Cognitive science of religion and theism: how can they be compatible?

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEO NÄREAHO
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
World View ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
The World ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractIn this article, I examine the compatibility thesis, according to which the assumptions and results of cognitive (and other bio-psychological) theories of religion are compatible with the theistic world-view. In particular, I analyse the conception of world-view neutrality concerning scientific theories of religion. I also investigate the nature of pro-theistic argumentation; one aspect of this is the role that various forms of naturalism have in theistic compatibility claims. I point out that the version of theism guiding the argumentation of the proponents of the compatibility thesis is seldom explicated. A commitment to classical theism is problematic because of the ultimate metaphysical separation of God and the world. Instead, I support the compatibility view with a notion of God construed as the structuring cause of the world.

The cognitive science of religion and theism again: a reply to Leo Näreaho

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID LEECH ◽  
AKU VISALA
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
World View ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn this article we respond to Leo Näreaho's critique of our position on the relationship of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and theism, arguing that he misrepresents our position and assimilates our views to ones we do not in fact hold. The central issue we address has to do with how Näreaho construes what he takes to be our commitment to a ‘world-view neutrality’ thesis regarding the ‘assumptions and results’ of the new bio-psychological theories of religion (in the case at hand, CSR). We suggest that Näreaho has misconstrued us on what the neutrality thesis actually is and what follows from it. We conclude that his own proposal for compatibility is not an alternative to ours but rather one permissible metaphysical reading of CSR among others.

scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

Theory and Criticism: The Cognitive Science of Religion

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 330-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benson Saler
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Evolutionary Theories ◽  
Theory And Criticism ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Great Complexity

AbstractAfter describing what the author regards as important and commendable characteristics of the current cognitive science of religion, the author contends that future theorizing ought to take account of mounting criticisms of cognitive-evolutionary theories of religion. That is especially so when criticism recognizes the great complexity of what we conventionally mean by the term “religion” and when it suggests that monochromatic theorizing is likely to prove inadequate for explaining the existence of polychromatic phenomena. Indeed, monochromatic perspectives tend to confine or impoverish our understandings of religion. Future theorizing about religion should aim for theories that better reflect the complexity of the phenomena that they purport to explain. One possibility, based on an analogy to epigenetic theorizing, is described by way of providing an example.

scholarly journals Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism: A Synthesis

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Tyler Dalton McNabb ◽  
Michael DeVito
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Christian Doctrine ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
General Revelation ◽  
Science Of Religion

Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation.

The Faith Frame: Or, Belief is Easy, Faith is Hard

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Luhrmann
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
The World ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Attitudes ◽  
The Way ◽  
The Invisible

This paper argues for thinking about religious commitments as different in kind from everyday ordinary understandings of the world. It argues against the straightforward assertion from the cognitive science of religion that belief in the supernatural is easy. That is, there is a way in which intuitions of invisible presence come very easily to people. Yet to sustain that belief commitment is hard, especially when the invisible other is omnipotent and benevolent. Here I suggest that it makes more sense to understand faith commitments as a kind of frame that coexists with everyday commitments. The approach shares much with Neil van Leeuwen’s understanding of religious commitments and factual commitments as being held with different kinds of cognitive attitudes. Here I suggest that people engage the faith frame the way engage play and fiction—except that in the case of faith, the commitment is a serious claim about the world.

Did a Little Birdie Really Tell Odin? Applying Theory of Mind to Old Norse Religion

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 280-308
Author(s):  
Declan Taggart
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Old Norse ◽  
Viking Age ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Theory ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa.

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