Congress, the Constitution, and First Use of Nuclear Weapons

1986 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 424-455
Author(s):  
Arthur S. Miller ◽  
H. Bart Cox
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Ultimate Responsibility ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Council Of State

This article analyzes the constitutional problems involved in “first use” of nuclear weapons. Its organizing principle is that Congress has a constitutional duty to ensure such control over nuclear weapons that first use (and first strike) is proscribed. After demonstrating that the Constitution requires collective decision-making in important policy decisions, it is recommended that Congress retrieve its delegated power over nuclear weaponry, and also establish a “council of state” within the office of the presidency with which the president must consult before taking important decisions, including those involving nuclear warfare. The council would take a sober “first look” at proposed policies, but the ultimate responsibility would be the president's.

Congress, The Constitution, and First Use of Nuclear Weapons

1986 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-245
Author(s):  
Arthur S. Miller ◽  
H. Bart Cox
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Ultimate Responsibility ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Council Of State

This article analyzes the constitutional problems of “first use” of nuclear weapons. Its organizing principle is that Congress has a constitutional duty to ensure such control over nuclear weapons that first use (and first strike) is proscribed. After demonstrating that the Constitution requires collective decisionmaking in important policy decisions, it is recommended that Congress retrieve its delegated power over nuclear weaponry, and also establish a “council of state” within the office of the presidency with which the president must consult before taking important decisions, including those involving nuclear warfare. The council would take a sober “first look” at proposed policies, but the ultimate responsibility would be the president's.

Islands of Stability: Engaging Emergence from Cellular Automata to the Occupy Movement

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Occupy Movement ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "

Corruption and Anticorruption in Democratic Athens

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Participatory Democracy ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Alexander The Great ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Individual Judgment ◽  
Collective Judgment ◽  
Hidden Knowledge

The chapter examines a major corruption scandal that involved the Athenian orator Demosthenes and an official of Alexander the Great. This episode reveals how tensions between individual and collective decision-making practices shaped Athenian understandings of corruption and anticorruption. The various and multiple anticorruption measures of Athens sought to bring ‘hidden’ knowledge into the open and thereby remove information from the realm of individual judgment, placing it instead into the realm of collective judgment. The Athenian experience therefore suggests that participatory democracy, and a civic culture that fosters political equality rather than reliance on individual expertise, provides a key bulwark against corruption.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document