression.Abstract: Influenced by the philosophy of the Enlightment and hostile toward Christian morality, Sade endeavored to criticize the moral-philosophical discourse of his time, focusing on the idea of the state of nature in a radically different way from contemporary philosophers and moralists. By placing Evil at the center of his considerations, he aims to overturn the dominant discourse of his time by enlisting incest, murder, and perversions as the tenets guiding his thought. Despite the immoral appearance of his writings, Sade falls prey to a moralizing schema based on the ideal of Evil. Acting and thinking according to the commandments of Evil then becomes the fundaments of Sade’s ethics. The idea moving this paper is to deepen our understanding of this theory in light of reflections by Klossowski, Bataille, and Lacan.Keywords: Evil, state of nature, law, ethic, transgression.


Author(s):  
Mark Somos

The exact phrase, “state of nature,” was used thousands of times in the British colonies between 1630 and 1810, in juridical, theological, medical, political, economic, and other senses. From the plurality of meanings, a distinctive American state of nature discourse started to emerge by the 1760s. It combined existing European and American semantic ranges and sidelined others in moments of intense contestation, for instance during the 1765–66 Stamp Act crisis, and the 1774 First Continental Congress. In numerous laws and resolutions, forensic arguments, petitions, sermons, broadsides, books, pamphlets, letters, diaries, and college essays, the increasingly distinct and coherent American state of nature came to justify independence at least as much as colonial formulations of liberty, property, and individual rights did.


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