Plantingian theism and the free-will defence

AbstractI advance a challenge to the coherence of Alvin Plantinga's brand of theism that focuses on Plantinga's celebrated free-will defence. This challenge draws on (but goes beyond) some ideas advanced by Wes Morriston. The central claim of my challenge is that Plantinga's free-will defence, together with certain claims that are plausible and/or to which Plantinga is committed, both requires and rules out the claim that it is possible that God is capable of engaging in moral goodness. I then critically evaluate an interesting strategy for responding to my challenge inspired by some recent work by Kevin Timpe, arguing that the response ultimately fails. The upshot of the article is that Plantinga's brand of theism is internally inconsistent; furthermore, because the claims that are in tension with the free-will defence are ones that many theists are likely to find attractive, many theists are not able to appeal to Plantinga's free-will defence in responding to the logical problem of evil.

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Plantinga's version of the free-will argument: the good and evil that free beings do

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412509990230 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 46 (1) ◽

pp. 21-39 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

KENNETH EINAR HIMMA

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Problem Of Evil ◽

Christian Ethics ◽

Moral Reasons ◽

Moral Good ◽

Logical Problem ◽

The World ◽

Evidential Problem Of Evil ◽

Good And Evil

AbstractAccording to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world.

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Getting off the Omnibus: Rejecting Free Will and Soul-Making Responses to the Problem of Evil

Open Theology ◽

10.1515/opth-2020-0005 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 6 (1) ◽

pp. 35-42

Author(s):

Brian C. Macallan

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Problem Of Evil ◽

Christian Tradition ◽

John Hick ◽

Religious Traditions ◽

The Problem Of Evil ◽

Key Issues ◽

Greater Good ◽

The Dead ◽

Powerful Process

AbstractThe nature of suffering and the problem of evil have been perennial issues for many of the world’s religious traditions. Each in their own way has sought to address this problem, whether driven by the all too present reality of suffering or from philosophical and religious curiosities. The Christian tradition has offered numerous and diverse responses to the problem of evil. The free-will response to the problem of evil, with its roots in Augustine, has dominated the landscape in its attempt to justify evil and suffering as a result of the greater good of having free will. John Hick offers a ‘soul-making’ response to the problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. Neither is effective in dealing with two key issues that underpin both responses – omnipotence and omniscience. In what follows I will contrast a process theological response to the problem of evil and suffering, and how it is better placed in dealing with both omnipotence and omniscience. By refashioning God as neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, process theodicy moves beyond the dead ends of both the free will and soul-making theodicy. Indeed, a process theodicy enables us to dismount the omnibus in search of a more holistic, and realistic, alternative to dealing with the problem of evil and suffering.

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God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

Religions ◽

10.3390/rel12040266 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (4) ◽

pp. 266

Author(s):

Cheryl K. Chen

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Actual World ◽

David Lewis ◽

Moral Good ◽

Moral Goodness ◽

Divine Intervention ◽

Horrendous Evil ◽

Good And Evil ◽

Free Will Defense ◽

Better Than

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.

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Ideal and nonideal moral theory for disaster bioethics

Human Affairs ◽

10.1515/humaff-2016-0002 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 26 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Dónal O’Mathúna

Keyword(s):

Recent Work ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Ethical Dilemmas ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Moral Goodness ◽

The Right ◽

Practical Implications

AbstractMoral theory has generally focused on resolving ethical dilemmas by identifying ethically sound options. Whether the focus is on consequences, duties, principles or virtues, ethical cases are often approached in ways that assume morally sound solutions can be found and followed. Such ‘ideal morality’ assumes that moral goodness is always possible, leaving people confident they have done the right thing. Such an approach becomes inadequate in disaster settings where any good solution is often difficult to see. This paper examines recent work on nonideal moral theory as a useful model for disaster bioethics. This approach views moral dilemmas as situations where no choice is ideal and every option involves some element of unavoidable wrongdoing. Rather than straining for ideal answers, this approach acknowledges that sometimes the lesser of two evils is the best that can be done. Such situations inevitably lead to feelings of regret or guilt, commonly encountered in discussions of disaster bioethics. This paper explores the practical implications of nonideal approaches for disaster responders working in tragic situations.

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Doing Theology in the Context of the Gift and the Promise of Nostra Aetate

Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations ◽

10.6017/scjr.v6i1.1581 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 6 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Terrence W. Tilley

Keyword(s):

Problem Of Evil ◽

Interreligious Dialogue ◽

Christian Theology ◽

Logical Problem ◽

The Gift ◽

The Way

This article addresses three problems and suggests ways to address these problems. First, Christian theology has often been supersessionist, especially in Christology and Mariology. Claims about Jesus and Mary being exceptional (in different ways) often involve forms of supersessionism. I report on two theological works that attempt to be orthodoxly Catholic and to avoid supersessionism. Second, I address the conflict between affirming the irrevocable covenant God made with Israel and the universality of salvation God wrought in Jesus. I argue herein that the key problem is logical, not theological. Hence, we should not seek to resolve this problem theoretically, but to dissolve it logically in a manner analogous to the way philosophers of religion have dissolved the logical problem of evil. Third, some have suggested that a commitment to true interreligious dialogue should weaken our commitment to our own tradition. I disagree and show that interreligious dialogue can, in practice, strengthen, not weaken, our commitments to our home tradition.

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"Sufficient to Have Stood, Though Free to Fall": Free Will in John Milton's Paradise Lost

10.28971/142020md103 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

David Martineau

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Human Nature ◽

John Milton ◽

Paradise Lost ◽

Problem Of Evil ◽

Garden Of Eden ◽

Adam And Eve ◽

The Problem Of Evil ◽

Book Of Genesis ◽

The Way

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.

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God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will

10.1093/oso/9780197556412.001.0001 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Laura W. Ekstrom

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Religious Life ◽

Human Beings ◽

Skeptical Theism ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Moral Goodness ◽

The Problem Of Evil ◽

Argument From Evil ◽

Close Investigation ◽

Traditional Doctrine

This book focuses on arguments from suffering against the existence of God and on a variety of issues concerning agency and value that they bring out. The central aim is to show the extent and power of arguments from evil. The book provides a close investigation of an under-defended claim at the heart of the major free-will-based responses to such arguments, namely that free will is sufficiently valuable to serve as the good, or to serve prominently among the goods, that provides a God-justifying reason for permitting evil in our world. Offering a fresh examination of traditional theodicies, it also develops an alternative line the author calls a divine intimacy theodicy. It makes an extended case for rejection of the position of skeptical theism. The book expands upon an argument from evil concerning a traditional doctrine of hell, which reveals a number of interesting issues concerning fault, agency, and blameworthiness. In response to recent work contending that the problem of evil is defanged since God’s baseline attitude toward human beings is indifference, the book defends the essential perfect moral goodness of God. Finally it takes up the question of whether or not it makes sense to live a religious life as an agnostic or as an atheist.

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The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica ◽

10.1515/mp-2021-0022 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 0 (0) ◽

Author(s):

Mark Maller

Keyword(s):

Modal Logic ◽

Free Will ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Problem Of Evil ◽

Freedom Of Will ◽

The Problem Of Evil ◽

Possible Worlds Theory ◽

Free Will Defense

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

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