The Problem of Evil and a Plausible Defence

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank J. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Good Action ◽  
Evil Action ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Creation

This paper argues that God may create and exist in any possible world, no matter how much suffering of any sort that world includes. It combines the traditional free will defence with the notion of an ‘occasion’ for good or evil action and limits God's responsibility to the creation of these occasions. Since no possible world contains occasions for more evil than good action, God is morally permitted to create any possible world. With regard to suffering that is not due to free will, namely the suffering of beings who are not moral agents, the paper questions the idea that the relief of such suffering is a moral perfection.

Are omnipotence and necessary moral perfection compatible? Reply to Mawson

2003 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
WES MORRISTON
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Active Power ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

In response to an earlier paper of mine, T. J. Mawson has argued that omnipotence is logically incompatible with wrong-doing, ‘whilst accepting that there is “a genuine, active power knowingly to choose evil” and thus leaving room for a free-will defence to the problem of evil’. Here, I attempt to show that Mawson is mistaken on both counts – that his argument for the incompatibility of omnipotence and wrong-doing is defective, and that the free-will defence cannot be sustained on the ground marked out by him. Given Mawson's understanding of power and freedom, I argue that it would be possible for God to create persons who are both free and unable to make evil choices.

scholarly journals Getting off the Omnibus: Rejecting Free Will and Soul-Making Responses to the Problem of Evil

Open Theology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Brian C. Macallan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
John Hick ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Greater Good ◽  
The Dead ◽  
Powerful Process

AbstractThe nature of suffering and the problem of evil have been perennial issues for many of the world’s religious traditions. Each in their own way has sought to address this problem, whether driven by the all too present reality of suffering or from philosophical and religious curiosities. The Christian tradition has offered numerous and diverse responses to the problem of evil. The free-will response to the problem of evil, with its roots in Augustine, has dominated the landscape in its attempt to justify evil and suffering as a result of the greater good of having free will. John Hick offers a ‘soul-making’ response to the problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. Neither is effective in dealing with two key issues that underpin both responses – omnipotence and omniscience. In what follows I will contrast a process theological response to the problem of evil and suffering, and how it is better placed in dealing with both omnipotence and omniscience. By refashioning God as neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, process theodicy moves beyond the dead ends of both the free will and soul-making theodicy. Indeed, a process theodicy enables us to dismount the omnibus in search of a more holistic, and realistic, alternative to dealing with the problem of evil and suffering.

scholarly journals "Sufficient to Have Stood, Though Free to Fall": Free Will in John Milton's Paradise Lost

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Martineau
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
John Milton ◽  
Paradise Lost ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Garden Of Eden ◽  
Adam And Eve ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Book Of Genesis ◽  
The Way

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.

The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
Free Will Defense

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

A Defence of the Free Will Defence

1972 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen T. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.

scholarly journals The problem of evil and moral indifference

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-345
Author(s):  
TIM MAWSON
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
General Nature ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Qualities ◽  
Moral Indifference ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Libertarian Free Will

In this paper, I argue that if the libertarian free will defence were seen to fail because determinism were seen to be true, then another solution to the problem of evil would present itself. I start by arguing that one cannot, by consideration of agents' choices between morally indifferent options, reach any conclusion as to these agents' moral qualities. If certain forms of consequentialism were false, determinism true, and if there were a God who chose to create this universe, then His choice would have been between such options. Consideration of the general nature of the universe God putatively chose to create would not then license any conclusion as His moral qualities.

scholarly journals Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikk Effingham
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Good Cause

The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different propositions must always be true at distinct worlds. The Multiactualities Response nevertheless has its own problem, namely that it requires the possibility of multiple actual worlds. This paper argues that if we consider spacetimes with wormholes, we have good cause to think there can be multiple metaphysically privileged present moments; given a suitable analogy between time and modality, it follows that there can be multiple metaphysically privileged (i.e. actual) worlds. This paper includes an in–depth examination of the metaphysics of both the temporal and modal cases.

Religion and Hope

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-174
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Natural Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Chapter 7 defends the rationality of hope for humanity on both theistic and non-theistic grounds. Hope is appropriate when our interest lies in an unknown outcome due to factors completely beyond our control, as is the case if our future is rendered inevitable by theological determination or by the past and the laws of nature. Conceptions of divine providence, whether or not they endorse free will, are challenged by moral wrongdoing and natural evil that appear not to be justified by any good to which they contribute. Responses to the problem of evil, e.g. theodicies, are not decisive, but they allow for rational hope that a providential God exists. There is a related hope that is rational on either theistic or atheistic presuppositions, a counterpart of John Dewey’s “common faith,” a faith in the survival and progress of humanity embedded in a thriving natural environment.

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