scholarly journals Religious Belief is Not Natural. Why Cognitive Science of Religion Does Not Show That Religious Belief is Trustworthy

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
World Religions ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Afterlife Beliefs

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Walter Scott Stepanenko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Argumentative Strategies ◽  
Science Of Religion

Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that these recent debunking efforts are very much motivated by methodological commitments that are shared with canonical research. I contend that these argumentative strategies put debunkers very much on an epistemic par with religious apologists: both advocate responses to the cognitive science of religion that are primarily motivated by methodological commitments.

Born idolaters: The limits of the philosophical implications of the cognitive science of religion

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Jong ◽  
Christopher Kavanagh ◽  
Aku Visala
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Cognitive Constraints ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Work Done

SummaryIn recent years, theoretical and empirical work done under the rubric of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have led many to conclude that religion (or, at least, some aspects thereof) is “natural”. By this, it is meant that human beings are predisposed to believe in supernatural agents, and that their beliefs about these agents are constrained in various ways. The details about how and why these predispositions and cognitive constraints developed and evolved are still largely unknown, though there is enough of a theoretical consensus in CSR for philosophers to have begun reflecting on the implications of CSR for religious belief. In particular, much philosophical work has been done on the implications of CSR for theism, on both sides of the debate. On one hand, CSR might contribute to defeating particular arguments for theism, or indeed theism altogether; on the other hand, CSR might provide support for specific theological views. In this paper, we argue that the CSR is largely irrelevant for

scholarly journals Mentalizing Mistakes: Distinguishing Mentalizing Ability from Bias in God Beliefs

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
LeRon Shults
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Conceptual Confusion ◽  
By Products

The claim that religions are by-products of evolutionary adaptations has been at the center of the cognitive science of religion since its inception nearly three decades ago. It has been argued that religious beliefs are manifestations of evolved hyperactive agent detection and other mentalizing biases, whose development required pan-human mentalizing abilities. Much of the current research on the cognitive underpinnings of religiosity seems to rest on the assumption that not only mentalizing biases but also mentalizing abilities give rise to god beliefs in the minds of contemporary individuals. However, this presupposes that the higher capacity an individual has for mentalizing the more likely he or she is to make mentalizing mistakes. We illustrate the conceptual confusion that results from this way of framing the discussion and point to empirical evidence that challenges this notion.

Locating the causes of religious commitment

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 752-753
Author(s):  
Harvey Whitehouse
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Commitment ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Broad Agreement ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Science Of Religion

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) survey a substantial body of theory and evidence on which there is broad agreement in the cognitive science of religion. Some parts of their argument (for instance, concerning the causes of costly commitment to religious beliefs) are more speculative and remain a focus of lively debate and further research.

The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin L. Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Proper Function ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Proper Functioning ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Science Of Religion

Plantinga’s suggested argument for God from positive epistemic status takes as its starting point that many of our beliefs have positive epistemic status and that such positive status is best thought of as derived from our belief-forming faculties functioning properly in an appropriate environment. Plantinga suggests that this proper function is best understood in terms of a designer having engineered these faculties for particular purposes, the best candidate for this designer being God. A ready objection is that the needed “proper” functioning could be derived from evolution and, so, God is not obviously the best candidate for being the “designer.” This essay evaluates versions of this objection in reference to recent scientific research from cognitive developmental psychology and cognitive science of religion.

scholarly journals The cognitive biases of human mind in accepting and transmitting religious and theological beliefs: An analysis based on the cognitive science of religion

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sayyed M. Biabanaki
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is an emerging field of cognitive science that gathers insights from different disciplines to explain how humans acquire and transmit religious beliefs. For the CSR scholars, the human mental tools have specific biases that make them susceptible to acceptance and transmission of religious beliefs. This article examines the characteristics of these biases and how they work, and shows that although our innate cognitive tendencies make our minds generally receptive to religion, they do not explain the emergence and endurance of specific religious beliefs in a particular culture. We will also show that although advocates of CSR study religion as a ‘natural’ phenomenon, and seek to discover the natural causes of the formation, acceptance, transmission and prevalence of religious beliefs, their efforts do not lead to decrease the validity of religious beliefs and rejection of ‘non-natural’ explanations of religious beliefs.

Darwin's Doubt, Non-deterministic Darwinism and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-483
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Charles Darwin ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Science Of Religion

AbstractAlvin Plantinga, echoing a worry of Charles Darwin which he calls ‘Darwin's doubt’, argues that given Darwinian evolutionary theory our beliefs are unreliable, since they are determined to be what they are by evolutionary pressures and could have had no other content. This papers surveys in turn deterministic and non-deterministic interpretations of Darwinism, and concludes that Plantinga's argument poses a problem for the former alone and not for the latter. Some parallel problems arise for the Cognitive Science of Religion, and in particular for the hypothesis that many of our beliefs, including religious beliefs, are due to a Hypersensitive Agency-Detection Device, at least if this hypothesis is held in a deterministic form. In a non-deterministic form, however, its operation need not cast doubt on the rationality or reliability of the relevant beliefs.

Theory and Criticism: The Cognitive Science of Religion

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 330-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benson Saler
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Evolutionary Theories ◽  
Theory And Criticism ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Great Complexity

AbstractAfter describing what the author regards as important and commendable characteristics of the current cognitive science of religion, the author contends that future theorizing ought to take account of mounting criticisms of cognitive-evolutionary theories of religion. That is especially so when criticism recognizes the great complexity of what we conventionally mean by the term “religion” and when it suggests that monochromatic theorizing is likely to prove inadequate for explaining the existence of polychromatic phenomena. Indeed, monochromatic perspectives tend to confine or impoverish our understandings of religion. Future theorizing about religion should aim for theories that better reflect the complexity of the phenomena that they purport to explain. One possibility, based on an analogy to epigenetic theorizing, is described by way of providing an example.

scholarly journals Reliability and Adaptability of Religious Beliefs in the Light of Cognitive Science of Religion

Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 64-73
Author(s):  
Konrad Szocik
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Evolutionary Study ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Cognitive Explanation

Abstract Cognitive approach towards the study of religion is a good and promising way. However, I think that this approach is too narrow and it would be better to use some basic concepts of CSR as a starting point for further, not cognitive explanation of religious. I suppose that religious beliefs should be explained also by their pragmatic functions because they were probably always associated with some pragmatic purposes at the group or at the individual levels. To develop further this last approach, the good explanatory way is the evolutionary study of religion.

The cognitive science of religion and theism again: a reply to Leo Näreaho

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID LEECH ◽  
AKU VISALA
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
World View ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn this article we respond to Leo Näreaho's critique of our position on the relationship of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and theism, arguing that he misrepresents our position and assimilates our views to ones we do not in fact hold. The central issue we address has to do with how Näreaho construes what he takes to be our commitment to a ‘world-view neutrality’ thesis regarding the ‘assumptions and results’ of the new bio-psychological theories of religion (in the case at hand, CSR). We suggest that Näreaho has misconstrued us on what the neutrality thesis actually is and what follows from it. We conclude that his own proposal for compatibility is not an alternative to ours but rather one permissible metaphysical reading of CSR among others.

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