Divine Perfection, Axiology and the No Best World Defence

1993 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Elliot
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Traditional Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Divine Perfection ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
Being There ◽  
Other World ◽  
Range Of Values

Advocates of the traditional argument from evil assume that an omnipotent and morally perfect being, God, would create a world of the greatest value possible. They dispute that this world is such a world. It is difficult to disagree. They go on to conclude that this world could not have been created by God. It is, however, possible consistently both to agree that God could have guaranteed the existence of a better world than this world and to reject the conclusion that this world could not have been created by God. Specifically, one may argue that this world is not a world of the greatest value God could guarantee, not because there is some other world which is, but because there is no such world. After all, it is plausible that for any possible world, no matter how good, there is another possible world which is even better, that the range of values for possible worlds has no upper limit. If this is correct, then for any world God creates there is a better world God could have created. So the argument from evil collapses, since it is logically impossible even for an omnipotent god to create a particular world which is the best or equal best possible world. God cannot act in accordance with the prescription ‘Create the best world possible!’, since there is no such thing. Nor can God act in accordance with the prescription ‘Create the best world you can!’, since from the perspective of an omnipotent being there is no such thing. This no best world defence has been advanced by Peter Forrest, John McHarry and George Schlesinger.

Mere addition and the best of all possible worlds

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN GROVER
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Mere Addition ◽  
Mere Addition Paradox ◽  
Better Than

The quantitative argument against the notion of a best possible world claims that, no matter how many worthwhile lives a world contains, another world contains more and is, other things being equal, better. Parfit's ‘Mere Addition Paradox’ suggests that defenders of this argument must accept his ‘Repugnant Conclusion’: that outcomes containing billions upon billions of lives barely worth living are better than outcomes containing fewer lives of higher quality. Several responses to the Paradox are discussed and rejected as either inadequate or unavailable in a theistic context. The quantitative argument fails if some world is such that addition to it is not possible, i.e., if it is intensively infinite, as Liebniz claimed. If the notion of such a world is incoherent, then no world is quantitatively best and the quantitative argument succeeds, but only at the cost of embracing the Repugnant Conclusion.

scholarly journals Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas J. Kraay
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Infinite Hierarchy ◽  
Best Possible World

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.

scholarly journals Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas J. Kraay
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Infinite Hierarchy ◽  
Best Possible World

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.

scholarly journals Kant on the Existence and Uniqueness of the Best Possible World

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-215
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
Keyword(s):  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
Essay On Man ◽  
Better Than

In the 1750s Optimism, the Leibnizian doctrine that the actual world is the best possible world, popularized by Pope in 1733 in his Essay on Man, was a hot topic. In 1759 Kant wrote and published a brief essay defending Optimism, Attempt at some Reflections on Optimism. Kant’s aim in this essay is to establish that there is one and only one best possible world. In particular, he argues against the claim that, for every possible world, there is a possible world better than it and against the claim that there are two or more equally good possible worlds that are better than all the rest. Although it is not clear why, Kant was later dissatisfied with his essay. In this article I shall reconstruct, discuss, and evaluate Kant’s arguments. My evaluation will be negative, and so I think Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with his essay.

An International Collaborative Study to Investigate Standardisation of Hirudin Potency

1993 ◽  
Vol 69 (05) ◽  
pp. 430-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Longstaff ◽  
Man-Yu Wong ◽  
Patrick J Gaffney
Keyword(s):  
Specific Activity ◽  
Collaborative Study ◽  
Residual Activity ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Assay Procedure ◽  
Specific Activities ◽  
International Collaborative ◽  
Range Of Values ◽  
International Collaborative Study

SummaryAn international collaborative study has been carried out to investigate the reproducibility of hirudin assays in 13 laboratories using four recombinant hirudins and one natural, sulphated product. A simple assay procedure was proposed involving the titration of α-thrombin with inhibitor and measurement of residual activity using a chromogenic substrate. A standard α-thrombin preparation was supplied to ensure that this reagent was of uniform quality throughout the study. The method appeared to present no difficulties and laboratories reported similar potencies for the 5 hirudin samples, in line with expected values. This gave 200–222 Thrombin Inhibitory Units/ampoule (TIU/ampoule) of lyophilised hirudin, with geometric coefficient of variation (gcv) values ranging from 10.15–15.97%. This corresponds to specific activities of approximately 14,300–15,900 TIU/mg protein. This is close to the upper limit of previously reported values of specific activity. We conclude that the precision of this determination compared with the wider range of values in the literature (8,000–16,000 thrombin inhibitory units [TIU]/mg) results from the use of good quality standard α-thrombin by all laboratories. This study has important implications for hirudin standardisation.

Being There: The Spatiality of ‘Other World’ Fantasy Fiction

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-251
Author(s):  
Anthony Pavlik
Keyword(s):  
Young Adults ◽  
Real World ◽  
The Real ◽  
Fantasy Fiction ◽  
Children And Young Adults ◽  
Being There ◽  
Other World

Fantasy other worlds are often seen as alternative, wholly ‘other’ locations that operate as critiques of the ‘real’ world, or provide spaces where child protagonists can take advantage of the otherness they encounter in their own process of growth. Rather than consider fantasy fiction's presentations of ‘other’ worlds in this way, this article proposes reading them as potential thirdspaces of performance and activity that are neutral rather than confrontational such that, in fantasy other world fiction for children and young adults, the putative ‘other’ world may not, in fact, be ‘other’ at all.

Creating the Best Possible World: Some Problems from Parfit

Sophia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Possible World ◽  
Best Possible World

scholarly journals Mínimo e máximo em estruturas nominais – uma análise semântica

2019 ◽  
pp. 250-264
Author(s):  
Rui Marques
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Possible World

This paper is concerned with the semantics of the portuguese phrases with the form o mínimo/máximo N (‘the minimum N’) and o mínimo/máximo de N (‘the minimum/maximum of N’). Some nouns may occur in both of these constructions, while others might occur in only one of them, and still other nouns might occur only if accompanied by a modal operator. The proposal is made that these facts can be straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that the first and the second of these syntactic constructions have, respectively, an extensional and an intensional meaning, together with the fact that some nouns have the same denotation in any possible world, while others denote different sets of entities in different possible worlds.

scholarly journals Nonexistence, Vague Existence, Merely Possible Existence

Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (33) ◽  
pp. 427-443
Author(s):  
Iris Einheuser
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Target Object ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Vague Existence

Abstract This paper explores a new non-deflationary approach to the puzzle of nonexistence and its cousins. On this approach, we can, under a plausible assumption, express true de re propositions about certain objects that don’t exist, exist indeterminately or exist merely possibly. The defense involves two steps: First, to argue that if we can actually designate what individuates a nonexistent target object with respect to possible worlds in which that object does exist, then we can express a de re proposition about “it”. Second, to adapt the concept of outer truth with respect to a possible world – a concept familiar from actualist modal semantics – for use in representing the actual world.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
David Pearson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Musical Style ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Democratic Capitalism ◽  
Politics And Culture ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Inside Out

As the United States emerged triumphant from the Cold War and became the world’s sole superpower, the 1990s underground punk renaissance challenged the narrative that democratic capitalism was the best possible world. It did so by transforming punk musical style, politics, and culture to speak to new conditions and revolutionize the punk scene from the inside out. An outline of punk’s history and musical development, as well as an exposition of original methods of musical analysis for punk rhythms, riffs, timbres, and vocals, provide the necessary background for understanding 1990s punk.

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